Integration of analysis techniques in security and fault-tolerance by Lenzini, Gabriele
INTEGRATION OF ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
IN SECURITY AND FAULT-TOLERANCE
Gabriele Lenzini

Members of the dissertation committee:
prof. dr. P. H. Hartel University of Twente, Enschede (promotor)
prof. dr. H. Brinksma University of Twente, Enschede (promotor)
dr. S. Etalle University of Twente, Enschede (assistant promotor)
dott. S. Gnesi Istituto di Scienza e Tecnologie dell’Informazione CNR, Pisa, Italy
prof. dr. R. J. Wieringa University of Twente, Enschede
prof. dr. W. J. Fokkink Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam, Amsterdam
prof. dr. J.-F. Raskin Universite´ Libre de Brussels, Brussels, Belgium
Distributed and Embedded Systems research group, Department
of Computer Science and the Centre for Telematics and Infor-
mation Technology, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The
Netherlands.
This thesis in included in the Centre for Telematics and Infor-
mation Technology (CTIT) Ph.D. Series, University of Twente,
Enschede, The Netherlands
The work in this thesis has been carried out under the auspices
of the research school IPA (Institute for Programming research
and Algorithmics), Eindhoven University of Technology, De-
partment of Mathematics and Computing Science, Eindhoven,
The Netherlands.
This research is partially supported by PAW: Privacy in an Am-
bient World a TUD/DIES/KUN/TNO-EIB/TNO-FEL collabo-
ration, funded by IOP GenCom under project nr. IGC03001.
This research is partially supported by Istituto di Informatica e
Telematica (IIT-CNR) Area della Ricerca CNR, Via G. Moruzzi,
1 – 56124 Pisa (ITALY)
This research is partially supported by the Istituto di Scienza
e Tecnologie dell’Informazione (ISTI-CNR) Area della Ricerca
CNR, Via G. Moruzzi, 1 – 56124 Pisa (ITALY)
This thesis was edited with Vim and typeset with LATEX.
Keywords: formal methods, security protocol analysis, fault-tolerance, formal models
c© G. Lenzini, Enschede, The Netherlands
All rights are reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by
any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or by
any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the author.
Printed by Ipskamp PrintPartners, Enschede, The Netherlands
CTIT Ph. D. Thesis Series Number: 05-70 — ISSN 1381-3617
IPA Dissertation Series Number: 2005-07
ISBN 90-365-2200-5
INTEGRATION OF ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
IN SECURITY AND FAULT-TOLERANCE
DISSERTATION
to obtain the doctor’s degree at the University of Twente,
on the authority of the rector magnificus,
prof. dr. W. H. M. Zijm,
on account of the decision of the graduation committee,
to be publicly defended
on Thursday, 30th June 2005, at 16.45
by
Gabriele Lenzini
born on 24 August 1968
in Livorno, Italy
This dissertation is approved by:
Prof. Dr. Pieter H. Hartel (promotor)
Prof. Dr. Ed Brinksma (promotor)
Dr. Sandro Etalle (assistant promotor)
To my beloved parents, Rosanna and Umberto,
to my dear “little” sister Ilaria.
In memory of my grandmother “nonna” Gina.

Abstract
In the last decade security related problems have attracted the attention of many researchers from
different areas, especially from the formal methods field. The massive research that grows up
around a new field is usually guided by the techniques and experiences specific to who is facing
the problem. This happened, for example, in cryptographic protocol analysis.
Once the surge of interest around a specific problem subsides, it is time to look for an inte-
gration among the different proposed approaches. In our opinion the quest for integration has a
doubly beneficial effect. Firstly, it allows to reuse knowledge, experiences and tools from different
areas of research in computer science. Secondly, it allows to understand the intrinsic difficulties
standing at the basis of a certain problem, independently of the formal approach initially used
to face it. For example, security properties like secrecy and authenticity are nowadays consid-
ered equally difficult to prove; this similarity was not clear at the beginning, when the different
formalizations for secrecy and authenticity seemed not to be directly comparable.
This thesis focuses on the study of integration of formal methodologies in security protocol
analysis and fault-tolerance analysis. The research is developed in two different directions: in-
terdisciplinary and intra-disciplinary. In the former, we look for a beneficial interaction between
strategies of analysis in security protocols and fault-tolerance; in the latter, we search for con-
nections among different approaches of analysis within the security area. In the following we
summarize the main results of the research.
Interdisciplinary Perspective. In this perspective, we recognize in Model Checking [48], in
Partial Model Checking [16], and in Non Interference Analysis [101] those methodologies that
can be applied profitably in security protocol analysis and fault-tolerance analysis. This division
of research is articulated in the following objectives:
√ Objective 1 To show how model checking can be applied to the validation of both security
protocols and fault-tolerant systems.
Model Checking has been widely used to validate fault-tolerant, safety-critical, systems. We
report on an industrial experience of validation in this field. Through another industrial experience
of validation of an authentication protocol we show that model checking is a valid strategy for
the analysis of security protocols as well. When studying model checking for security protocol
analysis, we also develop an original logic-based, on-the-fly, model checker for the analysis of
security cryptographic protocols.
√
Objective 2 To show how a precise specification framework allows security protocol engi-
neering and fault-tolerance engineering to share common strategies and tools of analysis. The
framework requires the neat separation of the system model from its malicious environment.
The specification framework is proposed and discussed prevalently in the framework of the
CCS [158] process algebra. The common analysis strategies we identify originate in partial model
checking and non interference analysis. Such strategies have been proposed and studied preva-
lently in the verification of security protocols, and they have made it possible to analyze the
behavior of a protocol acting in an open, malicious, environment. By partial model checking,
the problem of checking a security property, expressed as a µ-calculus logic formula over a CCS
protocol model, can be reduced to a validation problem in the µ-calculus. By a non interference
approach, many security properties can be formalized and checked by existing tools.
When applying partial model checking to fault-tolerance we identify a subset of the µ-calculus,
whose validation problem can be solved in time linear in the size of the formula. We provide
examples of safety and liveness properties that can be expressed in the sub-calculus identified.
When applying non interference ideas we show how fault-tolerance can be reformulated in the
context of the Generalized Non Deducibility on Composition (GNDC) scheme of analysis; we
show also how GNDC analysis strategies and existing tools can be used in fault-tolerance.
Intra-disciplinary Perspective. In this outlook we relate the use of different formal models in
security. The formal models we consider are: process algebra, automata, and multiset rewriting.
The division of our study, conducted in a scenario of analysis of security protocols, is organized
in the following objectives:
√
Objective 3 To relate two famous formalisms used in the analysis of security, process algebras
and multiset rewriting, in the framework of cryptographic and authentication protocol analysis.
Actually, with “process algebra” we denote a family of calculi which have been proposed
for describing features of distributed and concurrent systems. Here, “multiset rewriting”, which
has roots in concurrency theory and rewriting logic, denotes a language used to study fundamental
issues in authentication protocols. We define special encodings between the two formalisms which
preserve a bisimulation-like equivalence, and consequently secrecy and authentication properties.
√ Objective 4 To redefine the GNDC theory in terms of Team Automata.
Automata-based formalisms have been widely used in the analysis of fault-tolerant systems.
Recently, Team Automata have been proposed to specify computer supported cooperative work
and concurrent systems, but they still miss an analysis framework. By proposing a GNDC theory
in terms of Team Automata, we allow the migration of some of the theory for security analysis
from process algebra to the automata world. We show how to apply our framework to study an
integrity property over a multicast cryptographic protocol.
Samenvatting
Problemen gerelateerd aan veiligheid (security) hebben in het afgelopen decennium de aandacht
gekregen van vele onderzoekers uit verschillende gebieden, in het bijzonder uit de formele meth-
oden. De hoeveelheid onderzoek die tot stand komt rondom een nieuw gebied wordt meestal
gestuurd door de specifieke technieken en ervaringen van de persoon die het probleem aanpakt.
Zodra den verhoogde interesse rondom een specifiek probleem afneemt, is het tijd om op zoek
te gaan naar integratie van de verschillende invalshoeken die zijn voorgesteld. Wij zijn van mening
dat de zoektocht naar integratie een dubbel voordelig effect heeft. Ten eerste staat de integratie
het hergebruik van kennis, ervaringen en gereedschappen uit verschillende onderzoeksgebieden
binnen de informatica toe. Ten tweede helpt de integratie de intrinsieke moeilijkheden te be-
grijpen die aan de basis staan van een zeker probleem. Zo worden de veiligheidseigenschappen
secrecy en authenticity bijvoorbeeld tegenwoordig beschouwd als even moeilijk te bewijzen; deze
gelijkheid was oorspronkelijk niet zo duidelijk, toen de verschillende formalisaties voor secrecy
en authenticity niet direct vergelijkbaar leken.
De nadruk in dit proefschrift ligt op het bestuderen van de integratie van formele methodolo-
giee¨n binnen fault tolerance en security protocol analysis. Het onderzoek vindt in twee verschil-
lende richtingen plaats: interdisciplinair en intradisciplinair. In de eerstgenoemde richting zoeken
we naar een voordelige interactie tussen analysestrategiee¨n in fault tolerance en in veiligheid;
in de laatstgenoemde richting zoeken we naar connecties tussen de verschillende manieren van
analyse binnen het gebied van veiligheid. In wat volgt vatten we de belangrijkste uitkomsten van
dit onderzoek samen.
Interdisciplinair Perspectief. In dit perspectief herkennen we in Model Checking [48], in Par-
tial Model Checking [16] en in Non-Interference Analysis [101] de methodologiee¨n die op een
voordelige manier kunnen worden toegepast in fault tolerance en security protocol analysis. Deze
verdeling van onderzoek komt in de volgende doelstellingen naar voren:
√
Doelstelling 1 Laten zien hoe model checking kan worden toegepast om zowel fault tolerant
systemen als veiligheidsprotocollen te valideren.
Model checking wordt vaak gebruikt om fault-tolerant, safety-critical systemen te valideren.
Wij rapporteren over een industrie¨le ervaring met validatie in dit onderzoeksveld. Middels een an-
dere industrie¨le ervaring met validatie van een authenticatieprotocol laten we zien dat ook model
checking een valide strategie is voor het analyseren van complexe authenticatieprotocollen. Terwijl
we model checking voor security protocol analysis bestuderen, ontwikkelen we ook een originele,
6op logica gebaseerde, on-the-fly model checker voor de analyse van cryptografische veiligheid-
sprotocollen.
√
Doelstelling 2 Laten zien hoe een precies specificatiekader fault tolerance en security proto-
col engineering toestaat om gemeenschappelijke strategiee¨n en gereedschappen voor analyse te
delen. Het kader vereist een duidelijke afscheiding tussen het systeemmodel en haar boosaardige
omgeving.
Het specificatiekader wordt voornamelijk binnen de context van de procesalgebra CCS [158]
voorgesteld en bediscussieerd. De gemeenschappelijke analysestrategiee¨n die wij identificeren,
stammen uit Partial Model Checking en Non-Interference analysis. Zulke strategiee¨n zijn voor-
namelijk voor de verificatie van veiligheidsprotocollen voorgesteld en bestudeerd; zij maken het
bijvoorbeeld mogelijk om het gedrag van een protocol te analyseren dat in een open, boosaardige
omgeving handelt. Door middel van partial model checking kan het probleem om een velighei-
dsprotocol, uitgedrukt in de µ-calculus als een logische formule over een CCS protocolmodel,
te verifie¨ren, gereduceerd worden tot een validatieprobleem in de µ-calculus. Middels een non-
interference aanpak kunnen vele veiligheidseigenschappen door bestaande gereedschappen gefor-
maliseerd en geverifieerd worden.
Bij het toepassen van partial model checking op fault tolerance identificeren we een deelk-
lasse van de µ-calculus waarvan verificatieprobleem kan worden opgelost in lineaire tijd, afhanke-
lijk van de lengte van de formule. We geven voorbeelden van safety en liveness eigenschappen
die uitgedrukt kunnen worden in de geı¨dentificeerde subcalculus. Bij het toepassen van non-
interference ideee¨n laten we zien hoe fault tolerance herformuleerd kan worden in de context van
het Generalized Non Deducibility on Composition (GNDC) analyseschema; we laten ook zien
hoe GNDC analysestrategiee¨n en bestaande gereedschappen kunnen worden hergebruikt in fault
tolerance.
Intradisciplinair Perspectief. In dit perspectief relateren we het gebruik van verschillende for-
mele modellen in veiligheid. De formele modellen die we beschouwen zijn: procesalgebra, au-
tomaten en multiset herschrijven. Onze studie, uitgevoerd als een scenario voor de analyse van
veiligheidsprotocollen, is als volgt georganiseerd:
√
Doelstelling 3 Het relateren van twee standaard formalismen die gebruikt worden voor vei-
ligheidsanalyse, procesalgebra’s en multiset herschrijven, binnen het kader van cryptografische
en authenticatie protocolanalyse.
Met “procesalgebra” duiden we eigenlijk een familie van calculi aan die zijn voorgesteld om
eigenschappen van gedistribueerde en concurrente systemen mee te beschrijven. Hier duidt “mul-
tiset herschrijven”, wat wortelt in de theorie van concurrency en herschrijflogica, een taal aan
die gebruikt wordt om fundamentele noties in authenticatieprotocollen mee te bestuderen. Wij
definie¨ren speciale coderingen van de twee formalismen die een bisimulatie-achtige equivalentie
vertonen, en vervolgens secrecy- en authenticatieeigenschappen.
√
Doelstelling 4 Het herdefinie¨ren van de GNDC theorie in termen van teamautomaten.
Formalismen gebaseerd op automaten worden vaak gebruikt voor de analyse van fault tolerant
systemen. Teamautomaten zijn recentelijk voorgesteld voor de specificatie van noties voor com-
puter supported cooperative work en concurrente systemen, maar zij missen nog een analysekader.
Door een GNDC theorie in termen van teamautomaten voor te stellen, staan we de migratie van
een gedeelte van de theorie voor veiligheidsanalyse uit procesalgebra naar de wereld van auto-
maten toe. We laten zien hoe ons kader kan worden toegepast om een integriteitseigenschap over
een multicast cryptografisch protocol te bestuderen.
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This thesis is composed of different papers I have presented and published during my Ph.D. stud-
ies. The thesis is organized into three main parts, and a conclusive part (see Figure 1).
Part I: Formal Validation of Systems: Industrial Test Cases. This part collects my work
on formal validation of industrial systems. It reports the technical details of two experiences of
formal analysis. The former concerns the verification of a safety-critical fault-tolerant railway
system, and the latter focuses on the analysis of security aspects of an authentication protocol
used in the OSA/Parlay telecommunication network. Industrial test cases play an important role
in this thesis; all the problems that I have developed here were conceived while I was working on
the validation of real systems. In other words, the effort of modeling and analyzing a real system
makes clear what are the real difficulties, and hence the problems to be solved to have a real impact
for validation and verification.
Part II: Analysis Techniques in Security and Fault-Tolerance. This part assembles my work
on the development of techniques of validation in security protocol5 analysis and fault-tolerance
analysis. In this chapter the beneficial interaction between the two disciplines emerges. First,
we re-design in fault-tolerance analysis terms, techniques of validation that have been originally
introduced for security analysis; non-interference and its formalization in terms of process alge-
bras, and module checking [126] through partial model checking [16]. Second, we design and
implement a logic-based model checker for security protocol analysis, whereas model checking is
a traditional validation technique for the analysis of dependable systems.
Part III: Comparison of Formal Models in Security Protocol Analysis. This part gathers my
work on the interaction between different methodologies of modeling and verifying in security
protocol analysis. As formal models we chose process algebras (PA), multiset rewriting (MSR),
and team automata [194] (TA). Generally speaking, PA denote a family of calculi which have
been proposed for describing features of distributed and concurrent systems; MSR roots in con-
currency theory and rewriting logic and has been incorporated into a high-level specification lan-
guage for authentication protocols, the Common Authentication Protocol Specification Language
(CAPSL) [64]. TA derive from automata and they have been originally used to model concurrency










Figure 1: Organization Chart of the Thesis
and computer supported cooperative works. First we compare the expressiveness of PA and MSR
in the restricted field of security protocol analysis, and later we show how TA can be furnished
with a stable framework for the analysis of cryptographic protocols.
Part IV: Conclusions This part concludes the thesis. We identify general principles that emerge
from the present study and from our experience of integration.
Chapter Contents
Each of the main parts is organized into two chapters. We now summarise the contents of each
chapter.
Part I. This part contains Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 and it concerns the application of formal
methods to fault-tolerance and security protocol analysis. Chapter 1 is based on [97, 96, 98];
it reports a complete validation exercise of a fault-tolerant railway system. Chapter 2 is based
on [58, 57]; it relates on an experience of the validation of an authentication protocol that is part
of a Telecom web service.
Chapter 1 describes the experiences of formal specification and validation on a railway safety-
critical control system in which specific methodologies for the analysis of complex depend-
able systems (e.g., triple modular redundancy) have been expressed. From the technical
document describing the system we built a PROMELA [118] formal model. This requires
the design of a formal model that unambiguously describes the system at an appropriate
level of abstraction. This means first to examine a whole bunch of documents describing
the system requirements and to carefully filter out the information that is not significant,
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or interesting, or that lays at a level of detail that is not the one the validation refers to.
The model is then analyzed through model checking [48, 49] by using the tool SPIN [118].
Model checking suffers from a well known problem: the size of the state space of the model
can grow beyond the limits of the available hardware i.e., exponentially in the number of
its components [47]. We find the same problem with our complex model. This implies the
use of abstraction and compositional strategies over the formal model, during the analysis
phase.
Chapter 2 describes a validation experience that consists in modeling and verifying a real-world
authentication protocol. This “Trust and Security Management” protocol, is implemented
as a protocol in the Parlay/OSA Application Program Interfaces (APIs) [1]. Parlay/OSA
architectures aim to stimulate third parties in developing new services exploiting mobile
telecommunications resources, while allowing the network operator to maintain control
over its network specially with respect to the quality of service offered and the security
usage. The chapter explains in detail how a formal model has been built, starting from the
UML [179] specification of the protocol, and how the experiments of verification have been
performed. Moreover, it critically comments on the verification results, which point out
weaknesses in the authentication procedure, and it suggests a possible solution for strength-
ening the security of the protocol.
Part II. This part contains Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, and it concerns the integration of techniques
of analysis in fault-tolerance and security cryptographic protocol engineering. They show how
the two disciplines can benefit of common strategies of analysis: model checking, techniques of
analysis of non-interference, and partial model checking. Chapter 3 is made up of the articles
[100, 99] and Chapter 4 is based on the papers [94, 95, 134].
Chapter 3 is theoretical. It studies how fault-tolerance analysis can benefit from techniques of
analysis developed for the study of security protocols. It uses the CCS process algebra as
a formal framework to model the fault-tolerant system and its (potentially malicious) envi-
ronment as two separate and interacting CCS processes. The environment is able to induce
the system to switch to insecure states. In this framework a system enjoys a fault-tolerance
property if the systems satisfies the property despite any interaction with the environment.
From the point of view of the analysis, this chapter studies the fault-tolerance of a sys-
tem, with respect to a given property, when the environment is an unspecified component.
In this case, the role of environment in fault-tolerance can be compared with that played
by the intruder in security protocol analysis. This chapter restates in fault-tolerance two
strategies of validation used in security protocols analysis. The first strategy consists in
reducing the problem of checking if a property (here a µ-calculus formula) holds in our
framework, to a problem of validity in the µ-calculus. We exploit partial model checking
in this reduction step, and we show how the validity problem, generally EXPTIME com-
plete, can be solved efficiently in the universal conjunctive subclass of the µ-calculus. The
second strategy consists in applying the Generalized Deducibility on Compositions frame-
work (in short, GNDC) [86] to fault-tolerance. GNDC is a uniform scheme for defining and
analyzing security properties, and it originates in the field of non-interference for security
analysis. This chapter shows how fault-tolerance properties can be uniformly characterized
as GNDC properties, and how theoretical results (e.g., compositionality), validation tech-
niques, and tools – well established in the GNDC security analysis – can be exploited for
iv
fault-tolerance.
Chapter 4 proposes a logic-based model checking framework [48] for the verification of security
cryptographic protocols. Model checking enjoys a background of good results in depend-
ability and fault-tolerance analysis (e.g., see [19, 38]). On the contrary its use in security
cryptographic protocol analysis was quite new when the papers, on which this chapter is
based, were initially proposed in 2000. In the proposed model checking framework, proto-
cols are modeled as terms of a process algebra which is inspired by the Abadi and Gordon
spi-calculus [6]. Security properties, such as secrecy and authenticity, are formalized using
linear time temporal logic.
Part III. This part contains Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 and it concerns the integration of analysis
techniques within the field of security protocol analysis. Chapter 5 is based on [26, 24, 25] and
Chapter 6 is based on [197, 199, 198].
Chapter 5 develops a comparison between process algebras and multiset rewriting when applied
to the analysis of security cryptographic protocols. We compare an instance of process alge-
bra (called PAP ) and an instance of multiset rewriting (called MSRP ) which are expressive
when used to describe security protocols. Special encodings from one formalism to the
other allow secrecy and authenticity properties to be preserved.
Chapter 6 starts from the fact that team automata (TA) are an emerging model for the formaliza-
tion of cooperative network systems and recently of multicast/broadcast protocols. In fact,
TA theory extends the classical I/O automata theory by allowing the definition of differ-
ent parallel composition operators, that make it possible to formalize complex interactions.
This last feature makes TA an interesting model for the analysis of security protocols even
though TA lack a well-established analysis framework. The present chapter describes how
to model an insecure scenario for cryptographic multicast/broadcast protocols in terms of
TA and it proposes also the definition of GNDC theory for TA. Moreover it shows how, once
established the GNDC framework in terms of TA, it is possible to reuse part of the analysis
theory developed for process algebra in the automata world so that integrity properties can
be proved.
Part IV. This part is composed of Chapter 7. It synthesizes general principles representing the
conclusive remarks of the thesis.
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Validation of Fault-Tolerant Systems, a
Test Case: Analysis of a Railway,
Safety-Critical, Control System
“[...] e allora io quasi quasi prendo il
treno e vengo, vengo da te, ma il treno dei
desideri, dei miei pensieri all’incontrario
va.” (A. Celentano, in Azzurro, V.
Pallavicini e P. Conte, 1968)
“[...] I am going to take the train and
come, come to you. But the train of my
desires, of my thoughts runs in the opposite
direction.
Abstract
This chapter describes an experience of formal validation of a fault-tolerant railway control
system. The system is designed for the automatic management of medium-large scale railway
networks, and it is currently running at the Italian train station of “Roma Termini”.
The validation experience has been conducted in 1998 in the context of an industrial joint
project involving three partners: an Italian company working in the field of railway engi-
neering, the Ansaldobreda Segnalamento Ferroviario of Napoli, and two research institutes of
the Italian Research Council of Pisa, the Istituto di Elaborazione dell’Informazione and the
Centro Nazionale Universitario di Calcolo Elettronico. The project required the development
of formal models describing different components of the system: a fault-tolerant exclusion
mechanism and a fault-tolerant communication protocol. Moreover, the project demanded the
verification of fault-tolerance properties in case of Byzantine and fail silent faults.
This chapter reports on the design of the formal models and on the experiments of for-
mal verification. We use PROMELA as specification formal language, and SPIN as a model
checker. The properties of interest are specified as safety or liveness properties by means
of PROMELA assertions or linear time logical formulas. To cope with the state-space explo-
sion problem we split the main models in sub-models. Each sub-model is realized in both a
concrete and an abstract version. Any abstract sub-model is provably equivalent to the cor-
responding concrete with respect to an established set of properties, but it contains a lesser
degree of parallelism. By an appropriate composition of abstract sub-models in a whole sys-
tem model, we are able to keep under control the space explosion problem and to complete
the verification of most of the demanded properties.
1.1 Introduction
The need for safety in automatic management of modern railways forces the introduction of so-
phisticated, fault tolerant, computer-based control systems that have an intrinsic degree of com-
plexity [13]. Their validation requires techniques from formal methods [111, 205, 34, 54] that
are able to overcome the limitations of traditional methodologies, such as testing and simulation.
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Generally speaking, formal methods are a set of mathematical approaches that support the rigor-
ous specification, design, and verification of computer systems; for these activities, they provide
formal languages, verification techniques and automatic tools. It has been proved that the use of
the formal methods in industrial processes helps in reaching a high level of dependability during
the design and the development of a software or hardware component [54]. Important factors en-
courage the application of formal methods in the industrial production. First of all, the interest in
discovering as many errors as possible before entering in the production phase; during this stage
the cost of correction per error increases enormously [135], whereas in railway applications an
error can even cause a disaster. Secondly, many institutions require industries to conform to inter-
national standards that strongly suggest formal methods, for example the EU directives EN 50128
CENELEC Railways Applications [175], and the IEC 65108 [119].
Railway control systems are particularly suitable to be analyzed with formal methods. Eis-
ner [73] states that railway systems share important robustness and locality properties that distin-
guish them from most hardware systems, this peculiarity makes them easily checkable by symbolic
model checking [48] and Sta˚lmarck checking [184]. As a matter of fact, in the last decade many
railway industries have started pilot projects to evaluate the impact of formal methods on their
production costs. Sometimes, industries have even developed their own validation environment
such as, for example, the LIVE [14] environment by the Ansaldobreda Segnalamento Ferroviario.
The experiments and the results from these pilot projects have stimulated a wide range of scientific
production (e.g., see [87, 132, 28, 45, 165, 27, 46]). As a significant example, Groote et al [107]
use the micro Common Representative Language (µCRL) [105] to model the vital processor in-
terlocking that runs at the Dutch station of Hoorn-Kersenboogerd; correctness criteria, expressed
in a modal logic for µCRL [106], are verified automatically using tools generated with the meta
environment ASF+SDF [124]. Lately, Bernardeschi et al [20] show how it is possible to formal-
ize a significant part of a complex railway control system in the CCS process algebras [158], then
properties written in the computational tree logic (CTL) [189] are verified with the tool JACK [33].
In this chapter we describe the principal results of a project carried out by the Ansaldobreda
Segnalamento Ferroviario (ASF) of Napoli – an Italian company working in the field of railway
engineering – and two research institutes of the Italian Research Council (CNR), the Istituto di
Elaborazione della Informazione (IEI-CNR) and the Centro Nazionale Universitario di Calcolo
Elettronico (CNUCE-CNR) of Pisa1. The project has required the validation of a fault tolerant
control system in presence of Byzantine [128] and silent faults. First described in [164], the
system is designed to behave safely even in case of arbitrary failures of some of its component,
and it controls safety-critical components of a railway network.
The industrial partner ASF has suggested the use of the PROMELA [116] specification lan-
guage and of the SPIN [117, 118] model checker. With SPIN, ASF has previously verified safety
properties of different parts of the system [45]. The analysis described in this chapter uses the
version 3.2 [117] of SPIN 2. It was the newest version in 1998, when the work was conducted.
Some advanced features were not present at that time, for example the extension of PROMELA and
SPIN to the discrete time [32]; this explains why in this chapter we design our own strategies to
describe time-related behavior, such as fail silent faults and time-outs.
1In September 2003 IEI-CNR and CNUCE-CNR merged into ISTI-CNR, the Istituto di Scienza e Tecnologie
dell’Informazione “A. Faedo”.
2At present, the latest version is the 4.2.2.
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1.1.1 Linear Time Logic
In section recalls the (propositional) linear time logic [174] (LTL, for short). SPIN accepts prop-
erties expressed as formulas of LTL. We start with the definition of the linear time structure, that
formalizes the notion of a time line.
Definition 1.1.1 (Linear Time Structure) Let AP be a set of atomic propositions. A linear time
structure is a triple M = (S, x, L) where S is a set of states, x : N → S is an infinite sequence
of states (called time line), and L : S → 2AP is a function that labels each state with the set of
atomic proposition true in that state.
Formulas of LTL are built using the following grammar:
φ = p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ′ | Xφ | φUφ′
where p ∈ AP , is a propositional symbol. Informally, ¬φ and φ∧φ′ are the propositional negation
and conjunction of formulas, whereas X and U are the basic temporal operator of LTL. The former
is called “next”, the latter “until”. In LTL we find also the (classic) propositional derived operators:
ff
def= p ∧ ¬p
tt
def= ¬ff
φ ∨ φ′ def= ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬φ′)
φ⇒ φ′ def= ¬φ ∨ φ′
and the (important) following derived temporal operators:
“eventually” 3φ def= ttUφ
“always” 2φ def= ¬3¬φ
Formulas of LTL are interpreted over linear time structures M = (S, x, L). A graphical,
intuitive, explanation of the temporal operators is shown in Figure 1.1.
Informally, we say that a formula φ holds in a state of a time line we mean that it holds in the
time line that starts from that state; we say that a formula holds in the time line M if it holds in
state the first state x(0). The informal semantics of the temporal operators is as follows: Xφ holds
inM if and only if φ holds in state x(1); 2φ holds inM if and only if φ holds in every state of the
time line; 3φ holds in M if and only if there is a future state of where φ eventually holds; φUφ′
holds in M if φ holds in all the states until (possibly included) the state where φ′ holds.
Formally, the notation M, x |= φ means that φ is true in the time line x of the structure
M. Assuming the notation xi standing for the suffix x(i), x(i + 1), . . . of the time line x, the
satisfiability relation, |=, is defined inductively on the structure of the formula φ as follows:
M, x |= p iff p ∈ L(x(0))
M, x |= φ ∧ φ′ iff M, x |= φ and M, x |= φ′
M, x |= ¬φ iff M, x 6|= φ
M, x |= Xφ iff M, x1 |= φ
M, x |= φUφ′ iff exists j, M, xj |= φ′ and for all i < j, M, xi |= φ
We explicitly give also the formal semantics of the derived temporal operator:
M, x |= 2φ iff for all i ≥ 0, M, xi |= φ
M, x |= 3φ iff exists i ≥ 0, M, xi |= φ
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Figure 1.1: Graphical intuition for the semantics of the linear time operators “next”, “until”, “al-
ways”, and “eventually”. Each sequence represents the time line satisfying the related formula on
the left. States are depicted as circles, and arrows connect states in temporal sequence. A formula
above a state indicates that the formula holds in the state.
A formula φ is said to be satisfiable if and only if there exists a linear time structureM = (S, x, L),
such that M, x |= φ; in this case we say that M is a model for φ. In this chapter, the following
problem is also relevant:
Definition 1.1.2 (Model Checking Problem in LTL) Let M = (S, x, L) be a linear time struc-
ture, and φ be a LTL formula. The model checking problem consists in answering the following
question: “is M a model for φ”? Or equivalently does “M, x |= φ”?.
An algorithm solving the model checking problem is called model checker.
1.1.2 PROMELA and SPIN
This section briefly introduces the SPIN model checker [118] and its high-level specification lan-
guage, PROMELA [116]. We do not enter in any technical detail here: when necessary throughout
this chapter, we shall provide brief explanations. For a complete reference on SPIN and PROMELA
we suggest the book [118].
SPIN is an efficient tool for the simulation and the verification of PROMELA models. SPIN
runs on Unix, Linux, and Windows. Its basic structure is illustrated in Figure 1.2. In simulation
mode, SPIN can be used to get a quick impression of the types of behavior that are captured
by a model. In verification mode, SPIN checks correctness claims that are generated from logic
formulas expressed in LTL. When a claim is not valid over a model, SPIN produces a counter
example that shows explicitly how the property may be violated. The counter example can be fed
back to the SPIN simulator, so that the trail can be inspected in detail to determine the cause of
violation.
At high-level, a system model is specified as a set of PROMELA process templates, that SPIN
translates into a set of finite Bu¨chi automata [39]. A global automaton of the system behavior is
obtained by the interleaving product of all the automata composing the system. Once a model is






















Figure 1.2: The structure of SPIN. A PROMELA, high-level, description of a system is first checked
for syntax errors (1). Interactive simulation can be used to gain basic confidence that the model
has the intended properties (2). Optionally a PROMELA correctness claim can be generated from
a LTL formula (3). Then, SPIN is used to generate a verifier, compiled with possible compile-time
choices for optimization in memory usage (4). If the verification fails, SPIN returns a counter
example that can be fed back into the simulator (5). A graphical front-end, XSPIN, provides a
user-friendly approach to the SPIN environment (6).
and run separately. Different options can be set when compiling a verifier: partial order reduc-
tion, memory compression, data compact representation, or other optimization strategies can be
exploited in the analysis to deal with state space explosion problem [201], a fundamental problem
for any state space methods like model checking. Almost any system has huge number of states,
and the size of the structure used to represent a system, called states space, tends to grow expo-
nentially in the number of its processes and variables. This explosion causes a seriuos waste of the
computer memory, and in absence of optimization strategies it usually makes many verification
fail by out-of-memory.
Significant to this chapter are the optimization options of partial order reduction and memory
compression methods. Partial order reduction aims to reduce the number of system states that
need to be visited and stored in the state space to solve the model checking problem. This option is
enabled by default for all SPIN verification runs. Memory compression methods aim to reduce the
amount of memory that is required to store each state of the system. Options, such as COLLAPSE
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and MA are reserved for this target. Both reduce the memory requirement of an exhaustive search
by increasing the run-time requirements. The COLLAPSE feature exploits a hierarchical indexing
method to achieve compression. The MA, or minimized automaton, reduces memory by building
and updating a minimized finite state recognizer the state descriptor. Technical notes about the
algorithms for partial order reduction and memory compressions can be found in [118].
PROMELA is a language with a C-like syntax for the specification of the high-level behavior
of concurrent and interacting processes in a distributed system. PROMELA is based on Dijk-
stra’s guarded command language [68] and Hoare’s language CSP [115]; PROMELA has non-
deterministic control flow structures and primitives for process creation and interprocess com-
munication. Other control flow statements allow the definition of atomic sequences, deterministic
steps, and escape sequences. A PROMELA specification consists of one or more process templates,
called proctype, and at least one process instantiation. Processes are typically instantiated by the
built-in “init” process or by any already running process. Processes may terminate or run indef-
initely. Instantiated processes communicate via rendez-vous, via asynchronous message passing
through buffered channels, or shared memory.
1.2 System Description
The object of our study is the Computerized Central Apparatus (ACC) 3 a hardware system specif-
ically designed to manage medium/large railway networks. ACC is a highly programmable and
centralized control system deployed in a wider railway signaling system. This latter is a complex
and distributed architecture designed to manage a large railway network. Each node of the network
controls either a medium-large railway station or a line section with small stations, or a traffic line
with a simple interlocking logic. Figure 1.3 depicts the ACC architecture. The ACC is composed
of two independent sub-systems dedicated to management and vital functions:
Management functions control auxiliary tasks, such as data recording, diagnostic management
and remote control interface. They are run by the ACC sub-system called “RDT” (acronym
for Recording, Diagnosis and data Transmission) in Figure 1.3.
Vital functions are generally safety-critical procedures: they control critical machineries such as
train movements and the wayside equipment. Vital functions are run by the ACC sub-system
called “Vital Section” in Figure 1.3.
The vital section of the ACC is composed of several Control Posts, several Peripheral Control
Units (PCUs), and a Safety Nucleus (SN). Control Posts are formed by input/output interfaces and
by terminals. From them, a human operator can issue critical commands intended for the PCUs
that, in turn, execute them. These commands are critical because their execution affects physical
machineries such as railway semaphores, rail points or level crossings. For this reason particular
attention is paid to guarantee the safety of the system in case of faults.
The SN, a hardware component, is specifically designed for control and safety purposes. It
monitors the state of the system and tries to discover a faulty component, i.e., a PCU or a com-
munication bus. Its architecture is based on a triple modular redundant [191] configuration of
computers; for this reason the SN also faces the problem of an internal consensus. The classical
solution to this problem (also known as the Byzantine Generals Problem [128, 22]), cannot be im-
plemented in the SN due to hardware constraints; in case of inconsistency, instead of looking for a
3
“Apparato Centrale a Calcolatore”, in Italian.
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consensus the SN tries to exclude the faulty component or to force the whole system to shutdown
safely.
Remark 1.2.1 We study of the behavior of the SN and its interaction with the PCUs.
...
 RDT Safety Nucleus
Control Posts
Peripherical Control Units





Figure 1.3: The architecture of the Computerized Central Apparatus (ACC). The Management
Section controls auxiliary tasks. The Vital Section controls physical devices and train movements.
Commands issued from the Control Posts are executed by the Peripheral Control Units. The Safety
Nucleus controls and manages the system in case of arbitrary faults in the Peripheral Control Units
or in the communication lines.
1.3 Formal Models
This section discusses how we represented time-outs, Byzantine faults and transient faults in
PROMELA. It also illustrates the two PROMELA models of the vital section of the ACC, which we
call TMR and TMR-PCU; they describe different views of the ACC vital section:
1. TMR describes, in detail, the triple modular redundant architecture of the SN and its ex-
clusion logic mechanism (see also Figure 1.4). We use TMR primarily to verify safety
properties of the SN in presence of Byzantine behavior of one of its components. PCUs
play only a marginal role here.
2. TMR-PCU describes, in detail, the SN-PCU communication infrastructure (i.e., busses), the
relative communication protocol, and the internal PCU architecture (see also Figure 1.5).
Here, we model only those parts of the SN that are involved in the communication with the
PCUs, i.e., we explicitly avoid modeling the exclusion logic. We use TMR-PCU to verify
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liveness properties of the SN-PCU communication protocol and safety properties in case of
communication time-outs caused by faults in the busses or in some PCUs.
1.3.1 Formalization of Faults
Before describing the PROMELA models TMR and TMR-PCU, we focus our attention on the for-
malization of the classes of faults that we consider in our analysis:
• fail silent faults (i.e., faults causing time-outs in communication);
• Byzantine faults.
Both classes of faults are used within the models TMR and TMR-PCU. Byzantine faults are
supposed to happen only in some SN modules. In reality Byzantine faults only occur in SN
modules, therefore we assume that they do not occur elsewhere. Fail silent faults may originate
in any ACC component: SN modules, PCUs, or communication lines. Moreover, we also discuss
how to model temporary fail silent faults.
Fail Silent Faults
Fail silent faults cause the system to omit the correct answer [19]. In the case of ACC they cause
time-outs in communications. In other words, a fail silent fault becomes visible to the other system
components only when a communication event results in a time-out. ACC communications are
with time-outs, but since PROMELA does not deal with time4, we have to abstract from any defini-
tion of it in our models. We simulate time-outs with a special empty message , whose presence in
a channel must be interpreted as absence of the expected message. The use of the empty message
lightly changes the interpretation of send and receive and, consequently, their implementation in
our models. A “send” of a message m is now implemented as a non deterministic choice between
transmitting either m or . A “receive” of a message in variable x requires a test x ==  after
the reception: in fact, in a ‘receive” with time-outs there is the need to discern, depending on the
content of the message gotten, if a time-out has expired or not. This latter case happens if and only
if the message received is the empty message .
In PROMELA, where typed and buffered (of lenght N) channels are defined via the declaration
chan <name> = [N] of <type>, the message  is defined as a reserved constant value for
example the integer value 0. This value must not be used in any other communication along the
whole formal model. Consequently, a “send” with time-outs is implemented in PROMELA with
the following code:
/* *************************************** */
/* implementation of a send with time-out */
/* *************************************** */
// global definitions
// (in the environment where the module are defined)
define EMPTY 0 // empty message
4See the discussion in Section 1.1.2
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Figure 1.4: The architecture of TMR. The triple modular redundancy of the SN is represented in
detail: three (functionally) identical modules and an exclusion logic. Each SN module commu-
nicates with the others and with the exclusion logic via a dedicated symmetric link. PCUs are
connected with the SN through a shared bus.
chan c = [0] of <t>; // (synchronous) channel
[...]
// local definition (within a module)
<t> msg; // message (<> 0) of type <t>
[...]
/* implementation of a send with time-out */
if
:: c!msg // send the real message
:: c!EMPTY // send the empty message
fi;
In PROMELA, comments are enclosed within /* */ and the statement
if :: <guard1> -> <s1>
:: <guard2> -> <s2>
[...]










module B module C
module A
computer A computer B
Figure 1.5: The architecture of TMR-PCU. The communication infrastructure between SN and
the PCUs is represented in detail. PCUs are linked with the SN modules through a pair of busses,
called primary and secondary respectively. Each PCU module is composed of two identical com-
puters in configuration 2 out-of 2.
:: <guardn> -> <sn>
:: else -> <sn+1>
fi
is a guarded, non deterministic, choice among the statements s1, s2, . . ., sn. A statement s,
is enabled if the corresponding guard, guard, is satisfied. When more statements are enabled,
one statement is selected non-deterministically. When present, the else guard is satisfied if and
only if all the other guards are not. The keyword true, is a guard that is always enabled; it is
usually omitted and :: true -> <s> is written as :: <s>. The primitive c!x is the send
command over the channel c of the value associated to x. In the previous code implementing
the send with time-outs, the guards are always satisfied, so the “send” with time-outs is a pure
non-deterministic choice between sending the message msg or the empty message.
In PROMELA the “receive” with time-outs is coded as follows:
/* ***************************************** */
/* implementation of a receive with time-out */
/* ***************************************** */
// global definitions
define EMPTY 0 // empty message
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chan c = [0] of <t>; // (synchronous) channel
[...]
/* implementation of a receive with time-out */
c?x ->
if
:: (x == EMPTY) -> <exception time-outs>
:: else -> <reception>
fi;
In PROMELA, c?x is the receive operation from channel c of a value that will be stored into
the variable x. In the previous code, a message is first retrieved from the channel c then, if the
message proves to be the empty message, a procedure for handling the time-out is called.
Byzantine Faults
We start with a definition of Byzantine behavior due to Lamport et al [128]:
Definition 1.3.1 (Byzantine Behavior) Assuming to have a finite set M of identical modules m
whose behavior is specified by a communication algorithm A:
1. all loyal modules in M run the same algorithm A, and in particular they correctly send all
messages as specified in A;
2. a Byzantine module m′ ∈ M runs the same algorithm A as a loyal module but it can
arbitrarily fail in executing it. As an effect of failure the Byzantine module may send wrong
messages, it may send a message delayed with respect to a synchronization event, or it may
send no message at all.
Definition 1.3.1 focuses on communication events: any Byzantine fault in a module becomes
observable only when the faulty unit communicates. As a consequence of this assumption any
Byzantine fault is modeled as a communication error; precisely as a communication of a corrupted
message or as a delay in the communication, or as a lack of communication.
We model both a delay and a lack of communication with a time-out i.e., with the empty
message . To generate a corrupted message, we define a function corrupt() : (T − {}) −→ T ,
where T is a message type. Given a message m, corrupt(m) 6= m indicates that the message m
is corrupted.
In PROMELA, an instance of corrupt() is the function corrupt(n) = −n. Note that, be-
cause for the choice of modeling the empty message with the integer value 0 there is no semantic
ambiguity between the concepts of “corrupted message” and “absence of a message”.
Byzantine faults, and the way we model them, affect the PROMELA implementation of a send.
On the contrary the implementation of a receive does not require any further change with respect
to its implementation with time-outs. In PROMELA a Byzantine send appears as follows:
/* ***************************************** */
/* implementation of a Byzantine fault */
/* ***************************************** */
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// global definitions
define EMPTY 0 // empty message
chan c = [0] of <t>; // (synchronous) channel
// local (to a module) definitions
<t> msg; // message
[...]
/* implementation of a send with Byzantine failure */
if
:: true -> c!msg // send the corrected message
:: true -> c!EMPTY // time-outs (delay or lack)
:: true -> c!(-msg) // send a corrupted message
fi;
In the code above, a non deterministic choice guides the possibility of sending the correct
message or causing a time-out, or sending a wrong message.
Temporary Fail Silent Faults
The behavior of each ACC module (see also Section 1.4 and 1.5) consists of a cyclic execution
of a sequence of statements; we call this execution loop. ASF is interested in modeling time-outs
that are persistent for at least one whole execution loop but not necessarily in all the loops. This
interest is motivated by what ASF has observed in the field.
As a solution, we model such faults in the following way: at the beginning of an execution
loop, a non-deterministic choice decides if a component, for instance a bus or a module, run in
either error-prone or in error-free mode. Running in error-prone mode means that every commu-
nication involving the component ends in a time-out. For example, if the component represents
a communication bus, every communication through it results in a time-out. A scheme of this
solution in PROMELA is as follows:
/* initial setting of the state bit */
bit error_free = 1
/* execution loop */
do
/* change the state bit */
if
:: error_free = !error_free
:: skip
fi;
do /* a send */
:: c!(msg && error_free)




In the code above, the state bit is changed first, then the send occurs. Moreover the statement
do
:: <guard1> --> <s1>
:: <guard2> --> <s2>
[...]
:: <guardn> --> <sn>
od
is a repetition construct; it cyclically selects, non-deterministically, one enabled statement among
the guarded statements s1, s2, . . ., sn. We use the repetition construct to implement an execu-
tion loop. At the beginning of the execution loop a choice may change the state from error free
(error free = 1) to error prone (error free = 0) or vice versa. Later any outgoing mes-
sage is sent in conjunction with the state bit: a value of 0 has the effect of resetting the outgoing
message to the value we use to model the empty message.
1.4 The TMR model
This section describes the TMR model. Its general architecture, drawn in Figure 1.4, consists of:
• three identical central modules, called module A, module B and module C. They constitute
the triple modular redundant configuration of the SN. They communicate with each other,
with the exclusion logic, and with the PCUs.
• a module called exclusion logic. It watches the central modules and acts as a voter. More-
over, the exclusion logic is able to exclude one inconsistent central module or to bring the
SN to a safe shutdown.
• the PCUs, consisting of n control units (in our study n = 2). In the TMR, the behavior of
the PCUs is only sketched;
• the set of communication channels. Three symmetric channels connecting the three central
modules, three symmetric channels between the central modules and the exclusion logic,
and a single bus between the central modules and the PCUs.
In the following we explain only the PROMELA model of a central module. This is sufficient to
understand what we are going to verify. The complete PROMELA codes, composed of thousands
of code lines, is property of ASF. We describe here, with permission, only what is needed to
understand this work.
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The Central Modules In TMR, modules A, B, and C are designed for the following tasks:
• to collect global information about the whole system state i.e., the local states of the other
central modules;
• to elaborate summary information about the system state first, then sending it to the exclu-
sion logic;
• to communicate with the PCUs.
The three central modules communicate with each other via symmetric channels. Each module is
connected via another symmetric channels with the exclusion logic, and via a bus with the PCUs.
The behavior of a central module is the execution loop, formally described with the following
pseudo-code:
/* ******************************* */





3. * <data exchange with the other modules>
4. <distributed voting>
5. * <communication with exclusion logic>
/* communication with the 2 PCUs */
for i = 1 to 2 do
6.1 if <is my turn> then
6.2 * <synchronization>
6.3 * <send command to the PCUs[i]>
6.4 * <receive acknowledge from the PCUs[i]>
endfor
endloop
In the code above we indicated the communication phases with an “*”. We now describe
informally each phase.
Synchronization. During this phase, each module exchanges a synchronization message with the
other modules. This phase is used to collect information about the state of activity of the
other modules. A time-out is interpreted as a sign of non activity. and the module that
caused the time-out is excluded by any later communication within the current execution
loop. Within the current loop the module that has caused the time-out is excluded from any
subsequent communication. The system is expected to run in a configuration of at least 2
out of 3; if a module detects a time-out from both the other two modules it enters in a safe
shutdown state;
Command elaboration. During this phase, each module composes a summing up of the local
view that the module has about the state of activity of the other two modules;
Data exchange. During this phase, each module sends to, and receives from the other modules
the message composed in the previous phase;
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Distributed voting. During each phase, each module checks the consistency of its local informa-
tion (about the system state) with that received from the other two modules, and composes
a new message about the result of this test;
Communication with the exclusion logic. During this phase, the result of the test is sent to the
exclusion logic, which, after having analyzed all the results, can decide to disconnect the
module(s) considered potentially faulty;
Communication with the PCUs. During this phase, a module communicates with the PCUs by
running a particular circular protocol. At each loop of this protocol only two modules are
enabled to communicate with the PCUs. A distributed procedure within the protocol, as-
sures a cyclic selection of the two modules candidate to the communication. In the TMR,
this procedure is extremely simplified.
In the following we report a synthesis of the PROMELA code implementing the synchroniza-
tion phase for the module C. In the code we have omitted programming details that are not signif-
icant at this level of description, for example the statements atomic or d step used to reduce
unnecessary parallelism in the model.
/* ***************************************** */
/* synchronization phase */
/* ***************************************** */
/*** in the global environment ***/
#define EMPTY 0 // the empty message
#define SYNCH 1 // the synchronization message
/* global_activeC is the global state of module C. */
global_activeC = 1 // state of activity of C
[..]
/*** module C’s local variables ***/
activeA_C = 1; /* state of A, in C viewpoint */
sentA_C = 0; /* flag "sent" (to module A) */
recvA_C = 0; /* flag "received" (from module A)*/
activeB_C = 1; /* state of B, in C viewpoint */
sentB_C = 0; /* flag "sent" (to module B) */
recvB_C = 0; /* flag "received" (from module B)*/
do
/* -------------------- */
/* communication with A */
/* -------------------- */
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/* send (with time-outs) to A */
:: (!sentA_C) ->
if
// send the synch (if A is active)
:: true -> outA!(SYNCH && activeA_C);
// time-outs
:: true -> outA!(EMPTY);
fi;
sentA_C = 1;
/* receive (with time-outs) from A */
:: atomic{(!recvA_C && inA?[synA]) -> inA?synA;}
recvA_C = 1;
/* set the activity state of A */
if
:: synA == SYNCH -> activeA_C = 1;
// time-outs imply no activity
:: else -> activeA_C = 0;
fi;
/* -------------------- */
/* communication with B */
/* -------------------- */
/* Here activeB_C is used instead of activeA_C */
/* recvB_C instead of recvA_C, */
/* sentB_C instead of sendA_C etc. */
:: [ ... the same for B ... ]
/* exitloop when done all the two modules */
:: (sentA_C && sentB_C && recvA_C && recvB_C) -> break;
od;
/* safe shutdown if A and B are not active */
if
:: !activeA_C && !activeB_C ->
/* goto a part of the code that is recognized as a */
/* safe shutdown. The module wait to be restarted */
goto SHUTDOWN
:: else -> skip
fi;
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SHUTDOWN:
/* Set the state of activity of C to ’’inactive’’ */
/* C has safely shut down. */
global_activeC = 0;
<wait>
Here activeA C and activeB C are C’s local variables that indicate the state of activity of
module A and module B, respectively; they are set at the beginning of the execution loop, and
reset in case a time-out occurs in a communication with module A or module B, respectively.
The PROMELA code implementing the other phases is similar except for the type of messages
involved and for some different local computation. As explained in Section 1.3.1, in its Byzantine
implementation a module may, in any send action, send a corrupted message. In reference to the
previous code, the fragment of PROMELA code that shows the Byzantine implementation of the
“communication with module A” is as follows:
[...]
/* communication with A */
:: (!sentA_C) ->
if
/* send the synch (if A is active) */
:: true -> outA!(SYNCH && activeA_C);
/* send a corrupted message */
:: true -> outA!(-SYNCH && activeA_C);
/* time-outs */




1.4.1 Formal Verification of TMR
This section lists some of the properties we verify for the TMR model and the related results. We
postpone the discussion about how to cope with the state explosion problem, till Section 1.6. Prop-
erties are expressed as either LTL formulas or PROMELA assertions. An assertion in PROMELA is
a statement including a boolean expression that is evaluated each time the statement is executed.
Assertions are used to express invariant properties over a model.
An informal description of the properties is as follows:
(TMR1) After a communication phase it is always true that if two modules do not receive any re-
ply from the third module, this latter module will be eventually disconnected by the exclusion
logic.
(TMR2) After a communication phase, it is always true that if one module does not receive any
reply from the other two modules, it will eventually enter a safe shut-down state.
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(TMR3) After a distributed voting phase, it is always true that if two modules, in reciprocal
agreement on the global state knowledge, recognize that a third module is not in agreement
with them, this latter module will be disconnected eventually by the exclusion logic.
All the previous properties can be formalized with LTL formulas with the following common
structure:
2 (p⇒ 2 (q ⇒ 3 r))
Here p, q and r are predicates on variables.
As an example let us consider property TMR1 written in the following way: “after a commu-
nication phase it is always true that if module A and module B do not receive any reply from C,
this latter will be eventually disconnected by the exclusion logic“. This formula is expressed with
the following formula:
2
(¬(activeC A)⇒ 2 (¬(activeC B)⇒ 3¬(global activeC)) ∧ (1.4.1)
2
(¬(activeC B)⇒ 2 (¬(activeC A)⇒ 3¬(global activeC))
Here activeC A is a boolean variable of module A that evaluates to true if and only if A receives
a reply from module C; activeC B evaluates to true if and only if B receives a reply from module
C; global activeC is a global valuable that evaluates to true if and only if module C is active.
Informally formula (1.4.1) evaluates true if and only if when A does not receives a reply from C,
and B does not receive a reply from C then eventually C is not active.
(TMR4) After a communication phase, every module has sent and received a message (or the
empty message) from all the other modules.
Property TMR4 is specified with an assertion placed after each communication phase. For exam-
ple, this property in case of module C, is:
assert{(recvA_C+recvB_C==2) && (sentA_C+sentB_C==2)}
Here variables recvA C and recvB C are reset at the beginning of the execution loop, and set
after module C has received a message from module A and module B respectively. Similarly,
sentA C (sentB C, resp.) is reset at the beginning of the loop, and it is set after any send action
towards module A (module B, resp.).
(TMR5) A module is in safe shut-down state only if the other two have caused a time-out in a
previous communication phase.
Within module C, this property is specified as the following assertion located after the SHUTDOWN
entry label (see the PROMELA code in Section 1.4):
assert{activeA_C + activeB_C == 0}
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property state vector depth RAM result
TMR1 192 5266 20 success
TMR2 192 5266 22 success
TMR3 196 45273 25 fail
TMR4 68 9763 14 success
TMR5 68 9763 14 success
Figure 1.6: Summary of the verification results on TMR. These results are obtained by running
SPIN with MA+CO options selected, and with one Byzantine module. In the first column we have
the property name, in the second the number of bytes required to store the state vector, in the
third the depth of the search in number of steps, in the fourth the total memory required by the
verification in Mbytes, and in the last the result of the verification.
1.4.2 Discussion
Figure 1.6 reports a summary of the results of the verifications. We run the verification in presence
of one Byzantine module. We briefly discuss the result concerning property TMR3. The analysis
of the counterexample shows that the Byzantine module C causes one of the loyal modules to be
disconnected by the exclusion logic. In fact, module C fails in participating in a communication
with one module and makes that module believe that module C is not active. Consequently, in
the distributed voting the loyal module is found in disagreement, and then disconnected by the
exclusion logic. This is a typical disagreement situation due to Byzantine behaviors.
1.5 The TMR-PCU model
The TMR-PCU describes the SN-PCU communication protocol and in more detail the architecture
of PCUs. Figure 1.5 depicts a scheme of the TMR-PCU architecture, that is composed of:
• the three identical central modules, A, B and C. Here the modules implement an abstraction
of the SN, i.e., the part significant for the later analysis;
• the PCUs. They are composed of n control units (in this study n=2), each consisting of two
computers, computer A and computer B;
• the interconnection channels. Three symmetric channels connecting the three central mod-
ules, and two busses, connecting the three modules to the two computers of the PCUs.
With respect to the TMR-PCU model we are interested to verify:
1. liveness properties of SN-PCU communication protocol in the absence of a Byzantine mod-
ule. This protocol is implemented as a distributed algorithm designed to assure a cyclic use
of the busses and a cyclic selection of two central modules demanded to send the commands.
2. safety properties of SN-PCU communication protocol in case of some hardware faults. In
particular we are interested in temporary, fail silent faults in the interconnection busses and
in the computers A and B of a PCU.
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In our PROMELA code we define a process for each central module and a process for each
peripheral unit. We also define a synchronous symmetric channel between the central modules,
and four busses between the SN and PCU. The first two busses, model the primary and secondary
bus connecting SN and all computers “A” of each PCU; the second two busses model the primary
and secondary busses connecting SN and all computers “B” of each PCU. In this way we want to
distinguish between computer A and B, avoiding to define different processes for this.
We now briefly describe the protocol run by a central module and the one run by a periph-
eral unit, giving the PROMELA code where significant. This protocol is a detailed version of the
“communication with the exclusion logic” phase in the TMR (see the pseudo-code in Section 1.4)
The protocol run by a central module It consists of several phases, as described by the follow-
ing pseudo-code:
loop
/* communication with the PCUs */
for i = 1 to 2 do
6.1 <synchronization>
6.2 * <decide the turn>
6.3 * (x,j) = <diagnostic>
6.4 * msg = <message elaboration>
6.5 if <is my turn> the
6.6 * <send msg to computer[x] of PCU[i], via bus[j]>
6.7 * <receive acknowledge>
endfor
endloop
Informally, before communicating with the PCUs a module tries to gather information about
the global state of the system. In this case it is the state of activity of the other two modules, the
state of the two busses, and the state of the two computers of each PCU. We now describe each
phase separately.
Synchronization. This phase is a synthetic version of the synchronization phase of the TMR.
During this phase, a module checks the other modules activity state. This information is
used in a distributed tournament procedure to decide what module is enabled to send a
message to the periphery.
Diagnostic. During each phase, each module summarizes information about the global state, com-
posed of the activity state of the PCU computers and of the busses. This information is used
to decide which bus to use, and whether computer A or B will be the recipient of the message
to be prepared next.
Message elaboration. Depending on the state of the PCU computers, either the effective periph-
eral command or a special DIAGNOSTIC message is prepared;
Communication with the PCUs. During this phase, the SN sends its prepared message to the
PCUs.
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The protocol run by a peripheral unit
In TMR-PCU the PCU model is realized in more detail. It is schematically described by the
following pseudo-code
loop
1. <decide the state>
/* communication with the safety nucleus */
parallel_for (i = A to B) and (j = 1 to 2) do
2.1 <computer[i] receives from a module via bus[j]>
2.2 <command elaboration>
2.3 <computer[i] send the ack via bus[j]>
endfor
endloop
We now describe each phase in detail:
Decide the state. During this phase, non-deterministic choice is made to decide on the functional
state of the busses and of the computers A and B of the peripheral unit. In case of a state set
to “fault” every communication results in a time-out;
Receive a command. During this phase, each computer of each unit waits for a message from
one of the busses;
Elaborate the command. During this phase, each computer of each unit evaluates the message
received. A diagnostic message does not imply any further action, while effective com-
mands carry information about what action the PCUs have to perform. In our model they
are simply stored in a PCU local stack;
Acknowledgment. During this phase, an acknowledgment message is sent back to the all the
module of SN.
In the following we give a synthesis of the PROMELA code of the PCU, called CDA1:
/* recvA1_CDA1,recvB1_CDA1 */
/* # msg received via bus1, by computer A and B, resp. */
/* initially set to 0 */
/* recvA2_CDA1,recvB2_CDA1: */
/* # msg received via bus1, by computer A and B, resp. */
/* initially set to 0 */
/* stateBUS1, stateBUS2: state of bus1, bus2 */
/* stateA, stateB : state of computer A,B */
/* all set to 1, meaning that the state is not faulty */
/* loop */
do
24 Chapter 1. Validation of Fault-Tolerance Systems: a Test Case
::
/* decide the state */
if
:: stateA = 0 /* fault in the 1st computer */
:: stateA = 1 /* the 1st computer is now ok */
:: stateB = 0 /* fault in the 2nd computer */
:: stateB = 1 /* the 1st computer is now ok */
:: stateBUS1 = 0 /* fault in the 1st bus */
:: stateBUS1 = 1 /* 1st bus is ok */
:: stateBUS2 = 0 /* fault in the 2nd bus */




/* Promela channels defined */
/* A1, A2 : computer A-BUS1, A-BUS2 */
/* B1, B2 : computer B-BUS1, B-BUS2 */
do
/* ----------------------------- */
/* computer A receives from bus1 */
/* ----------------------------- */
:: atomic{!DONE && A1in?[PCU1, senderA1, msg] ->
A1in?PCU1, senderA1, msg;}
if
/* if it is a diagnostic message */
:: msg == DIAGNOSTIC -> skip;
/* if it is a command message store it */
:: else -> msg[i] = msg; i++;
fi;






/* computer A receives from bus2 */
/* ----------------------------- */
:: [... the same using A2, stateBUS2,
1.5. The TMR-PCU model 25
recvA2_CDA1, senderA2 and stateA ..]
/* ----------------------------- */
/* computer B receives from bus1 */
/* ----------------------------- */
:: [... the same using B1, stateBUS1,
recvB1_CDA1, senderB1 and stateB ..]
/* ----------------------------- */
/* computer B receives from bus2 */
/* ----------------------------- */
:: [... the same using B1, stateBUS2,
recvB2_CDA1, senderB2 and stateB ..]





1.5.1 Formal Verification on TMR-PCU
In this section we list some of the properties verified for the TMR-PCU model, and the most
meaningful results. Again we postpone the discussion about how we were able to verify these
properties coping the the state explosion problem, till Section 1.6. The interesting properties in
this context can be described informally as follows:
(PCU1) Correctness of the communication protocols, in absence of Byzantine faults.
The term correctness here means correctness of the diagnostic test and of the tournament algorithm
run by a module. This property is verified by checking absence of deadlock. We slightly modify
the PROMELA code of the PCUs in such a way as to force a peripheral unit to receive messages
according to the intended behavior protocol. If the central module does not follow, or fail to follow,
the protocol as the PCUs, the systems deadlocks.
(PCU2) When two or more modules are active, each peripheral unit eventually receives exactly
two messages in a single loop.
(PCU2′) In presence of Byzantine errors in one module, and when two or more modules are
active, each peripheral unit eventually receives exactly two messages in a single loop.
(PCU3) When two or more modules are active, each peripheral unit eventually receives exactly
two message via different busses in a single loop.
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(PCU4) When two or more modules are active, each computer of every peripheral unit receives
exactly one message in a single loop.
All the previous properties are formulated with different LTL formulas with the following common
structure:
2 p⇒ ((23 q) ∧2 q ⇒ (3 r)))
here p, q and r are propositional formulas composed of predicates on variables. For example the
property PCU2 (instantiated for the PCU called CDA1), is expressed by the LTL formula:
2 (global activeA+ global activeB+ global activeC >= 2)⇒ (1.5.1)(
23 (CDA1[5]@is receiving) ∧ 2 (CDA1[5]@is receiving⇒
(3 (CDA1[5]@has received⇒
(recvA1 CDA1+ recvB1 CDA1+
recvA2 CDA1+ recvB2 CDA1 == 2)))
)
Variables global activeA, global activeB, and global activeC evaluate to 1
if and only if module A, module B, and module C respectively are active. The state labels
CDA1[5]@is receiving and CDA1[5]@has received indicate that the CDA with identi-
fier 5 is either running or has completed the communication phase with the central modules. Vari-
ables recvA1 CDA1 and recvA2 CDA1 (recvB1 CDA1 and recvB2 CDA1, respectively) in-
dicate the number of messages that computer A has received from bus 1 and from bus 2 (computer
B has received from bus 1 and from bus 2, respectively). Informally formula 1.5.1 says that when
al least two out of three central modules are active, the PCU called CDA1 is infinitely often in
its receiving state and, whenever eventually the communication phase with central modules termi-
nates, it has received exactly two messages.
1.5.2 Discussion
Figure 1.7 reports a summary of the results of the verifications, run in the presence of one Byzan-
tine module. We briefly discuss the results for property PCU2′. We want to prove safety properties
of the tournament algorithm in the hypothetic situation of a persistent Byzantine module. We prove
that Byzantine behavior in the communication with the periphery phase makes the tournament al-
gorithm fail. Analyzing the counter-example, we notice that three modules (and not two) send a
message to the PCUs. With this result we underline the critical role of safety logic: if it fails to
disconnect a Byzantine module before the tournament, this algorithm fails as well.
1.6 Abstraction and Implementation Strategies
The complexity of the ACC model forces us to introduce modularity techniques to cope with the
state explosion problem. We proceed as follows:
1. by physically separating, in the PROMELA model, each phase in the ACC behavior, with the
intention to use them as building blocks. In other words, we plan to develop the phases in
separate files, to be included in main file representing the whole ACC model;
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property state vector depth RAM output
PCU1 352 44047 60 success
PCU2 284 25465 23 success
PCU2′ 284 1295 33 fail
PCU3 284 25465 23 success
PCU4 288 449467 33 success
Figure 1.7: Summary of the verification results on TMR-PCU. These results are obtained by
running SPIN with MA+CO options selected, and without Byzantine modules (with the only ex-
ception of PCU2’). In the first column we have the property’s name, in the second the dimensions
of the state vector (in byte), in the third the depth of the search (in number of steps), in the fourth
the total memory needed to the terminate the verification (in Mbytes), and in the last the result of
the verification.
2. by modeling each building block representing a communication phase, both in a correct and
in a Byzantine version;
3. by modeling each building block representing a correct or a Byzantine communication both
in a concrete and in an abstract version.
In the Byzantine (versus the correct) version we implement the Byzantine version of the send.
In this way we: (a) can control the state space growth of the whole model by incrementally in-
serting Byzantine phases, which introduce more non-determinism than the corresponding correct
phase; (b) can test the robustness of the system in the presence of some particular Byzantine phases
and not in the presence of a widely distributed, less realistic, Byzantine behavior.
In the concrete (versus the abstract) version, we model communication with the maximum
parallelism: that is what happens in the real system. On the contrary, in the abstract version we
impose a total order the communication events. For example, module A sends and receives first
from B and then from C; module B receives and sends first to A and then sends and receives from
C; finally module C first receives from A and from B first, and then sends to A and to B. By build-
ing a modular model we obtain an acceptable degree of scalability. In this case, scalability refers
to abstract versus the concrete implementations and with respect to certain properties decided in
accordance with ASF. We prove invariant properties both in concrete and abstract versions. These
properties express fundamental invariants on the communication phases among internal modules
composing the ACC. These properties can be informally described as follows:
(P1) before starting a communication phase, at least two out of three modules are active;
(P2) after a communication phase, each module has sent a message to all the other active mod-
ules;
(P3) after a communication phase, from all the other active modules, a module has either received
a message, or detected a time-out.
(P4) after a communication phase, if a module has detected a time-out while receiving from all
other active modules, it will go in a safe shutdown state.
The properties, expressed as PROMELA assertions, were shown to be satisfied by using SPIN,
on both the concrete and abstract models. This was a sufficient condition (we agree with ASF) for
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not loosing information when substituting, in the model, a concrete phase with the corresponding
abstract version.
The correct and the concrete versions, with respect to the Byzantine and the abstract implemen-
tations, have different impacts on the state space. The correct version has less non-determinism
than the Byzantine version; the abstract version eliminates all non-determinism in the communi-
cation events. By an appropriate composition of different versions in the whole system model, we
obtain a large set of models at different abstraction levels (see Figure 1.8): we checked safety prop-
erties introduced in Section 1.4.1 and Section 1.5.1 by varying the number of the Byzantine phases
inserted in the model. In addition, whenever the state dimension started to become problematic for
our computational resources, we preferred the abstract over the concrete implementation of some,
or all, the phases. In this way we executed a wide set of verification runs. For example, the results
reported in Figure 1.6 have been performed by considering a module with one Byzantine phase in
its abstract implementation, whereas those in Figure 1.7 have been run with all the communication
phases in their abstract versions.
1.7 Conclusions
The project described in this chapter consists in verifying safety properties of a model of a safety-
critical control system in presence of Byzantine behavior of one of its components.
In the context of the project that motivates this valitation work, we report that some of errors
we have found fulfill the expectation of ASF; some other confirme what ASF has discovered
with traditional techniques (i.e., code inspection, testing). Moreover, the great flexibility and high
expandability of formal models has helped us during almost all the steps of the project, when we
have been able to enriched our models, with respect to the initial requirements, at a very low time
and resources cost.
On the basis of this project an assessment of the application of the tool we used to support
formal specification and verification process has been made. For what concerns the language
PROMELA, we already underlined its suitability and expressive power in describing this type
of distributed system. The only disadvantage we have found was the absence of any automatic
management of termination of processes, that obliged us to model ad hoc time-outs as an active
communication with heavy repercussions on the size of the state space. In fact, we need to for-
malize a shutdown as an active behavior; a shutdown module does nothing but participates in all
the communication phases by sending empty messages to cause time-outs.
Regarding the tool SPIN the most important fact to be underlined is related to strategies deal-
ing with the state explosion problem. In particular, the use of a minimized automaton encoding
technique (MA) combined with the state compression option (COLLAPSE) turns out to be useful in
helping with out-of-memory problems, but at the cost of a long execution time. Most verifications,
due to the large state space size required the use of both optimization strategies.
As an example, Figure 1.9 contains representative data, concerning a verification on a 256
Mbyte RAM Pentium II - Linux Suse 5.3 - for a system model whose complete description re-
quired 348 bytes per state; in the figure memory and time resources have been compared by using,
respectively, the COLLAPSE (for which we ran out-of-memory, with the longest depth-first search
path containing 15125 transitions from the initial state) and the COLLAPSE + MA options (for


























































































Figure 1.8: a) The framework in which we develop abstract/concrete and Byzantine/correct model.
b) One of the model we used in TMR-PCU verification.








Depth (100 x steps)
Figure 1.9: A representative example of memory versus time usage in our SPIN experiments, with
CO and with CO+MA optimization strategies. On the left we report the RAM (in Mbytes) and
the time (in minutes) and the depth (in hundreds of steps) reached in a verification that ran out-of-
memory. In this verification only the CO option is used when compiling the model checker. On the
right, we report the same data for the same verification with the CO+MA compiler option enabled.
In this case, a significant reduction of memory makes the verification end without running out of
memory, at the cost of a considerable increase of the running time.
2
Validation of Security Protocols, a Test
Case: Security Analysis of the
OSA/Parlay Framework
“Al solito, quelli dei telefoni tiravano a
praticare l’assurdo. Dicevano, per esempio: il
numero da lei chiamato e` inesistente ... Ma come
si permettevano un’affermazione accussı´? Tutti
i nummari che uno arrinisciva a pinsari erano
esistenti. Se veniva a fagliare un nummaro,
uno solo nell’ordine infinito dei nummari, tutto
il mondo sarebbe precipitato nel caos. Se ne
rendevano conto quelli dei telefoni, sı` o no?”
(Salvo Montalbano in La pazienza del Ragno,
A. Camilleri, 2003)
“As usual those of the phone company
were talking nonsense. They say, for
instance: the number you’re calling
doesn’t exist ... How could they dare to
make such a statement? All the numbers
one can think of must exist. If only one
number was missing, one of them in the
infinite sequence of numbers, the whole
world would fall into chaos. Aren’t those
of the phone company aware of this?”
Abstract
This chapter reports on an experience in analyzing the security of the Trust and Security Man-
agement (TSM) protocol, an authentication procedure within the OSA/Parlay Application
Program Interfaces (APIs) of the Open Service Access and Parlay Group. The experience
has been conducted jointly by research institutes, experienced in security, and an industry ex-
pert in telecommunication networking. OSA/Parlay APIs are designed to enable the creation
of telecommunication applications outside the traditional telecommunication network space
and business model. Network operators consider the OSA/Parlay architecture promising in
stimulating the development of web-service applications by third party providers that are not
necessarily expert in telecommunications. The TSM protocol is executed by the gateways to
OSA/Parlay networks; its role is to authenticate the client applications that try to access the
interfaces of some object representing an offered network capability. For this reason potential
security flaws in the TSM authentication strategy can lead to unauthorized use of network
with evident damages to the operator and to the quality of service. This chapter reports on a
rigorous formal analysis of the TSM specification originally given in UML; it reports on the
design activity of the formal model, the tool-aided verification performed, and the security
flaws discovered. This will allow us to discuss how the security of the TSM protocol can be
generally improved.
2.1 Introduction
OSA/Parlay 1 Application Program Interfaces (APIs) [108] are designed for an easy interaction be-
tween traditional IT applications and telecommunication networks. OSA/Parlay APIs are abstract
1See http://www.parlay.org
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building blocks of network capabilities that developers, not necessarily expert in telecommunica-
tions but perhaps with more expertise in the enterprise market, can quickly comprehend and use to
generate new applications. Concisely, OSA/Parlay APIs proposes an attractive framework where
programmers can develop innovative resources or design new services.
An example of such a service is the retrieval and purchase of goods via a mobile phone.
The service could be provided by a third party provider, different from the mobile operator. In
this case, the provider could develop the service by assembling components that control network
capabilities and functions, e.g., sending/receiving a SMS. These components are furnished by the
telecoms operator in particular their APIs. For example, the sending/receiving of a SMS could
be realized in the following SOAP body that, in XML notation where namespace and encoding









Could you please reserve
two seats for 9 o’clock?
</message>
</sendSMS>
OSA/Parlay APIs can also be used in the development of new web-based services. The Parlay
community has designed particular APIs, called Parlay X APIs, based on web service principles
and oriented to the Internet community.
When network resources are broadly accessible, it becomes crucial to define and enforce ap-
propriate access rules between the entities that offer network capabilities and the service suppliers,
so that an operator can maintain full control over the usage of her resources and on the quality of
service. For instance, it is important that the use of services is guided by a set of rules defining
the supply conditions and the reciprocal obligations between the client and the network operator.
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) are commonly used to formalize a detailed description of all the
aspect of the deal. To avoid that unauthorized entities can sign an agreement and use the network
illegally, on-line authentication checks are of primary importance.
Authentication, in a distributed setting is usually achieved by the use of cryptographic proto-
cols. Experience teaches that such protocols need to be carefully checked, before being fielded.
Formal methods have been profitably applied in the verification of many security or authentication
protocols (e.g., [5, 53, 104, 138, 152, 177, 182]), and nowadays developers have access to libraries
of reliable protocols for different security goals. For example the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) by
Netscape, is widely used to ensure authenticity and secrecy in Internet transactions. Unfortunately,
the use of reliable, plugged-in, protocols is not sufficient to ensure security, just like the use of re-
liable cryptography is not sufficient to ensure secrecy in a communication. In this ambit formal
methods help to validate the correct use of security procedures.
In this chapter we discuss a validation experience whose aim is to analyze formally the au-
thentication mechanism in the Trust and Security Management protocol in OSA/Parlay APIs [1].
As a result of the analysis we propose an improvement concerning its security. This protocol is
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designed to protect telecommunication capabilities from unauthorized access and it implements
an authentication procedure. TSM is specified in the Unified Modeling Language (UML) [171],
where its composing messages, its interfaces towards the client and the server, and the methods im-
plementing security-critical procedures, are described at different levels of abstraction. The formal
validation experiment, conducted within a joint project between research Institutes and Telecom
Italia Lab, has revealed some security flaws of the authentication mechanism. From the analysis
of the traces showing the attacks, we were able to suggest possible solutions to fix the security
weaknesses discovered, and to state a general principle of prudent engineering (in the style of [8])
for improving the security in web-service applications.
2.2 The OSA/Parlay Architecture
The OSA/Parlay architecture enables service application developers to make use of network func-
tionality through an open standardized interface. OSA/Parlay APIs [1] provide an abstract and
coherent view of heterogeneous network capabilities, and they allow a developer to interface its
applications via distributed processing mechanisms. The OSA/Parlay architecture, shown in Fig-
ure 2.1, consists of:
• a set of Client Applications accessing the network resources;
• a set of Service Interfaces, or Service Capability Features (SCFs), that represent interfaces
for controlling the network capabilities provided by network resources (e.g., controlling the
routing of voice calls, sending/receiving SMSs, locating a terminal, etc.);
• a Framework, that provides a modular and “controlled” access to the SCFs.
• Network Resources, in the telecommunication network, implementing the network capabil-
ities.
A Parlay Gateway includes the framework functions and the Service Capability Services
(SCSs) i.e., the modules implementing the SCFs: it is a logical entity that can be implemented
in a distributed way across several systems. Since the target applications could be deployed in
an administrative domain different from the one of the Parlay Gateway, the secure and controlled
access to the SCFs is a predominant aspect for the Parlay architecture. To get the references of the
required SCFs, an application must interact several times with the framework interfaces. For ex-
ample, the application must carry out an authentication phase before selecting the SCFs required,
as described in Section 2.2.1. In this phase the framework verifies whether the application is autho-
rized to use the SCFs, according to a subscription profile. Finally, an agreement is digitally signed,
and the framework gives to the application the references to the required SCFs (e.g., as CORBA
interface reference). These references are valid only for a single session of the application. When
the framework has to return an SCF reference to an application, it contacts the SCS which imple-
ments it, by passing all the configuration parameters e.g., the Service Level Agreement conditions,
stored in the subscription profile of the application. The SCS creates a new instance of the SCF,
configured with the received parameters, and returns its reference to the framework. Each time the
application invokes a method on the SCF instance, the SCS executes it by taking into account the
configuration parameters received at instantiation time.



































Figure 2.1: The OSA/Parlay Architecture. The Trust and Security Management protocol runs
between the Framework Interfaces and the Clients.
2.2.1 Trust and Security Management protocol
One of the critical steps for guaranteeing controlled access to the SCFs is the authentication phase
between the gateway and the application. It is supported by the protocol implemented by the Trust
and Security Management (TSM) API. We focuses on the analysis of the properties of this security
protocol, whose behavior is summarized by the message sequence chart in Figure 2.2. The main
steps of the protocol are:
• Initiate Authentication: the client invokes the method “ initiateAuthentication
WithVersion” on the framework’s public interface (e.g., an URL) to initiate the authen-
tication process. Both the client and the framework provide a reference to their own access
interfaces.
• Select Authentication Mechanism: the client invokes the method “ selectAuthenti
cationMechanism” on the framework authentication interface, to negotiate which hash
function will be used in the authentication steps.
• The client and the framework authenticate each other. The framework could authenticate
the client before (or after) the client authenticates the framework, or the two authentication
processes could be interleaved. However, the client shall respond immediately to any chal-
lenge issued by the framework, as the framework might not respond to any challenge issued
by the client until the framework has successfully authenticated the client. Each authentica-
tion step is performed following a one-way Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
(CHAP) [133] i.e., by issuing a challenge in the “challenge” method, and checking if the
partner returns the correct response. An invocation of the method “authentication
succeeded” signals the success of the challenge.
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• Request an access session: when authenticated by the framework, the client is permitted to
invoke “requestAccess” to start an access session. The client provides a reference to
its own Access interface, and the framework returns a reference to Access interface, unique
for this client.
• The access interface is used to negotiate the signing algorithm to be used in the session and
to obtain the references to other framework interfaces (we will call them, service framework
interfaces), such as service discovery and service agreement management.
Having obtained the reference to a service framework interface the TSM finishes. Note that
the references to the interfaces must remain secret: if an intruder got hold of them, it would be
able to (abusively) access the services. For this reason our analysis will mainly concentrate on the
secrecy of these references. In fact, after the TSM ends, the client selects the required SCFs by
invoking the method “selectService” on the service agreement management interface. The
client obtains a service token, which can be signed as part of the service agreement by the client
and the framework, through the “signServiceAgreement” and the “signAppService
Agreement” methods. Generally the service token has a limited lifetime: if the lifetime of the
service token expires, a method receiving the service token will return an error code. If the sign
service agreement phase succeeds, the framework returns to the client a reference to the selected
SCF, personalized with the client configuration parameters.
2.3 Formal Security Analysis
This section explains in detail the formal analysis of the security of the TSM protocol that we have
done. To carry out the verification phase we used CoProVe [59] a constraint-based system for the
verification of cryptographic protocols 2. CoProVe has been developed at the University of Twente
(NL); it is an improved version of the system designed by Millen and Shmatikov [156]. CoProVe
is based on the strand spaces model [77]; it enjoys an efficient implementation, a monotonic
behavior which allows to detect flaws associated to partial runs, and an expressive syntax in which
a principal may also perform explicit checks for deciding whether to continue or not with the
execution. All these features make CoProVe quite efficient in practice. The intruder model is that
of Dolev-Yao [69], where the malicious entity is identified with the communication infrastructure.
Protocols are written in Prolog-lake style, and properties are expressed as reachability predicates.
In case a security flaw is discovered, CoProVe can show one or all the traces showing the attack.
2.3.1 Modeling Choices
One of the challenges in applying tools of automatic analysis to industrial architectures lies in
translating the (usually less formal) specification into a rigorous formal model. In our experience,
translating a complex system design into a formal protocol specification involves many non-trivial
steps: software technology concepts such as method invocation and object interfaces have to be
“encoded” into an algebraic protocol specification. This encoding phase also forces the engineer
to reason about the security implication of using these constructs.
The OSA/Parlay framework APIs specification consists of many pages of UML specification;
at this level of abstraction it is difficult to have a good overview of its security mechanisms. In
the APIs specification, for instance, there is no explicit transmission of messages: the exchange
2Freely accessible via the web at http://wwwes.cs.utwente.nl/24cqet/coprove.html
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Figure 2.2: Message sequence chart describing the steps of the TSM protocol [1]
of one (sometimes even more) messages happens exclusively by the mechanism “invocation of a
method over an object interface”. Moreover, different levels of abstraction are mixed: for exam-
ple, the same mechanism of “method invocation” is used both to describe, in one step, the whole
set of critical steps of the CHAP handshake and the single message starting of the protocol. More
critically, “method invocation” does not specify the confidentiality of the input/output parame-
ters involved. Innocent acknowledgment messages are treated in the same way as references to
confidential object interfaces.
The application of clear modeling choices encourages the design of a formal model without
the previous ambiguities. In translating the TSM specification in a model we define and apply the
following modeling choices.
Modelling Choice 1 A reference to a (new) private interface, F , is modeled by a (new) shared
encryption key, KF .
Choice 1 reflects the fact that an intruder who does not know the private interface reference cannot
infer anything from any method invocation over that interface. This simple, but essential observa-
tion will make our security analysis straightforward, as we explain in Section 2.3.
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Modelling Choice 2 Calling a method, with parameter M , over a private interface F is mod-
eled as sending the message {M}KF i.e., , M encrypted with KF . Dually, getting the result is
translated as receiving a message encrypted with the same KF ;
In Choice 2 we treat a reference to an object interface as a communication port; consequently
calling a method equates transmitting a message through that port. Moreover, we model the trans-
mission of a message through F , as the transit of a message encrypted with the key KF . In other
words, calling a method over an interface is modeled as a communication encrypted with the in-
terface key. This choice reminds of an observation by Abadi and Gordon [7], who suggest the use
of cryptographic keys to model mobility. Our situation is indeed much simpler: the only form of
“mobility” we have, is the dynamic creation of a “channel”, i.e., an interface reference.
2.3.2 Formal Models
We apply Choices 1 and 2 to design the TSM formal abstract model written in the usual represen-
tation of cryptographic protocols. The obtained model is as follows:
* initiate *
step 1. C−→F : C,KC
step 2. F−→C : KF
* select authentication methods *
step 3. C−→F : {[h, h′, h′′]}KF
step 4. F−→C : {h}KF
* challenge *
step 5. F−→C : {F,N}KC
step 6. C−→F : {C, h(N,SCF )}KC
step 7. F−→C : {ok/fail}KC
* request access *
step 8. C−→F : {req}KF
step 9. F−→C : {KA/fail}KF
* select signing methods *
step 10. C−→F : {[s, s′, s′′]}KA
step 11. F−→C : {s}KA
* request for service interface *
step 12. C−→F : {req ′}KA
step 13. F−→C : {KS/fail}KA
In this abstract model, C represents a client and F the framework, whileC −→ F :M denotes
C sending message M to F . With {M}K we indicate the plain-text M encrypted with a key K,
while h(M) denotes the result of applying a hash function h to M . In step 1 the client initiates the
protocol over the public interface of the framework, by providing its name and a reference to its
interface, KC. In step 2 the framework replies by sending a reference, KF , to its own interface.
Remark 2.3.1 It may seem odd that despite modelling choice we transmit references to interfaces
(represented as keys) in clear. The expectation here is that the challenge response protocol of steps
5-7 would avoid intrusion anyway.
In steps 3 and 4 the client asks the framework to choose an authentication method among h, h′
and h′′. In steps 5 and 6 the actual CHAP protocol is carried out, using the hash function selected
in step 4. Here, SCF represents a shared secret between C and F , required by CHAP [133].
Indeed the UML specification did not provide the details about the CHAP implementation; here
we use the version of CHAP where the client and the framework already share the secret SCF .
In steps 8 and 9 the client asks for an interface where to invoke the request access for a service. In
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steps 10 and 11 the framework chooses the interface. Finally in steps 12 and 13 the client sends a
request for a service and receives back the reference to the relative framework interface.
The abstract model has been translated into the language required by CoProVe. The result of
this translation is a concrete formal model; in addition, we encode (in the language of CoProVe)
the security properties that we want to check. In Figure 2.3 we report one of the concrete models
we used for checking whether KA remains secret or not.
The specification in Figure 2.3 involves three principals: one client (c), one framework (f) and
eavesdropping agent (sec). Each role is specified by a sequence of send or receive actions that
mimic exactly the steps of the abstract model. Symbol “+” is used to denote symmetric encryption
using shared keys. Formal parameters (e.g., in the client role C,F,Kc,Kf,N,Req,Ka,Scf are
used to denote all the objects used in the role specification. In a scenario these parameters are
instantiated with actual constants representing real objects (i.e., c,f, ,kf,n, ,ka,scf). Here
“ ” is used when no instantiation is required, that is when a free variable is involved. The intruder
is assumed to know only the client and framework names plus its own name “e”. Verification of
secrecy consists in asking if there is a trace leading the eavesdropper to know a secret.
2.3.3 Formal Analysis and Detected Weakness
The analysis performed on the model of TSM protocol, pointed out weaknesses in the security
mechanism. In the following we will describe the flaws discovered as a commented list of items.
Where significant, we show the output produced by CoProVe and we interpret the output.
Flaw 1. An intruder can impersonate a client and start an authentication challenge with the frame-
work.
An intruder can obtain the reference to the interface used by the client to start the authentication
challenge (key kf). This happens, unsurprisingly, because the reference kf is transmitted in clear,





Each row represents a communication action. For example, c,send[c,kc] represents the ac-
tion “send” that “c” executes with message “[c,kc]”; c,recv( h325) represents the results
of a “receive” where the client “c” receives the name (in this case generated by the intruder)
“ h325”. The sequence of actions reveal the attack. It can be visualized in the conventional nota-
tion of security protocol (where, we also write h325 as KE, the intruder key, because this is its
understood meaning.):
1. C −→ I(F ) : C,KC
1’. I(C) −→ F : C,KC
2. I(F ) −→ C : KE
2’. F −→ I(C) : KF
This run comprises two parallel runs of the protocol, in which the intruder plays, respectively, the
role of the client against the framework (I(C) in steps 1′ and 2′) and the framework against the
client (I(F ) in steps 1 and 2).
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%(it is a singleton role)
secrecy(N, [ recv(N) ] ).
% scenario specification
% pairs [name, Name]








% The initial intruder knowledge
initial_intruder_knowledge([c,f,e]).
% specify which roles we want
% to force to finish
%(only sec in this example)
has_to_finish([sec]).
Figure 2.3: The “CoProVe” specification (in two columns) used to check the secrecy of KA. To
reduce the search space here we implemented only steps 1-2, 5-6 and 8-9. In other words we
assumed: (a) a fixed hashing function h; (b) that the framework does not reply (instead of replying
“false”) if the client answer wrongly to the CHAP challenge.
This flaws is not serious in itself (provided the authentication procedure is able to detect an
intruder and close the communication), but it becomes serious when combined with the next weak-
nesses in the security; by knowing kf an intruder is able to grab other confidential information.
Flaw 2. An intruder can impersonate a client, authenticate itself to the framework and obtain the
reference to the interface used to request access to a service (key ka).
This is a serious flaw that compromises the main goal of the protocol itself. Informally, a
malicious application can pass the authentication phase instead of an honest client, and it can
obtain a reference to the interface used to request a service (key ka). The study of the output of
CoProVe shows the existence of an “oracle” attack, where the intruder uses the client to get the





5’. [f,send([f,n] + kc)]
5. [c,recv([f,n] + kc)]
6. [c,send([c,sha([n,scf])] + kc)]
6’. [f,recv([c,sha([n,scf])] + kc)]
8. [c,send(req + _h325)]
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9. [c,recv(_h391 + _h325)]
8’. [f,recv(req + kf)]
9’. [f,send(ka + kf)]
[sec,recv(ka)]
Using the standard informal notation for describing protocols, the above trace is read as follows:
1. C −→ I(F ) : C,KC
1’. I(C) −→ F : C,KC
2. I(F ) −→ C : KE
2’. F −→ I(C) : KF
5’. F −→ I(C) : {F,N}KC
5. I(F ) −→ C : {F,N}KC
6. C −→ I(F ) : {C, h(N,SCF )}KC
6’ I(C) −→ F : {C, h(N,SCF )}KC
8. C −→ I(F ) : {req}KE
9. I(F ) −→ C : {fail}KE
8’. I(C) −→ F : {req}KF
9’. F −→ I(C) : {KA}KF
This run comprises two parallel runs of the protocol, in which the intruder plays, respectively, the
role of the framework against the client and the role of the client against the framework.






5’. [f,send([f,n] + kc)]
5. [c,recv([f,n] + kc)]
6. [c,send([c,sha([n,scf])] + kc)]
6’. [f,recv([c,sha([n,scf])] + kc)]
8. [c,send(req + kf)]
8’. [f,recv(req + kf)]
9’. [f,send(ka + kf)]
9. [c,recv(_h325)]
[sec,recv(ka)]
This trace shows that the intruder can eavesdrop first the key kf, passed in clear, and then steal
the message ka+kf. At this point key ka can be obtained by a simple decryption. This attack is
obviously straightforward at this point of the analysis, but it became clear as soon as we applied
Choice 1.
Flaw 3. An intruder can impersonate a client, authenticate itself to the framework, send a request
for a service and obtain the reference to a service framework interface (key ks).
This is also a serious flaw that compromises the main goal of the protocol. An intruder can
obtain the reference to a service framework interface (key ks). It is easy to understand, that this is
possible, for example, as a consequence of flaw 1 and 2: once an intruder has authenticated itself
instead of the client, it can easily obtain the reference.
Further checks with CoProVe, show that the intruder can even retrieve this reference with
a man-in-the-middle attack e.g., by listening to the communication between the client and the
framework and stealing the reference when it is passed in clear. In our model this attack can be
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explained as follows: the intruder intercepts, by eavesdropping, the message {KS}KA and it de-
crypts it. This is possible because the encryption key KF is passed in clear and, by eavesdropping,
the intruder can easily obtain {KA}KF , and hence KA (see Flaw 2).
Flaw 4. An intruder can force the framework to use an authentication mechanism of her choice.
This flaw has been discovered using the specification in Figure 2.4, with two instances of the
framework. When a client offers a list of authentication methods, the first instance selects the
first method at the head of a list (here consisting of only two items), whereas the second instance
chooses the second. In this way we model different choices made by the framework.
The attack is shown by the following CoProVe trace; an intruder can force the framework to





a.3. [c,send([a1,a2] + _h320)]
a.3’. [f,recv([a1,a2] + kf)]
a.4’. [f,send([a1,a1] + kf)]
a.4. [c,recv([a1,a1] + _h320,)]
a.5’. [f,send([f,n] + kc)]
a.5. [c,recv([f,n] + kc)
a.6. [c,send([c,sha([n,scf])] + kc)
a.6’. [f,recv([c,sha([n,scf])] + kc)
a.8. [c,send(req + _h320)]
a.9. [c,recv(req + _h320)]
a.8’. [f,recv(_h404 + kf)]
a.9’. [f,send(ka + kf)]
b.1’. [f,recv([c,_h487])]
b.2’. [f,send(kf2)]
b.3’. [f,recv([a1,a1] + kf2)]
b.4’. [f,send([a1,a1] + kf2)]
b.8’. [f,recv(_h488 + kf2)]
b.9’. [f,send(ka2 + kf2)],
[sec,recv(ka2)]
The attack can be represented in the following abstract steps:
a.1 C −→ I(F1) : C,KC
a.1’ I(C) −→ F1 : C,KC
a.2 I(F ) −→ C : KE
a.2’ F1 −→ I(C) : KF
a.3 C −→ I(F1) : {[h1, h2]}KE
a.3’ I(C) −→ F1 : {[h1, h2]}KF
a.4’ F1 −→ I(C) : {[h1]}KF
[. . .]
b.1’ I(C) −→ F2 : C,KE
b.2’ F2 −→ I(C) : KF2
b.3’ I(C) −→ F2 : {[h1, h1]}KF2
b.4’ F2 −→ I(C) : {[h1]}KF2
In the trace the intruder acts as a man-in-the-middle in a communication between the client and
the first instance of the framework F1 and it learns what method the framework is able to use
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(sequences a.i). In the second run, the intruder acts as a client, and it offers to the second instance
of the framework F2 the choice that the framework is able to accept (sequences b.i). The structure
of the attack is such that it can be applied also for forcing the selection of a signing methods i.e.,
steps 10 and 11 of the abstract model.
2.4 Discussion
The analysis performed so far shows some weaknesses of the protocol, and gives also useful indi-
cations on how to improve the robustness of the protocol. This section discusses the weaknesses
here presented, and suggests possible solutions to increase the overall security. We start with some
preliminary considerations.
The security weak is because some references to interfaces are passed in the clear. This is
because the role of those references has been misunderstood, or under-evaluated, or more prob-
ably not recognized in the UML, high-level, object specification. A rigorous, synthetic, formal
specification and precise modeling choices help in giving each object its right role. In our case we
were able to identify in the role of some references to object interface the same role that session
keys have. This observation can be quoted as a principle:
Independently of their high-level representation, data that directly or indirectly gives
access to a secret, must be thought of (hence, modeled) as encryption keys.
This principle plays a role also in fixing the protocol. In fact, the common practice in protocol
engineering [8] suggests the use of (other) session keys to protect the confidentiality of sensitive
information, which in the case of TSM are the references to interfaces.
According to this model, session keys are indeed missing completely from the present im-
plementation3, while their use could prevent the intruder from gaining a reference to an interface
(as shown, by a man-in-the-middle attack). Note that unfortunately it is not sufficient to establish
a session key during the challenge phase. In this case, Flaw 2 remains intact, as confirmed by
CoProVe. This implies that the structure of the protocol needs to be globally reviewed. An ad-
ditional point of discussion concerns the correct use of a CHAP-based authentication. From the
OSA/Parlay documentation [1] we read that security can be ensured if the “challenge” is frequently
invoked by the framework to authenticate the client that, in turn, must reply “immediately”:
However, the client shall respond immediately to any challenge issued by the frame-
work, as the framework might not respond to any challenge issued by the client until
the framework has successfully authenticated the client” ([1], page 19)
Our analysis proves that not only the intruder can act as a client with respect to the frame-
work, but also that it can passively observe, as man-in-the-middle, the framework and a client
authenticating each other as many times as they want, and then steal the references to the service
framework interfaces when they are transmitted in clear. At this point the intruder can substitute
itself for the client.
Flaw 4 is different in nature, and it teaches that particular care must be paid to the choice of
the encryption algorithms or digital signature procedures offered by the framework: for example,
the intruder can force the system to use the encryption algorithm that is easier to crack.
3Do not confuse them with the session keys that appear in the abstract model. Those are part of the model and
represent private references to interfaces.
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2.5 Conclusions
This chapter discusses an industrial experience of formal analysis applied to the security aspects of
the OSA/Parlay Trust and Security Management protocol. The protocol is devised to authenticate
the clients before giving them access to the network services. Our experience confirms that formal
methods are an invaluable tool that can discover serious security flaws that may be overlooked
otherwise. This is true in two respects. First, the use of a formal model, where only the relevant
security features are expressed, helps in pointing out what are the critical parts for security. In
an informal description, on the other hand, this information is usually dispersed and difficult to
gather. Second, the use of an automatic tool allows us to identify dangerous man-in-the middle
attacks, which are notoriously difficult to detect in high-level specifications.
From this experience, conducted within a joint project between industry and research insti-
tutes, we state a general principle for security in web-services: it is essential to identify clearly the
security role of each object involved in service specification. It is vital especially for those objects
that abstractly represent encryption keys. This principle helps in simplifying the security analysis.
With the application of this principle we discover serious weaknesses more easily, and we are able
to discuss how the security of the TSM protocol can be generally improved.
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% secrecy check (singleton role)















% Set up the intruder knowledge
initial_intruder_knowledge([c,f,e]).
% specify which roles we want
% to force to finish
% (only sec in this example)
has_to_finish([sec]).
Figure 2.4: The “CoProVe” code used to discover flaw 4 (in two columns). The model of the
framework includes the “select authentication method” phases of the abstract model and imple-
ments steps 1–9 of the abstract model. Step 7 is omitted, i.e., the framework does not reply (instead
of sending “fail”) in case of failure of the challenge phase. The second instance of the framework
models only steps 1–4 and steps 8–9, i.e., those steps strictly necessary to discover the attack.
Part II




Techniques of Security Protocol
Analysis in Fault-Tolerance
Fenesta cu sta nova gelosia tutta lucente de
centrella d’oro, tu m’annascunne Nennella bella
mia, lassamela vere` sinno` me moro. (R. Murolo
in La Nova Gelosia, Serenata Napoletana del
’700)
Damn this new jalousie, shiny and with a
golden chain, you hide beloved Nennella
from my sight, please let me see her, or I
will die.
Abstract
This chapter shows how fault-tolerance analysis can benefit from techniques of analysis devel-
oped for the study of security protocols. We use the CCS process algebra as a formal frame-
work. We model the fault-tolerant system and its environment as two separate and interacting
CCS processes, P#F and F respectively. In P
#
F , we describe the system’s failing behavior
and its fault-recovering procedures. Faults are represented by reserved actions from a finite
set F. In F , we model the fault assumptions, that is the assumptions over the modalities of
occurrence of faults; moreover, F is able to trigger fault actions in P#F by interacting through
the set of actions in F. In the CCS, this framework has to the general form (P#F ‖ F ) \ F.
From the point of view of the analysis, we study the fault-tolerance of P#F with respect to a
given property, when F is an unspecified component; in this case, the analysis can be made
independent from any particular fault assumption, and the role of F can be compared with that
played by the intruder in security protocol analysis. We restate in fault-tolerance two strate-
gies of validation used in security protocols analysis. The first strategy consists in reducing
the problem of checking if a property (here a µ-calculus formula) holds in our framework, to
a problem of validity in the µ-calculus. We exploit partial model checking in this reduction
step, and we show how the validity problem, generally EXPTIME complete, can be solved ef-
ficiently in the universal conjunctive subclass of the µ-calculus. Through examples, we show
that this subclass is sufficiently expressive to model many important fault-tolerance proper-
ties. The second strategy consists in characterizing the fault-tolerance properties (here “fault
tolerance”, “fail stop”, “fail safe”, and “fail silent”) in the Generalized Non Deducibility on
Compositions, a scheme that has been profitably applied in the definition and in the analysis
of many security protocol properties. Thus, we can reuse in fault-tolerance the techniques for
validating non-interference from which the Generalized Non Deducibility on Compositions
originates. We also argue about the availability of effective methodologies of analysis, and
about the possibility of applying compositional techniques.
3.1 Related Work
Some preliminary ideas about a relationship between security and fault tolerance analysis can be
found in [204, 187, 185, 153, 151, 180, 122, 89].
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An informal and introductory comparison between properties in dependability and security is
presented in [121]. In a seminal paper [204], Weber shows that the concept of non-interference
[101] used in security, captures the intuitive notions of “fault-tolerance” and of “graceful degra-
dation”; informally, they can be read as “the occurrence of faults does not interfere (or weakly
interferes) with the visible behavior of the system” [204]. Weber suggests to validate a system
under different sets of fault scenarios, and he supposes that the likelihood of these scenarios is
determined by an environment interacting with the system.
We anticipate that in this chapter we develop these ideas further. First, we model a fault-
tolerant system and its environment in the formal framework of the Calculus of Communicating
Systems [158]; then we characterize fault-tolerance in terms of logical and non-interference prob-
lems. In our framework, we are able to propose different strategies of analysis, which were missing
in [204].
In [153] Meadows proposes a classification of security properties inspired by the taxonomy
used in fault-tolerance. She also argues that security analysis can be improved by incorporating
techniques typical of dependability. Four years later, following a complementary trend, Mead-
ows and McLean claim that the use of emerging results in security analysis can enrich the fault
prevention and fault removal strategies [151].
Rushby [180], observes analogies between non-interferences approaches in security and in
safety analysis mainly regarding the technique in system design called “partitioning”. Foley [88,
89] uses CSP [115] to define the “integrity” property as a predicate over traces. Integrity is a
common property of dependability and computer security; Foley shows how his characterization
classifies integrity as a non-interference property.
A formal characterization of safety properties such as non-interference, non deducibility, and
casuality and their role in fault intrusion tolerance is discussed by Stavridou and Dutertre in [187].
They affirm that, even though the pessimistic worst-case assumptions used in security are too
strong when applied to fault-tolerance, non-interference provides a useful framework for spec-
ifying and verifying safety, reliability and availability [187]. They also point out the need for
verification techniques of non-interference, especially those addressing compositionality.
In [185], Simpson, Woodcock and Davies, uses CSP to formalize “fail safe”, “fail soft”, and
“fault-tolerance” as properties of non-interference. These properties are expressed by a weak
version of a relation, called protection, defined for classes of events: in a process P , E is protected
from F if availability of E actions in any trace of P is unaffected by the occurrence of events from
F . A particular process, Run(F ) makes events from F always available, and properties over a
system are defined by assuming the system to run concurrently with Run(F ). They also use the
CSP model checker [176] as a verification tool.
3.2 Introduction
In this chapter, we apply to fault-tolerance analysis two strategies used to define and to analyze
computer and protocol security properties. The first strategy, studied Section 3.6, requires a fault-
tolerance property to be expressed by a µ-calculus formula. It consists in reducing the problem
of checking if a property holds in our framework, to a problem of validity in the µ-calculus. We
exploit partial model checking in this reduction step, and we show how the validity problem,
generally EXPTIME complete, can be solved efficiently in the universal conjunctive subclass of
the µ-calculus. The second strategy, studied in Section 3.8, consists in characterizing the fault-
tolerance properties “fault-tolerance”, “fail stop”, “fail safe”, and “fail silent” in the Generalized
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Non Deducibility on Compositions (in short, GNDC) [86]. GNDC is a scheme that has been
profitably applied in the definition and in the analysis of many security protocol properties. The
analysis of fault-tolerance properties within the GNDC can benefit from techniques and tools for
the verification of information flow and non-interference properties [82], from which GNDC ori-
ginate. Moreover, the uniform framework of GNDC helps in proving similarities between security
properties and fault-tolerance properties; we show, for example, that fault-tolerance is exactly the
BNDC [81] security property. Potentially this is also a first step towards a formal and uniform
taxonomy of fault-tolerance properties.
As a common modeling framework, our approach requires that a system, its failing behav-
ior, and its fault-recovering procedures, are formally specified as finite state terms in a process
algebra. Here, we use the Calculus of Communicating System (CCS) [158], but our framework
is completely general and it can be easily rephrased in other process algebras, for instance the
CSP [115] or the pi-calculus [161]. The validation framework we propose falls into the open sys-
tem paradigm: a system acts within an unspecified environment which is able to trigger actions
in the system. We will call such an environment faulty environment. Usually, the presence of an
environment causing any action of the system’s interface has two unpleasant effects: the first is the
well-known state space explosion [201], the second is that unrealistic situations may arise during
the analysis [93]. As a solution we verify a system P in a well-characterized class EF of (faulty)
environments. Each faulty environment F ∈ EF acts as a fault-injector that interacts with the sys-
tem only through a specified finite set F of fault actions. Differently from [185, 200], we treat F
as an unspecified component of the system. In this way, we check the reliability of a system model
with respect to any potential occurrences of faults. In CCS, our framework can be summarized as
(P ‖ F ) \ F, where P is the model of our fault-tolerant candidate system, F is an unspecified
term in EF, and F is the finite set of fault actions.
In the first part of this chapter we formalize fault-tolerance in a logical formalism, here a
variant of the µ-calculus [35]. By partial model checking [16], the fault tolerance analysis problem
is reduced to a validity problem in the µ-calculus. Intuitively, the idea is as follows: proving that
∀F ∈ EF, (P ‖ F )\F satisfies a fault-tolerance property φ, is equivalent to prove that the modified
formula φ//FP is valid in EF, where //F is the partial evaluation for the parallel composition and
restriction operators. The modified formula φ/F P characterizes exactly the scenarios of faults the
system is resilient to. Moreover, by considering the characteristic formulas φ of a set of possible
fault scenarios, checking if P is fault-tolerant with respect to those scenarios is equivalent to check
the validity of φ ⇒ ϕ//P . logical characterization of fault-tolerance is given, several analysis
techniques may be adopted. Some of them lead to efficient analysis of certain properties: we
identify a class of µ-calculus formulas whose validity checking can be performed in linear-time in
the dimension of φ/F P .
In the second part we study the application of Generalized Non Deducibility on Compositions
(GNDC) in fault-tolerance analysis. GNDC, first presented in [86], is a framework where a family
of security properties has been uniformly expressed and verified [86, 85]. GNDC has roots in
non-interference analysis, and it has not been applied to fault tolerance so far. In our framework a
GNDC property has the form:
P satisfies GNDCα/ iff ∀F ∈ EF : (P ‖ F ) \ F / α(P )
Generally speaking this means that a system P enjoys GNDCα/ if and only if P shows (with
respect to a process relation /) the same behavior as α(P ). This must be true even if P is com-
posed, by the parallel operator ‖, with any environment F chosen from EF. Here, EF represents
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the set of all environments which interact with P through actions F. GNDC is parametric in /, a
relation among processes representing the notion of “observation”, and in α a function between
CCS terms. Given P , α(P ) describes the expected (correct) behavior of P .
In the uniform scheme of the GNDC we express and compare the fault-tolerance properties
“fault-tolerance”, “fail stop”, “fail safe”, and “fail silent”. This comparison describes a preliminary
step towards a formal classification of dependable properties, on the basis of the work by Focardi
et al [85] who have compiled a classification of security properties. Finally, we show how some
of the theoretical results of GNDC originally stated for security analysis (e.g., compositionality in
proving a GNDC property) can be reformulated and reused in the analysis of fault-tolerance.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.3 summarises the basic theory of CCS. Sec-
tion 3.4 explains the uniform scheme that we use to model a fault-tolerant (candidate) system and
its environment. Section 3.5 recalls the (equational) µ-calculus modal logic for process analysis.
Section 3.6 describes our characterization of fault-tolerance in the µ-calculus logic framework.
Moreover, it explains our solution methods based on partial model checking and on an efficient
methodology to check the validity in a subclass of the µ-calculus. Section 3.7 summarises the def-
initions of process behavioral equivalences we use in the rest of the chapter. Section 3.8 describes
our characterization of fault-tolerance in the GNDC scheme, and underlines our solution methods
in this framework. Section 3.9 concludes the chapter.
3.3 CCS Background
This section summarises the basic notions and definitions of the Calculus of Communicating Sys-
tem (CCS) [158], the calculus used through the chapter.
CCS assumes a set Act = L ∪ L of (observable) communication actions. Names from L
model the emission of a signal; overlined names from L (called co-names) represent the reception
of a signal. The purpose of putting a line, called complementation, over a names is to show that the
corresponding action can synchronize with its complemented partner. Complementation follows
the rule that a = a, for any communication action a ∈ Act . A special symbol, τ , is used to model
any (unobservable) internal action; hence the full set of possible actions is Actτ = Act ∪ {τ}.
We let a, b range over Actτ . The following grammar specifies the syntax of the language defining
all the CCS processes:
P,Q ::= 0 | a.P | P +Q | P ‖ Q | P \A | P [f ] | A
Informally, 0 is the process that does not perform any action. a.P is the process ready to
perform action a, then it behaves as P . Process P +Q can choose non-deterministically to behave
either as P or as Q. ‖ is the operator of parallel composition: in P ‖ Q, P and Q may evolve
concurrently or communicate via complementary communication actions. In P \A, whereA ⊆ L,
actions a ∈ A ∪ A are prevented from happening; they are possible only in a communication
internal to P . P [f ] is the process obtained from P by changing each a ∈ Actτ into f(a); the
relabeling function f must be such that f(τ) = τ . A is a process identifier. We assume that every
process identifier A has a defining equation A def= P .
The operational semantics of CCS is given in the form of labelled transition systems (E,Actτ ,
a−→) , where states E are CCS terms, actions Actτ are CCS actions, and the transition relation
a−→⊆ E × Actτ × E is defined by structural induction as the least relation generated by the
following set of inference rules:





P +Q a−→ P ′
Q
a−→ Q′
P +Q a−→ Q′
P
a−→ P ′
P ‖ Q a−→ P ′ ‖ Q
Q
a−→ Q′
P ‖ Q a−→ P ‖ Q′
P
a−→ P ′, Q a−→ Q′, a 6= τ




f(a)−→ P ′[f ]
P
a−→ P ′, a 6∈ A ∪A
P \A a−→ P ′ \A
P
a−→ P ′, A def= P
A
a−→ P ′
The transition relation a−→ defines the usual concept of derivation in one step: P a−→ P ′
means that process P evolves in one step into process P ′ by executing action a ∈ Actτ . We write
P




a−→ is written −→∗.
Definition 3.3.1 Given a CCS process P , the set Der(P ) = {P ′|P −→∗ P ′}, is the set of its
derivatives. A CCS process P is finite state if Der(P ) is finite.
Definition 3.3.2 Let Sort(P ) (called the sort of P ) be the set of names of actions that syntactically
appear in the process P , and let F be a finite set of actions. The set, EF, of processes whose sort
is in F ∪ {τ}, is so defined:
EF
def= {F : Sort(F ) ⊆ F ∪ {τ}}
3.4 Modeling Fault-Tolerant Systems
Using process algebras it is possible to provide a uniform framework for specifying fault-tolerant
systems. In [19, 21] CCS/Meije is used to specify a fault-tolerant system, its failing behavior, its
recovery strategies, and the fault assumptions. Fault assumptions define if a fault is, for instance,
temporary, permanent, or Byzantine.
We follow a similar modeling approach, but differently from [19, 21] we do not include any
specific fault assumption in the system specification. Instead, we develop a neat separation be-
tween the system and its environment that acts as a fault-injector. We call such a fault-injector
environment faulty environment. This choice has important conceptual implications:
• the specification of the system must describe the behaviors of the system in reaction to
faults, but not the fault assumptions;
• all the fault assumptions are part of the faulty environment.
These are our technical ideas to encode fault-tolerance analysis as the analysis of an open
system. We are interested in evaluating the system behavior in a general and unspecified faulty en-
vironment; we describe our strategies of analysis in Section 3.6 and Section 3.8. In the following,
when talking about formal specifications of fault-tolerant systems, we understand the following
definitions:
A system is a finite state CCS process, P , describing the behavior of the system through the
execution of actions. Generally, P is a parallel composition of sub-processes, each modeling
sub-components of the system communicating with each other.
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A failing system is a finite state CCS process, PF, obtained by extending the process P with the
possibility of executing fault actions from a set F. In PF we specify also the failure modes
i.e., the behavior of the system induced by the occurrence of the faults.
A fault-tolerant (candidate) system is a finite state CCS process, P#F , obtained by adding to
PF those processes modeling some error-recovery mechanism in accordance with some
fault-tolerant design strategy (e.g., modular redundancy, voting). In CCS, P#F has the form
(P (1)F ‖ · · · ‖ P (n)F ‖ Q) \A where:
• P (1)F . . . P (n)F are n copies of PF in a parallel composition.
• Q is a process that represents an additional error detection module, for instance, a
voter. The detail description of this process usually depends on the particular fault-
tolerance strategy we are describing in the system specification.
• A = {a1, · · · , an}, A ∩ F = ∅ is the set of names over which P (1)F . . . P (n)F and Q
communicate.
Occurrences of faults are induced by a faulty environment F , that causes faults to happen. It
interacts with P#F only through actions in F.
The previous definitions suggest a uniform characterization of P#F : a fault-tolerant (candidate)
system P can be obtained by applying, to P , a function, β, from processes to processes. In the
following, we abstract from any particular β in our modifier ( )#F . So P
#
F is the CCS specification
of the fault-tolerant version of P obtained by applying some fault-tolerance technique. As a unique
constraint, at model level, the set F must remain disjoint from any other set of actions and must
be accessible to the environment.
Example 3.4.1 We show the CCS specification of a simple fault-tolerant battery, Bat . The battery
returns one unit of energy when it receives a request message. Actions get and ret model the
request signal and the unit of energy, respectively. The CCS process describing Bat is as follows:
Bat def= get.ret.Bat
In its failing version, Bat{f0,f1}, the battery may crash after it receives a request. As an effect,
it may produce either a valid energy unit (action ret1) or an invalid burst of energy (action ret0).
We assume two different possible faults: the former (action f0) certainly causes the battery to
fail; the latter (action f1) causes the battery to switch in a failing state where either a valid or
an invalid energy unit may be produced non-deterministically. A silent action, τ , models some
internal behavior that appears before the module switches into its failing state as an effect of a f1





Bat ′ def= ret1.Bat{f0,f1} + ret0.Bat{f0,f1}
Starting from Bat{f0,f1} we design the fault-tolerant version of the battery. It is composed of two
redundant instances of the battery and of the two additional modules: Spl , a splitter, and Con , a
voter. We now give the CCS processes describing all of these components.
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Bat (i) def= Bat [geti/get, reti,1/ret]
Bat (i){f0,f1}
def= Bat{f0,f1}[geti/get, reti,0/ret0, reti,1/ret1]
The two indexed instances of the battery Bat and Bat{f0,f1}, are specified by processes Bat
(i)
and Bat (i){f0,f1} respectively, for i = 1, 2. Action get1 (respectively, get2) represents the request
that the splitter directs to the first (respectively, the second) instance of the battery. Actions ret1,1
and ret1,0 (respectively, ret2,1 and ret2,0) represent the outputs of the first (respectively, the
second) battery in case of a valid or an invalid production of energy.
Spl def= get.get1.get2.ack.Spl
The CCS process specifying the splitter, Spl , delivers the energy request to each of the two
redundant modules. For sake of simplicity, our splitter forwards a request of energy in a precise
order. Moreover, Spl cannot accept a new energy request until it receives a synchronization signal
from the controller (action ack).
Con def= ret1,0.Con ′ + ret1,1.ret.Con ′′
Con ′ def= ret2,0.Con ′′′ + ret2,1.ret.Con ′′′
Con ′′ def= ret2,0.Con ′′′ + ret2,1.Con ′′′
Con ′′′ def= ack.Con
The controller can collect the energy units from the two batteries. If a valid unit is returned, the
controller shows it to the environment (action ret). It also absorbs an eventual over production of
energy. After the controller has received a signal from both the batteries, it sends to the splitter the
synchronization message ack; if both batteries fail in producing their unit of energy the controller
only sends the message ack, and the splitter is ready to receive a new energy request. We can now
build two different fault-tolerant (candidate) specifications:
Bat#{f0,f1}
def= (Spl ‖ Bat (1) ‖ Bat (2){f0,f1} ‖ Con) \A (3.4.1)
Battery#{f0,f1}
def= (Spl ‖ Bat (1){f0,f1} ‖ Bat
(2)
{f0,f1} ‖ Con) \A
where A = {get1, get2, ret1,0, ret1,1, ret2,0, ret2,1, ack}.
Bat#{f0,f1}, contains one potentially failing battery (see also Figure 3.1); Battery
#
{f0,f1}, uses
two failing batteries. We will use Bat#{f0,f1} and Battery
#{f0, f1} as test cases throughout the
chapter.
3.4.1 Our Scenario for Fault-Tolerance Analysis
In this section, we introduce in our general scenario for the analysis of fault-tolerance, and we give
a formalization of it in CCS. As introduced in Section 3.2, we propose to study a fault-tolerant
(candidate) system in a generic and unspecified faulty environment acting as a fault-injector. The
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Figure 3.1: The flow diagram of the (candidate) fault-tolerant version of the battery, Bat#{f0,f1}.
Restricted actions are within brackets.
faulty environment is able to interact with the systems through a finite and defined set of fault
actions, in fact triggering the occurrence of faults in the systems. In CCS this scenario is so
defined:
∀F ∈ EF, (P#F ‖ F ) \ F (3.4.2)
In scenario (3.4.2), process F is the faulty environment, that interacts with P#F through the finite
set of actions F. Moreover, F is an unspecified component ranging over EF, the set of possible
CCS processes whose sort is in F∪{τ}. Set EF is the class of all possible faulty environment and
it represents our unique fault assumption model.
Remark 3.4.2 P#F we do not include other fault actions than those triggered by F . Therefore, F
is exactly the set of names over which P#F and F interact.
Remark 3.4.3 Fault actions are restricted. This implies that PF and F have to synchronize on
F. At the abstraction level of our scenario of analysis, faults are then considered internal (i.e., not
observable) actions of the failing systems: only the (probably faulty) behavior of a system is really
observable.
In practice, a system is either resilient to faults or the presence of faults is highlighted by
its subsequent behavior. Roughly speaking, in our framework “fault-tolerance” means that faults
cannot interfere with the normal observable behavior of the system.
Example 3.4.4 The scenario for analyzing the fault-tolerant (candidate) battery Bat#{f0,f1} is as
follows:
∀F ∈ E{f0,f1}, (Bat#{f0,f1} ‖ F ) \ {f0, f1}
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3.5 Background on Logic and Properties of Processes
In this section we summarize the technical background required to understand the logic charac-
terization of fault-tolerance we will develop in Section 3.6. We summarise basic notions of the
modal µ-calculus and of the equational µ-calculus in Section 3.5.1 and Section 3.5.2 respectively,
we digest the use of the µ-calculus for observational properties over processes in Section 3.5.3,
and we synthetize the basic of partial model checking in Section 3.5.4.
3.5.1 Modal µ-calculus
The modal µ-calculus [35] is a modal logic with fix-point operators. It is used in computer science
to express temporal properties of distributed systems, such as non-terminating behaviors, safety
and liveness properties [127]. Formulas of the µ-calculus are generated by the following grammar:
φ := tt | ff | X | φ ∧ φ′ | φ ∨ φ′ | 〈a〉φ | [a]φ | µX.φ | νX.φ
Here a ranges over the action set Actτ and X ranges over a set of variables V. The fix-point
operators are ν (greatest fix-point) and µ (least fix-point). The semantics, ‖φ‖ρ, of a µ-calculus
formula φ is defined over labelled transition systems. Let M = (Q, Q0,Actτ ,
a−→) be a labelled
transition system, and ρ an environment function that associates a subset of Q to the free variables
in φ. As a notation ρ[x/X] is the environment ρ where x is associated with X . If we let σ range
over {µ, ν} then ‖φ‖ρ is the set of states of M defined by the following equations:
‖X‖ρ = ρ(X), ‖tt‖ρ = Q, ‖ff‖ρ = ∅
‖φ1 ∧ φ2‖ρ = ‖φ1‖ρ ∩ ‖φ2‖ρ, ‖φ1 ∨ φ2‖ρ = ‖φ1‖ρ ∪ ‖φ2‖ρ
‖[a]φ‖ρ = {Q|∀Q′ : Q a−→ Q′ implies Q′ ∈ ‖φ‖ρ}
‖〈a〉φ‖ρ = {Q|∃Q′ : Q a−→ Q′ and Q′ ∈ ‖φ‖ρ}
‖σX.φ‖ρ = σf where f(x) def= ‖φ‖ρ[x/X]
A labelled transition system M satisfies a µ-calculus formula φ, written M |=ρ φ, if Q0 ∈
‖φ‖ρ. We remove the subscript ρ when it is clear from the context or when φ does not contain free
variables, i.e., when φ is a closed formula.
Remark 3.5.1 The modal µ-calculus here presented does not contain a negation operator¬. How-
ever for any formula φ there is a formula φc, called the complement of φ, which expresses the
negation of φ. A formula φc is obtained by substituting for every operator in φ its dual according
to the following inductive rules:
ttc = ff
(〈K〉φ)c = [K]φc





(φ ∨ φ′)c = φc ∧ φ′c
(νZ.φ)c = µZ.φc
The modal µ-calculus subsumes [63, 23] several other state-based logics such as PDL, CTL,
and CTL∗, and action-based logics such as ECTL∗, ACTL and ACTL∗. Moreover, the µ-calculus
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enjoys the finite model property, i.e., if a closed formula φ is satisfiable then there exists a finite
model for φ [192]. A finitary axiomatization has been proposed by Walukievicz [202].
Many properties can be express in the µ-calculus (see [190, 37]). For example, νX.〈−〉tt ∧
[−]X expresses “deadlock freedom”, and µX.〈−〉tt∧ [−a]X expresses “action a must eventually
occur”. In writing properties, here and in the rest of the chapter, we use the shortcut notations
[K]φ and 〈K〉φ where K is a set of actions in Actτ : [K]φ is a macro for
∧
a∈K [a]φ and 〈K〉φ
for
∨
a∈K〈a〉φ. Moreover −K is an abbreviation for Actτ −K. The abbreviation −a stands for
−{a}; 〈Actτ 〉φ and [Actτ ]φ are synthetically written as 〈−〉φ and [−]φ, respectively.
3.5.2 Equational µ-calculus
The equational µ-calculus [125, 16, 23, 17] is an equivalent variant of the µ-calculus. By the
use of standard techniques [15, 145, 146], a µ-calculus formula φ can be transformed, in linear-
time in φ, into an equivalent equational µ-calculus formula and vice-versa. For this reason the
µ-calculus and the equational µ-calculus can be use interchangeably in all the results we show
in this chapter. Bhat and Cleaveland proposed translations from CTL, CTL∗ and ECTL∗ into
equational µ-calculus [23].
The equational µ-calculus is based on fix-point equations that substitute the recursion opera-
tors. Let X be a variable ranging over a set V of variables, then a least (greatest) fix-point equation
is X =µ φ (X =ν φ), where φ is an assertion, that is a modal formula without recursion operators.
The syntax of assertions (φ) and of lists of equations (ϕ) is defined by the following grammar:
assertion φ := tt | ff | X | φ ∧ φ′ | φ ∨ φ′ | 〈a〉φ | [a]φ
equations list ϕ ::= (X =ν φ) ϕ | (X =µ φ) ϕ | 
It is assumed that variables appear only once on the left-hand sides of an equations list ϕ : the
set of these variables is denoted as Defs(ϕ). An equations list ϕ is closed if every variable that
appears in the assertions of the list is in Defs(ϕ). Figure 3.2 gives example of properties in the
equational µ-calculus.
The semantics of the equational µ-calculus is defined over labelled transition systems. As a
notation, unionsq represents the union of disjoint environments, and [] denotes the empty environment.
Letting σ be in {µ, ν}, σU.f(U) represents the σ fix-point of the function f in one variable U .
Let be M = (Q, Q0,Actτ ,
a−→) a labelled transition system and ρ an environment function that
assigns a subset of Q to the free variables in φ. The semantics, ‖ϕ‖′ρ, of an equation list ϕ is an
environment which assigns subsets of states of Q systems to variables in Defs(ϕ). Formally, ‖ϕ‖′ρ
is defined by the following equations:
‖‖′ρ = []
‖(X =σ φ)ϕ‖′ρ = ‖ϕ‖′(ρunionsq[U ′\X]) unionsq [U ′/X]
where U ′ = σU.‖φ‖(ρunionsq[U/X]unionsqρ′(U)), and ρ′(U) = ‖ϕ‖′(ρunionsq[U/X]). The interpretation, ‖φ‖ρ, of an
assertion φ is defined as for the µ-calculus.
Informally ‖(X =σ φ)ϕ‖′ρ says that the solution to (X =σ φ)ϕ is the σ fixed point solution
U ′ of ‖φ‖ρ where the solution to the rest of the list of equations ϕ is used as environment. A
labelled transition system M satisfies an equation list ϕ, written M |=ρ ϕ ↓ X , if Q0 ∈ ‖ϕ‖′ρ(X),
where X is the first variable in the list ϕ. We omit ρ out when it is evident from the context or
when ϕ is closed.
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X =ν [−]X ∧ 〈−〉tt Absence of deadlock
X =ν [−]X ∧ 〈a〉tt On all-paths an action a occurs
Y =µ [−]Y ∨ 〈a〉ff There is path on which eventually no a occurs{
X =ν Y
Y =µ [−]Y ∨ 〈a〉X
Along all paths a occurs infinitely often
Figure 3.2: Examples of properties in the equational µ-calculus [17], and their informal meaning.
3.5.3 Observable µ-calculus Properties over Processes
In case an external observer cannot see τ actions, a natural way of analyzing a process is abstract-
ing these actions from the behavior of the processes, while preserving the branching structure.
This is the viewpoint that we consider in our framework. Let us consider the following labelled
transition relation a=⇒, between CCS terms
P
τ=⇒ P ′ if P τ−→∗ P ′
P
a=⇒ P ′ if P τ−→∗ a−→ τ−→∗ P ′, a ∈ Act
Transitions a=⇒ are called observable transitions, or weak transitions in contrast to transitions
a−→ which are qualified as strong.
Modal µ-calculus formulas are usually too strong with respect to what an external observer can
see. In other words they can distinguish processes that are indistinguishable if we would consider
only observable transitions. In order to make properties compatible with the notion of external
observation, modalities of the µ-calculus must be interpreted in terms of observable transitions,
that is by using the transition a=⇒. In that case, 〈〈 〉〉 and [[ ]] are used instead of 〈 〉 and [ ], respec-
tively. The interpretation of formula 〈〈a〉〉φ, for example, is like 〈a〉φ where the weak transition
relation is used instead of the strong one:
‖〈〈a〉〉φ‖′ρ = {Q| ∃Q′ : Q a=⇒ Q′ and Q′ ∈ ‖φ‖′ρ}
Weak modalities can be also defined in terms of the corresponding strong modalities [189]; for
example 〈〈a〉〉 def= µZ.〈τ〉Z ∧ 〈a〉µZ.φ∧ 〈τ〉Z. The sub-logic of the µ-calculus obtained restricting
the modalities to the subset {〈〈 〉〉, [[ ]], 〈〈K〉〉, [[K]]} (with τ 6∈ K) is called the observational
µ-calculus [189].
3.5.4 Partial Model Checking
Partial model checking [16, 17] is a technique that relies upon compositional methods for proving
properties of concurrent system. It has been introduced first by Andersen, who used the equational
µ-calculus for technical convenience [16]. Indeed, the µ-calculus and the equational µ-calculus
can be used interchangeably in this context, as noticed in Section 3.5.2.
Reformulated in the CCS, the intuitive idea underlying partial evaluation is the following:
proving that (P ‖ Q) \ A satisfies an equational µ-calculus formula φ is equivalent to proving
that Q satisfies a modified formula φ/A P , where //A P is the partial evaluation function for the
operators of parallel composition and restriction.
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In the following we use P ‖A Q as an abbreviation for (P ‖ Q) \ A. In Figure 3.3 we give
the definition of //A , the partial evaluation function for the CCS operator ‖A where A ⊆ Act .
Andersen proves the following lemma [16]:
Lemma 3.5.2 Given a process P ‖A Q (where P is finite-state) and an equational specification
ϕ↓X we have:
P ‖A Q |= (ϕ↓ X) iff Q |= (ϕ↓ X)//A P
Remark 3.5.3 Andersen [17] proves that the size of (ϕ ↓ X)//‘A P is exponentially larger that
(ϕ ↓ X) in the worst case. Andersen also proposes heuristics that make (ϕ ↓ X)//A P smaller
while maintaining logic equivalence. Quoting Andersen “the strategies are generally valid but
might or might not succeed in decreasing the size of the assertion” [17].
3.6 Logic Characterization and Analysis of Fault-Tolerance
In this section we explain our first framework for the analysis of fault-tolerance. From Section 3.4,
we recall that our proposal consists in viewing fault-tolerance analysis as the analysis of an open
system; a fault-tolerant system is studied when acting in a faulty environment. Here, we char-
acterize the problem of the analysis of fault-tolerance, with respect to a property, as a validation
problem in the (equational) µ-calculus. Within this framework we reformulate, in fault-tolerance
terms, a technique of validation studied in security protocol analysis [146, 148]. The technique
is based on partial model checking. Moreover, we study an efficient solution [122] for checking
the validity of a subclass of the µ-calculus. In the rest of the chapter, we do not make any distinc-
tion between µ-calculus and equational µ-calculus since these logics are equivalent and a formula
in one logic can be transformed in an equivalent formula in the other logic in linear-time (see
Section 3.5.2). Without lost of generality, we will refer only to the µ-calculus.
3.6.1 The Problem
Let us consider a system model P , its fault-tolerant (candidate) version P#F , and a µ-calculus
formula φ expressing a desirable property of a system even in presence of faults. We are interested








φ characterizes the fault-tolerant capability of P
#
F as the set of faulty environments




φ = EF, then it means that no faulty environment is able to force P
#
F not to satisfy
φ. This observation leads to a first logic characterization of fault-tolerance, as in the following
definition:
Definition 3.6.1 (Logic Characterisation of Fault-Tolerance I) A process P#F is fault-tolerant
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Supposing M = {Q, Q0,Actτ ,→} be a finite state LTS , where Q = {Q0, . . . , Qn}:
(ϕ↓ X)//AM = (ϕ//AM)↓ XQ0 ,
//AM = 
(X =σ φ)ϕ//AM =

(XQ1 =σ φ/A Q1)
. . .
(XQn =σ φ//A Qn)
ϕ//AM
X//A Q = XQ




′, if a 6= τ ∧ a 6∈ A ∪A
〈a〉φ//A Q = ff, if a ∈ A ∪A













′, if a 6= τ ∧ a 6∈ A ∪A
[a]φ/A Q = tt, if a ∈ A ∪A









(φ1 ∧ φ2)//A Q = (φ1//A Q) ∧ (φ2//A Q),
(φ1 ∨ φ2)//A Q = (φ1//A Q) ∨ (φ2//A Q)
tt//A Q = tt
ff//A Q = ff
Figure 3.3: The partial evaluation function for ‖A.
To check whether a model P#F satisfies Definition 3.6.1 we have to solve the following prob-
lem:
∀F ∈ EF, (P#F ‖ F ) \ F |= φ (3.6.2)
Solving problem (3.6.2), that is checking the (candidate) system again any faulty environment
is, in principle, useful. As an example let us consider P = a.0 + f.f.b.0. In P , two consecutive
occurrences of a fault make the (good) action b occur: here we think about one fault cancelling
the effect of the other. Checking the fault-tolerance of P in a particular environment, for example
as F = f.F leads to the conclusion that, in (P ‖ F ) \ {f}, action b eventually happens. Checking
against an unspecified environment we can figure out, for example, that F = f.0 makes this
property false in P .
From the point of view of the analysis Definition 3.6.1 is not practical. It requires to perform
model checking against all environments. By exploiting partial model checking techniques we can






= {F ∈ EF : F |= φ//F P#F } (3.6.3)





characterizes the fault-tolerance of P#F as the set of models of the formula
φ//F P
#
F . If this set coincides with the set, EF, of all possible (faulty environment) models, this










Proof. The thesis follows directly from Lemma 3.5.2.
The characterization in (3.6.3) is easier to manage since it corresponds to a common repre-
sentation of sets, and permits to define the analysis of a fault-tolerant process, with respect to a
property φ, as a validity checking problem in the µ-calculus. It brings to the following alternative
logic characterization of fault-tolerance:
Definition 3.6.3 (Logic Characterisation of Fault-Tolerance II) A process P#F is fault-tolerant
with respect to the logical property φ if and only if φ/F P#F is a valid formula in EF.
We prove that:
Proposition 3.6.4 A process P#F satisfies Definition 3.6.1 if and only if it satisfies Definition 3.6.3.
Proof. From Proposition 3.6.2.
Definition 3.6.3 and Proposition 3.6.4 state that for checking if a model P#F satisfies this
definition of fault tolerance, with respect to a property φ, we have to solve the following validation
problem:
∀F ∈ EF, F |= φ′, where φ′ = φ//F P#F (3.6.4)
In the next section we study efficient solutions to this problem, with respect to time complexity.
3.6.2 Improving the Time Complexity of the Analysis
The validity (satisfiability) problem for the (equational) µ-calculus, such as (3.6.4), is generally
EXPTIME complete [75, 193]. Better performances are reached on particular subclasses of the
µ-calculus. For example, the satisfiability problem in the disjunctive subclass of the µ-calculus is
linear time in the size of the formula [203]. It follows that the validity problem for those formulas
whose complement falls in the disjuntive subclass of the µ-calculus (i.e., the conjunctive subclass
of µ-calculus) can be solved in linear time.
Our framework use the partial model checking to reduce the fault-tolerance checking problem
to a validity problem in the µ-calculus. To obtain an efficient strategy of analysis, we have to look
for a subclass of µ-calculus that is closed under the partial evaluation function of the partial model
checking and whose complemented class fall in the disjuntive subclass of the µ-calculus. In this
section we define the universal conjunctive subclass of the µ-calculus (we write in short, ∀∧MC),
and we prove that
• ∀∧MC is closed under the partial evaluation function ( )//F P ;
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• the class of the complemented ∀∧MC formulas is strictly included in the disjunctive µ-
calculus.
Remark 3.6.5 We use the two previous results to prove that (3.6.4) is solvable in time linear in
the size of φ′.
Remark 3.6.6 The size of the formula obtained after the partial model checking procedure is
polynomial in the size of the process and the formula, hence it can be, in the worst case, exponen-
tially longer than the original formula. Thus the effectiveness of our solution methods depends
also on the success of the heuristics that Andersen proposes to make φ/F P#F smaller while main-
taining logic equivalence.
In the next sections we summarize the definitions and results about the disjunctive subclass
of the µ-calculus; then we introduce the universal conjunctive subclass of the µ-calculus and we
show how our validation problem can be solved efficiently in this class.
Disjunctive µ-calculus
From [120] we reproduce the definition of the disjunctive µ-calculus. Formulas in this subclass of
the µ-calculus, called disjunctive formulas, are interesting because their satisfiability problem can
be solved in time linear in the size of the formula [120]. Their definition depends on the definition
of the following special class of formulas:
Definition 3.6.7 (Special Conjuntive Formulas) A conjunction α1 ∧ . . . ∧ αn is special if and
only if every αi is either a literal or a formula of the form1 (a → Φ) and for every action a there
is at most one conjunct of the form (a→ Φ) among α1, . . . , αn.
Definition 3.6.8 (Disjunctive µ-calculus formulas) The set of disjunctive µ-calculus formulas is
the smallest set D defined by the following clauses:
• every literal is a disjunctive formula,
• if α, β ∈ D then α∨ β ∈ D. Moreover if X occurs only positively in α, and does not occur
in the context X ∧ γ, for some γ, then µX.α, νX.α ∈ D.
• (a→ Φ) ∈ D if Φ ⊆ D
• special conjunctive formulas are disjunctive formulas
The following theorems hold [120]:
Theorem 3.6.9 For every µ-calculus formula there exists an equivalent disjunctive µ-calculus
formula.
Theorem 3.6.10 Satisfiability checking for a disjunctive µ-calculus formula can be done in linear
time in the size of the formula.
Remark 3.6.11 Theorems 3.6.9 and 3.6.10 lead to the conclusion that the transformation from µ-
calculus to disjunctive µ-calculus introduces, in the worst case, an exponential blow up. We will
avoid this problem by expressing our formulas directly in a subclass of the disjunctive µ-calculus.
1The µ-calculus construct a → Φ, where a is an action and Φ a finite set of µ-calculus formulas, is an abbreviation
for
V{[a]φ : φ ∈ Φ}∧ [a]WΦ [203]. 〈a〉φ is equivalent to a → {φ, tt}, while [a]φ is equivalent to (a → ff)∧ (a →
{φ}) so any µ-calculus formula can be written using this new construct.
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∀∧MC, the Universal Conjunctive µ-calculus
We now identify and define the ∀∧MC; then we prove our main results, namely:
• ∀∧MC is closed under the partial evaluation function ( )//F P (Lemma 3.6.13);
• the class of complemented ∀∧MC formulas is strictly included in the disjunctive µ-calculus
(Lemma 3.6.14).
Definition 3.6.12 (Universal Conjuntive Formulas) The set, ∀∧MC, of universal conjunctive
µ-calculus formulas is the largest subset of µ-calculus formulas that can be written without either
the ∨ operator or the 〈 〉 modality. The formulas of the ∀∧MC are generated by the following
grammar:
φ ::= ff | tt | Z | φ ∧ φ′ | [K]φ | µZ.φ | νZ.φ
Lemma 3.6.13 ∀∧MC is closed under the partial model checking function //F P .
Proof. By definition of ( )//F P (see Figure 3.3). For all F and all CCS process P , ( )//F P
preserves ∧ and [ ], while the transformation of [ ] introduces only ∧.
Lemma 3.6.14 If φ ∈ ∀∧MC, the complement formula of φ, φc, is disjunctive in the sense of
Definition 3.6.8.
Proof. By structural induction over φ. If φ is a literal, or if φ = φ1∧φ2 the lemma holds trivially.
If φ = [K]φ1, then φc = 〈K〉φ1c. In this case the lemma holds since 〈K〉φ1c can be written as
〈K〉 → {φ1c, tt}, and φ1c is disjunctive by the induction hypothesis. If φ = µX.φ1(X) then
φc = νX.φ1c(X) and φ1c is disjunctive by the induction hypothesis. The case φ = νX.φ1(X) is
treated similarly. This concludes the proof.
The previous results are the foundation of our solution method for (3.6.4), synthesized by the
following theorem:
Theorem 3.6.15 If φ′ ∈ ∀∧MC then (3.6.4) can be solved in time linear in the size of φ′.
Proof. Problem (3.6.4) requires the validity check of φ′. The ∀∧MC formula φ′ is valid if and
only if the complement formula φ′c is not satisfiable. φ′c can be obtained in linear time from φ′.
By Lemma 3.6.14 φ′c is disjuntive, and by Theorem 3.6.10 the satisfiability of φ′c’ is solvable in
linear time in its size. This concludes the proof.
Corollary 3.6.16 If φ ∈ ∀∧MC then (3.6.2) is answered in time linear in the size of φ//F P .
Proof. By partial model checking, ∀F ∈ EF, (P#F ‖ F ) \ F |= φ if and only if ∀F ∈ EF, F |=
φ//F P
#
F . By Lemma 3.6.13 φ/F P
#
F is in the ∀∧MC, and the Corollary follows immediately
from Theorem 3.6.15.
3.6.3 ∀∧MC Formulas in Fault-Tolerance
This section discusses the role of ∀∧MC in fault-tolerance. We start with a general discussion
followed by a list of concrete properties. Those properties, taken from the literature, are divided
into two sublists: the former contains properties that fall in ∀∧MC, the latter contains those that
do not fall in ∀∧MC.
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Suitability of ∀∧MC in Fault-Tolerance: a Discussion
Accordingly to [19], fault-tolerance properties can be divided informally into the following cate-
gories:
• fault-tolerance if the system delivers a correct answer despite faults;
• fail-silence if system failures can only be omission failures i.e., it gives either a correct
answer or no answer;
• fail-stop if, in case of faults, the system terminates;
• fail-safe if the system, in case of faults, enters into a state in which no catastrophic event
occur.
Depending on the particular system some of the previous properties are formalized as safety
or liveness properties; others are formalized as a combination of them, i.e., they are neither safety
nor liveness properties. Safety and liveness properties where first described by Lamport in [127],
who studied linear-time properties of reactive systems. He suggested that the intuitive meaning
of safety is “nothing bad happens in the lifetime of the system”, while the meaning of liveness is
“something good eventually happens” [127].
In the following we give an intuition to understand what kind of properties are expressible with
∀∧MC. We need to refer to a formal definition of safety and liveness. In the rest of the chapter
we will use the following linear-time semantic definitions of safety and liveness [10, 166, 143],
that correspond to the branching-time definitions of universally safety and universally liveness
properties respectively [144].
Definition 3.6.17 (Semantic Characterization of Safety and Liveness) Let P be a property ex-
pressed as a sequence of events. P is a:
safety property, if and only if every infinite sequence of events that does not satisfy this property
contains a finite prefix such that no infinite sequences obtained by adding an infinite suffix
to this finite prefix satisfies this property;
liveness property, if and only if for every finite sequence we can find an infinite suffix, so that the
resulting infinite sequence satisfies the property.
Remark 3.6.18 Alene and Schneider proved in [10] that any property can be classified as a safety
or a liveness property, or an intersection of them.
“Fail silence”, “fail stop” and “fail safe” enjoy a common structure [19]. In the µ-calculus, the
previous properties are expressible by formulas whose external form is νX.[F]φ ∧ [−]X , where
φ expresses respectively a behavior without faults, a stop, or a safe behavior: if φ ∈ ∀∧MC,
formulas in this form fit ∀∧MC. Properties expressing “fault-tolerance” are more general and
do not have a common form. In this case to understand if they fit ∀∧MC we have to study
each formula separately. As a general consideration we note that safety properties of the form
νX.φ ∧ [−]X , expressing “no bad state is ever reached” (here φc, the complement of φ, holds
in the bad state) will fit ∀∧MC only if φ fits. On the other hand, safety properties of the form
νX.[K]ff ∧ [−]X , expressing “no bad action in K ever happens” do fit ∀∧MC.
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Liveness properties are a bit more tricky. For example, the general formulation of a liveness
property that involves a condition over a state i.e., expressing that “a state satisfying φ is eventually
reached” is µX.φ∨ (〈−〉tt∧ [−]X) [190]. This form does not fit ∀∧MC because of the 〈−〉 and
the ∧.
The liveness property expressing “an action a eventually occurs” requires a discussion. Its
µ-calculus formulation, µX.〈−〉tt ∧ [−a]X [37], does not fit ∀∧MC. The subformula 〈−〉tt is
required to avoid that the formula is trivially satisfied because the system deadlocks. If we assume
to check deadlock freedom separately, this conjunct can be removed and the weaker formulation,
µX.[−a]X , fits ∀∧MC.
Other categories of formulas, which are neither safety nor liveness properties, (e.g., some
cyclic properties) have to be considered one by one. We anticipate that witnesses of these formulas
fall in ∀∧MC. We are now ready to give concrete examples of each category of formula in the
next section. This preliminary discussion also suggests how the ∀∧MC formulas are related to the
set of fault-tolerance properties as illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Examples of ∀∧MC Formulas in Fault-Tolerance
This section provides examples of fault-tolerance properties that do fit ∀∧MC (positive examples)
and that do not fit ∀∧MC (negative examples). providing examples of (categories of) formulas in
Positive Example
Our examples consist of a list of ∀∧MC properties taken from [188, 37, 190]. For all the proper-
ties, we underline their use in fault-tolerance.
Safety Properties
Nothing Bad (positive example [190], page 128–130). Let φc be a property that holds in a bad
state. The general form expressing that “in case of some fault in F the bad state is never
reached” is expressible as follows:
NothingBad(φ) def= νZ.[F]φ ∧ [−]Z
This class of safety formulas is in ∀∧MC only if φc is in ∀∧MC. A necessary condition for
this to happen is, for example, that φc does not contain conjunctions.
Never ([37] page 42, [190] page 128). Let K be the set of transitions indicating a bad behavior.
Formula
Never(K) def= νZ.[K]ff ∧ [−]Z
expresses the safety property “no transition in K ever happens”2. It can be used to express
the following fail safe property “in case of a fault in F, no bad transition ever happens”:
νX.[F]Never(K ) ∧ [−]X
2Another way of interpreting Never(K) is that the bad state 〈K〉tt is ever reached.








Figure 3.4: Fault-tolerance properties that are expressible as ∀∧MC formulas. ∀∧MC is able to
express many safety property and some liveness property. See text for more details.
Deadlock or Termination ([188], page 7).
NoObservableAction def= [[−]]ff
The previous formula expresses that the system is incapable of performing any observable
action, that is it either deadlocks or stops. This property can be used to express the fail stop
property “in case of faults F, the system deadlocks or terminates”:
νX.[F]NoObservableAction ∧ [−]X
Unless ([190], page 43).
Unless(K , J ) def= µZ.[−(K ∪ J)]ff ∧ [−J ]Z
This formula expresses “in any run actions from K happen unless a J action occurs”. This
property where an action in J may not eventually occur, implements the weak version of
the until modality [35]. It can be used to express fault-tolerance, or as a building block to
express fail safe as follows:
νX.[F]Unless(K , J ) ∧ [−]X
Cycle I ([37] page 42) Properties expressing cycles are in ∀∧MC. The simplest example is the
following safety property:
Cycle(a, b) def= νZ.[b]ff ∧ [−a, b]Z ∧ [a](νY.[a]ff ∧ [−a, b]Y ∧ [b]Z)
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expressing “two actions a and b occur in alternation”. A sequence (also infinite) of other
actions is allowed to interleave between an a and the next b. It expresses fault-tolerance, or
it can be used to express a fail safe behavior as follows:
νX.[F]Cycle(a, b) ∧ [−]X
Formulas expressing cycles with more than two actions also fall in ∀∧MC [190].
Liveness Properties
Fairness I ([37], page 110). For an agent with sort {a, b, c}
Fairness(b; a) def= νZ.µY.νW.[[b]]Z ∧ [[a]]Y ∧ [[c, ]]W
expresses the liveness property “no infinite sequence can be performed containing infinitely
many occurrences of a, but no occurrences of b”. It represents a fair behavior in case of
some fault, for example as in the following fail safe property:
νX.[F]Fairness(b; a) ∧ [−]X
Fairness II ([190], page 130). Another ∀∧MC fairness property is:
Fairness ′(a; b, c) def= νZ.(µY1.[b](νY2.[c](νY3.Y1 ∧ [−a]Y3) ∧ [−a]Y2) ∧ [−]Z
Informally, it says “in any run, if b and c happen infinitely often, than so does a”. This
formula can be used to express the property saying and that “in any run, fairness holds in
case of some fault in F occur”:
νX.[F]Fairness ′(a; b, c) ∧ [−]X (3.6.5)
Finitely Often ([190], page 132). Another liveness property that falls in ∀∧MC is:
FinOft(a) def= µZ.µY.[a]Z ∧ [−a]Y
expressing “in each run, a can only happen finitely often”. Used as an invariant, it expresses




Some properties that are neither safety nor liveness properties fall in ∀∧MC also. For example,
the following variants of the cyclic property Cycle(a, b):
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Cycle II ([190], page 131-132)
Cycle ′(a, b) def= µY.[b]ff ∧ [a](µZ.[a]ff ∧ [b]Y ∧ [−b]Z) ∧ [−b]Y
This property expresses the property “two actions a and b do occur in alternation” with the
constraint that no intervening actions are allowed to continue forever without the next a or
b happening. The variant using a greatest fixed point
Cycle ′′(a, b) def= νY.[b]ff ∧ [a](µZ.[a]ff ∧ [b]Y ∧ [−b]Z) ∧ [−b]Y
also falls in ∀∧MC. It expresses the same property as Cycle ′(a, b) does, with the constraint
“other actions can intervene forever between an a and the next b, but whenever an a happens
b must eventually happen”.
Negative Examples
This section lists examples of formulas that do not fit ∀∧MC.
Nothing Bad (negative example [190], page 128–130] Let φc be a condition that holds in a bad
state. The general form expressing the safety property that nothing bad happens is:
NothingBad(φ) def= νX.[F]φ ∧ [−]X
If φ 6∈ ∀∧MC, this family of properties fall outside in ∀∧MC; a sufficient condition for this
to happen is when φc contains conjunctions.
Deadlock Freedom ([37], page 109).
DeadlockFree def= µX.〈〈−〉〉tt ∧ [[−]]X
Deadlock freedom cannot be expressed in ∀∧MC, because we cannot avoid the 〈〈 〉〉 moda
lity. Deadlock freedom is a particular instance of the formulas expressing the “eventually”
modality.
Eventually ([37], page 43). In this category we find, for example, the formula saying “an action
a eventually happens”:
Eventually(a) def= µX.〈−〉tt ∧ [−a]X
If we want to exclude that the property holds because the system deadlocks (see the discus-
sion in section 3.6.3), this property does not fit ∀∧MC. Also the generalization
Eventually(φ) def= µX.φ ∨ (〈−〉tt ∧ [−a]X)
expressing “a closed formula φ eventually holds” does not fall in ∀∧MC either. As a con-
sequence, the ∀∧MC fragment cannot express any formula containing the “eventually”
modality, for instance “always eventually”.
The last negative example is “strong until”:
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Strong Until ([37], page 43):
StrongUntil(φ, ϕ) def= µX.φ ∨ (ϕ ∧ 〈−〉tt ∧ [−]X)
where X does not occur in φ. Informally strong until says “φ holds until ϕ becomes true”.
It also requires that ϕ becomes eventually true. Strong until needs the modality 〈〉 and,
consequently, does not fall in ∀∧MC.
3.6.4 Our Running Example
This section shows a CCS model of a simple fault-tolerant system, and shows how we check a
fault-tolerance property in the framework of the analysis proposed so far.
Let us consider a different version of our fault-tolerant battery specified in Example 3.4.1 (see
also Figure 3.5). In this more sophisticated version the controller module also acts as a failure
detector: if both batteries do not produce a valid burst of energy, it returns the message fail. The
CCS model is as follows:
Det def= ret1,0.Det ′ + ret1,1.ret.Det ′′
Det ′ def= ret2,0.fail.Det ′′′ + ret2,1.ret.Det ′′′
Det ′′ def= ret2,0.Det ′′′ + ret2,1.Det ′′′
Det ′′′ def= ack.Det
We now build two new fault-tolerant batteries we call Ene#{f0,f1} and Energiz
#
{f0,f1} respec-
tively. In the former (see Figure 3.5) we include one faulty battery, and in the second two faulty
batteries:
Ene#{f0,f1}
def= (Spl ‖ Ene(1) ‖ Ene(2){f0,f1} ‖ Det) \A
Energiz#{f0,f1}
def= (Spl ‖ Ene(1){f0,f1} ‖ Ene
(2)
{f0,f1} ‖ Det) \A
where A = {get1, get2, ret1,0, ret1,1, ret2,0, ret2,1, ack}.
Let us now consider the following ∀∧MC formula expressing the safety property “in any run,
action fail never occurs”
φ
def= νX.([fail]ff ∧ [−]X) (3.6.6)
Equivalently, we can consider its equational version X =ν ([fail]ff ∧ [−]X). We want to
prove that property (3.6.6) holds on Ene#{f0, f1} even in case of faults. The scenario of analysis
is:
∀F{f0,f1} ∈ E{f0,f1}, (Ene#{f0,f1} ‖ F{f0,f1}) \ {f0, f1} |= φ (3.6.7)














Figure 3.5: The flow diagram of the (candidate) fault-tolerant version of the battery, Ene#{f0,f1}.









Figure 3.6: The minimum automata weak-bisimilar to Ene#{f0,f1}.
Here, to keep the size of the model small, and the analysis tractable, we use the minimum
process weak bisimilar toEne#{f0,f1}, reported in Figure 3.6. The use of a weakly bisimilar process
here is justified by the fact that we are analyzing fault-tolerance at the abstraction level of an ex-
ternal observer. This means also that properties are intended in their observational-based interpre-
tation; the equivalence of the analysis is so preserved. The partial evaluation, φ//{f0,f1} Ene
#
{f0,f1}
produces the following formula:
φ/{f0,f1} Ene
#
{f0,f1} = (X0 =ν [fail]ff ∧ ([−F]X0 ∧X1)
(X1 =ν [fail]ff ∧ ([−F]X1 ∧X2 ∧ [f0, f1]X3)
(X2 =ν [fail]ff ∧ ([−F]X2 ∧ [f0, f1]X3))
(X3 =ν [fail]ff ∧ ([−F]X3 ∧X0)
(3.6.8)
where F = {f0, f1, f1, f0}.
If we want to answer to the question “for every environment does the energizer satisfy the
formula φ” we have to check the validity of formula (3.6.8). With the theory we described, this
can be done in linear time. Let us observe that the result in [120] (i.e., that the satisfiability problem
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for µ-calculus disjunctive formulas can be solved in linear time) is not still directly applicable. For
using it, we need to answer (3.6.7) by checking the satisfiability for the complement of formula
φ//{f0,f1} Ene
#
{f0,f1}, which proves to be exactly disjunctive in the sense of Definition 3.6.8.
3.7 Background on Observational Properties
This section opens the second part of the chapter, where we characterize fault-tolerance in terms
of GNDC. First, we summarize the basic background to understand the GNDC characterization of
fault-tolerance. In Section 3.7.1 we recalls the notion of observational equivalences among CCS
processes. In Section 3.7.2 we summarise the definitions of NDC, BNDC, SNNI, BSNNI, and
SBSNNI; these definitions formalize in CCS basic non-interference properties.
Later, in Section 3.8 we present our characterization of fault-tolerance in the GNDC, and we
show how to re-use, in fault-tolerance strategies analysis techniques proper of the non-interference.
3.7.1 Observational Equivalences among Processes
Properties over a system model can be expressed also by comparing its behavior with that of an-
other model. As we have done in Section 3.5.3, we consider the case in which an external observer
cannot see τ actions; hence, actions τ are abstracted from our definition of process behavior. We
use trace equivalence and weak bisimulation [159, 83] as binary relations to compare the behav-
ior of two processes. These relations represent two different notions of observational equivalence
among processes. Informally, the former states that the sets of traces of two trace equivalent
processes appear the same to an external observer; the latter affirms that two weakly bisimilar
processes share also the branching structure of their labelled transition systems.
Since we focus on observable actions, both previous relations implicitly refer to the observable
transition a=⇒, defined in Section 3.5.3. We now recall the formal definition of trace equivalence
and weak bisimulation from [83]:
Definition 3.7.1 Let a˜ = a1 . . . an ∈ Act∗ be a sequence of actions. We write P a˜=⇒ P ′ if and
only if there exist P1, . . . , Pn ∈ E such that P a1=⇒ P1 a2=⇒ . . . an=⇒ Pn. Let T(P ) = {a˜ ∈ Act∗ :
∃P ′, P a˜=⇒ P ′} be the set of traces associated to a process P . We have that a CCS process Q can
execute all the traces of a CCS process P (written P ≤trace Q) if and only if T(P ) ⊆ T(Q). Two
processes P and Q are said to be trace equivalent (written P ≈t Q) if and only if P ≤trace Q and
Q ≤trace P .
Remark 3.7.2 Relation ≈t can be defined also as ≤trace ∩(≤trace)−1.
The general notion of bisimulation [158] consists of a mutual step-by-step simulation: given
two processes P and Q when P executes a certain action moving to P ′ then Q must be able to
simulate the single step by executing the same action and moving to a term Q′ which is again
bisimilar to P ′, and vice-versa. A weak bisimulation is a bisimulation which does not care about
internal τ actions.
We write P ba=⇒ P ′ for P a=⇒ P ′ if a ∈ Act and for P ( τ−→)∗P ′ if a = τ . Note that P bτ=⇒ P ′
means that P evolves in P ′ with zero or more τ .
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Definition 3.7.3 A relation R on E × E is a weak bisimulation if for each (P,Q) ∈ R and for
each a ∈ Actτ :
if P a−→ P ′ then ∃Q′ : Q ba=⇒ Q′ and (P ′, Q′) ∈ R
if Q a−→ Q′ then ∃P ′ : P ba=⇒ P ′ and (P ′, Q′) ∈ R
Two processes P and Q are weakly bisimilar (written P ≈ Q) if a weak bisimulation relation
R exists such that (P,Q) ∈ R.
Remark 3.7.4 P ≈ Q implies P ≈t Q [83].
Weak bisimulation is able to detect most of the safety properties we use in this chapter, such
as fail safe, fail silent, fail stop, and fault-tolerance. Some liveness properties, such as deadlock
freedom, can be caught too; instead, the use of weak bisimulation does not allow to distinguish
between deadlocks and livelocks [37].
3.7.2 Information Flow and Non Interference Properties
Information flow properties have been introduced to study and control flow of information among
different entities. Many information flow properties have been uniformly formalized in a CCS-
like process algebraic setting [80, 81]. The common intuition behind these properties is strictly
related to the classic notion of non-interference [101], which aims to control the information flow
between two levels of user, low and high. Basically, non-interference says “no low level user is
able to deduct anything about the activity of a high level user”. Non-interference properties have
been also restated in terms of network security [85], where high users represent network intruders,
and low level users model cryptographic protocols.
Among the many formalizations of non-interference properties we are interested in the Non
Deducibility on Compositions (NDC, for short), expressed in CCS as follows 3:
P ∈ NDC iff ∀X ∈ EH : (P ‖ X) \H ≈t P \H (3.7.1)
In (3.7.1) EH, where H ⊂ Act is the set of all processes whose sort is the set of high actions.
The NDC is defined in terms of a trace equivalence. The version of NDC that uses weak bisimula-
tion, instead of trace equivalence, is called bisimulation-based NDC (in short, BNDC). Properties
NDC and BNDC (we write (B)NDC when we do not want to distinguish between them) can be
read as “no high level activity can change the low level observational behavior”. In fact, in (3.7.1)
P \H exhibits only the low level behavior of P , while (P ‖ X) \H is the low level behavior of
P ‖ X .
Remark 3.7.5 From the informal reading of (B)NDC we can foresee its reading in fault-tolerance:
“no faulty environment (high level activity) can change the fault-tolerant system (low level) be-
havior”.
A serious obstacle to the verification of (B)NDC is the universal quantification over all the
possible X ∈ EH. In [83] two possible solutions are suggested and studied:
3Indeed, in [80] NDC has been originally formalized in SPA (Security Process Algebra) which is basically CCS
where the set of actions are partitioned into the setsH and L of high and low actions.
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(Solution A) to define a most powerful enemy (with respect to a behavioral equivalence relation)
in such a way that the universal quantification over all possible enemies can be removed in
favor of a single check against the most powerful enemy.
(Solution B) to prove other properties over P , stronger than (B)NDC, that do not require any
quantification.
Solution A, is based on the following definition and proposition.
Definition 3.7.6 A relation over processes, /, is a precongruence with respect to the CCS opera-
tors ‖ and \ if the following property holds, for all P,Q,X ∈ E and A ⊆ Act:
P / Q implies (P ‖ X) \A / (Q ‖ X) \A
The following results holds for precongruences [86, 85]:
Proposition 3.7.7 ≤trace is a precongruence with respect to the CCS operators ‖ and \.
Proposition 3.7.8 Let be / a precongruence with respect to ‖ and \. If there exists two processes
Top ∈ EH such that for every process X ∈ EH we have X / Top, then
P ∈ NDC / iff (P ‖ Top) \H / P \H
In Proposition 3.7.8 we have used a generalized version of the NDC, where a generic precon-
gruence / is used instead of the trace equivalence ≈t. Proposition 3.7.8 implies also the following
corollary about the congruence relation induced by a precongruence / [85]:
Corollary 3.7.9 Let / be a precongruence with respect to ‖ and \, and let ∼def= /∩ (/)−1. If there
exists two processes Bot ,Top ∈ EH such that for every process X ∈ EH we have Bot / X /Top,
then
P ∈ NDC∼ iff (P ‖ Bot) \H ∼ (P ‖ Top) \H ∼ P \H
In summary, solution A is based on the existence of a most powerful process Top. If we can
find a process Top such that ∀X ∈ EH, X / Top, then checking NDC against Top is necessary
and sufficient for checking NDC against all X in EH: the quantification is removed in favor of
single check against the (albeit huge) process Top.
Solution B exploits the following SNNI (acronym for, Strong Non-deterministic Non Interfer-
ence) property:
P ∈ SNNI iff P \H ≈t P/H (3.7.2)
Here / is the CCS hide operator [83]: P/H is the process P where all actions in H ∪ H are
replaced by a τ action. SNNI is defined in terms of a trace equivalence; the version using weak
bisimulation is called Bisimulation-based SNNI (in short, BSNNI).
Remark 3.7.10 SNNI and BSNNI can be checked by exploiting only local conditions. No uni-
versal quantification over EH is required.
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Another property of interest is the following SBSNNI [83] (Strong BSNNI):
P ∈ SBSNNI iff ∀P ′ ∈ Der(P ) : P ′ ∈ BSNNI (3.7.3)
Informally P enjoys SBSNNI if any P ′ in the derivative set of P enjoys BSNNI. Note that if
P is finite state, the Der(P ) is finite as well, and SBSNNI can be checked by performing a finite
number of BSNNI checks. Moreover, SBSNNI enjoys compositionality with respect to the CCS ‖
and \ operators:
Proposition 3.7.11 P,Q ∈ SBSNNI implies (P ‖ Q) \H ∈ SBSNNI
Finally, the following proposition holds [83]:
Proposition 3.7.12 The following relations between NDC, BNDC, SNNI, and SBSNNI hold:
• SNNI = NDC
• SBSNNI ⊂ BNDC
SNNI is a sufficient and necessary condition for NDC. We can check P ∈ SNNI instead of
P ∈ NDC , and checking SNNI requires a test only involving local information in P .
SBSNNI is a sufficient condition for BNDC. We can check P ∈ SBSNNI to understand if
P ∈ BNDC . SBSNNI is easily verifiable if P is finite state: it requires to check BSNNI – check
that requires only local information – over the finite set of derivatives of P . Moreover, the SBSNNI
is compositional: we can reduce the combinatorial explosion due to the parallel composition by
checking it directly on P subsystems.
3.8 GNDC Characterization and Analysis of Fault-Tolerant
This section introduces GNDC basic ideas and its application in fault tolerance analysis. From
Section 3.2 we know that a GNDC property has the following general form:
P ∈ GNDCα/ iff ∀X ∈ EH : (P ‖ X) \H / α(P )
This scheme is general enough to capture a wide class of security property definitions. For
example, more specific security properties such as the BNDC and the NDC, can be subsumed as
GNDC properties [85]. We instantiate fault-tolerance in GNDC, in three steps.
The first step requires to specify what P and EH are in this context: the former, is the process
P#F obtained by following the uniform modeling framework described in Section 3.3; the latter,
that is EH, is the set of all faulty environment, EF. We recall from Definition 3.3.2 that EF
def= {X |
Sort(X) ⊆ F ∪ {τ}}. Then the general GNDC scheme we propose for fault-tolerance, is:
Definition 3.8.1 (GNDC Characterization of Fault-Tolerance)
P#F ∈ GNDCα/ iff ∀F ∈ EF : (P#F ‖ F ) \ F / α(P#F ) (3.8.1)
Remark 3.8.2 The separation between the system model and the environment we made in Section
3.4.1, allows us to leave F unspecified and to let it range over EF.
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The second step requires α(P#F ) to be some basic property of fault-tolerance. In Section 3.8.1
we will see how to express properties like fail safe, fail silent, fail stop, and fault-tolerance over
our test cases models.
The third and last step for the instantiation of GNDC in fault tolerance, concerns understanding
what families of equivalences / are suitable for the analysis of such properties. This will be
discussed in Section 3.6.2, where we write P instead of P#F when no explicit reference to the
specification framework of Section 3.3 is required.
3.8.1 Fault-Tolerance Properties as Instances of GNDC
In this section we show how to express fail stop, fail silent, fail safe and fault-tolerance in the
GNDC scheme. Generally speaking these properties are modeled via a modified version α(P#F ),
of P#F , representing the expected behavior with respect to the property under examination. In the
following we treat each property separately, and we express them over our running example. The
definitions of fail stop, fail silent, fail safe and fault-tolerance are taken from [19].
Fail Stop. A model of a system P#F is expected to be fail stop if, in case of faults, it switches into
a stop state.
In this case the model exhibiting a fail stop behavior, e.g., the process αstop(P#F ), is built using
the following ideas. Fault actions in P#F are abstracted away and replaced by silent actions; then,
expected behavior of the system is either able to manage the fault without showing faulty behavior,
or to stop.
Example 3.8.3 Let us consider the fault-tolerant model Battery#{f0,f1} introduced in Example
3.4.1. A fail stop behavior model is, for example, the process αstop(Battery#{f0,f1}), written αstop
for short:
αstop
def= get.(τ.ret.αstop + τ.0) (3.8.2)
In (3.8.2) we model the idea that after having received a request of energy (action get) in case
of any fault (here hidden and represented by the silent action τ ) our fault-tolerant battery is either
able to satisfy the request and produce a valid unit of energy (action ret), or it stops by behaving
as the stuck process 0.
Let us assume the battery is in an environment that always injects all the possible faults, that
is F∗{f0,f1}
def= f0.F∗{f0,f1} + f1.F
∗




{f0,f1}) \ {f0, f1} 6≈ αstop (3.8.3)
From (3.8.3) we can conclude that Battery#{f0,f1} 6∈ GNDC
αstop
≈ .
Fail Safe. A model of a system P#F is expected to be fail safe if in case of faults it switches to a
safe state.
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In this case the model depicting fail safe behavior e.g., the process αsafe(P#F ) can be built
starting from P#F following a procedure similar to the previous case. Faults are abstracted away
and represented by silent actions. Next the system is either able to manage the faults without
showing faulty behavior, or it shows a behavior that is considered safe, e.g., any fault is detected.
The criteria describing a safe behavior are not clearly definable at this level of abstraction;
consequently the formulation of this class of properties is too general in GNDC. In our opinion
this is due to the fact that the word fail safe says nothing about what behavior is considered safe for
the system. In fact, this is the feedback we expect to get from using GNDC: formulating properties
in GNDC helps us to understand the degree of formality in the definition of a property itself.
Example 3.8.4 Let us consider the CCS model Energiz#{f0,f1} introduced in Section 3.6.4. A
possible fail safe behavior model, αsafe(Energiz#{f0,f1}) (in short, αsafe ), is:
αsafe
def= get.(τ.ret.αsafe + τ.fail.) (3.8.4)
In (3.8.4) we model as safe behavior the fact that the detector flags that no battery has produced
valid energy with the external action fail. So after having received a request of energy (action
get) and after any fault occurrence, our model is able either to manage the fault and produce a
valid unit of energy (action ret) or it signals that a failure happened (action fail). Again using
the CWB we can verify that:
(Energiz#{f0,f1} ‖ F
∗
{f0,f1}) \ {f0, f1} ≈ αsafe (3.8.5)
Here F∗{f0,f1} is the faulty environment representing our fault assumptions. From (3.8.5) we con-
clude that our fault-tolerant model satisfies the fail safe property under the assumption that faults
happen as expressed in F∗{f0,f1}.
In Section 3.8.2 we will discuss when, for suitable process relation /, (Energiz#{f0,f1} ‖





Fail Silent. A model of a system P#F is expected to be fail silent if a fault is ignored.
In this case α(P#F ) can be built starting from P
#
F following the idea that it is able to manage
its faults without showing failure. Again occurrences of faults are abstracted away and represented
by silent actions.
Example 3.8.5 Let us consider the model Battery#{f0,f1} introduced in Example 3.4.1. A model
of fail silent behavior, αsilent(Battery#{f0,f1}) (in short, αsilent ), is:
αsilent
def= get.(τ.ret.αsilent + τ.αsilent) (3.8.6)
In (3.8.6) fail silent behavior is intended as the ability of the system of neither stopping nor show-
ing unpredictable behavior. In case of fault, it becomes ready again to receive a new request for
energy. So after having received a request for energy (action get), our model is able either to
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manage the fault and produce a valid unit of energy (action ret) or it is ready to receive a new
energy request. Again using the CWB we can verify that:
(Battery#{f0,f1} ‖ F
∗
{f0,f1}) \ {f0, f1} ≈ αsilent (3.8.7)
Formula (3.8.7) implies that our fault-tolerant model satisfies the fail silent property under the
assumption that faults happen as expressed in F∗{f0,f1}. For some other class of equivalences /,
this also implies that Battery#{f0,f1} ∈ GNDCαsilent/ , as explained in Section 3.8.2.
Fault-Tolerance. A model of a system P#F is expected to be fault-tolerant if its behavior is ob-
servationally equal to the behavior of a module that does not fail at all. In this case then
αft(P
#
F ) = P
#
F \ F, that is fault-tolerant systems that can never execute any fault action.
Example 3.8.6 In this last example we consider two different versions of fault tolerant models:
the first Bat#{f0,f1} is the fault tolerant candidate model introduced in Example 3.4.1. The second
model is the modified version Ene#{f0,f1} introduced in Example 3.8.4. Fault tolerant behavior for
Bat#{f0,f1} and Ene
#












{f0,f1} \ {f0, f1} (3.8.9)
In both (3.8.8) and (3.8.9) the expected fault-tolerant behavior is the same behavior as resp. models
Bat#{f0,f1} and Ene
#
{f0,f1} where the fault actions are indeed not allowed to happen. By using the
CWB we verify that:
(Bat#{f0,f1} ‖ F
∗
{f0,f1}) \ {f0, f1} ≈ αft (3.8.10)
(Ene#{f0,f1} ‖ F
∗
{f0,f1}) \ {f0, f1} ≈ α′ft (3.8.11)
Remark 3.8.7 Observe that the GNDC instance where / is ≈, and where α(P#F ) is P#F \ F (i.e.,






F )≈ iff ∀F ∈ EF : (P#F ‖ F ) \ F ≈ P#F \ F (3.8.12)
As a final observation we note that BNDC is not compositional with respect to parallel com-
position (see [146]), that is from P, P ′ ∈ BNDC it cannot be deduced that P ‖ P ′ ∈ BNDC .
Anyway there are bisimulation based-equivalences that are compositional and imply BNDC ,
so that they can be used to prove a sufficient condition for fault-tolerance, and the formulation of
fault-tolerance given in (3.8.12) results are attractive from this point of view. An example of these
properties is SBSNNI introduced in Section 3.7.1.
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3.8.2 Other Observational Relations in GNDC for Fault-Tolerance
In the previous section we have used weak bisimulation when formalizing the instances of fault-
tolerance properties in the GNDC; weak bisimulation is useful to detect most of the properties
defined so far. However in practical situations we expect that many systems will be fault-tolerant
under weaker conditions. As long as the system response is “good enough”, it may not be a
problem if the existence of faults can be deduced.
For example, the definition of fault-tolerance given in (3.8.12) is too strong and prevents the
observer to deduce that any faults have occurred.
If we exclude deadlock detection, for all the other safety properties defined in this chapter
the ability to distinguish the branching structures is not required. In fact safety properties do not
depend on the (branching) path leading to a fault.
This allows us to resort to a weaker form of observational equivalence such as trace equiva-
lence and simulation. This has also, within GNDC theory, a positive effect on compositionality
and on avoiding the universal quantification of fault injectors over the faulty environment. In the
following we write P ‖F Q as an abbreviation for (P ‖ Q) \ F, and we refer to a generic α( )
function. Obviously the results will also hold for all α( )’s considered so far.
Most General (Faulty) Environment
The possibility of avoiding universal quantifier in expression (3.8.1) is based on the theory of
precongruences whose results we introduced in Section 3.7.8. These results can be restated in
terms of the GNDC, also:
Proposition 3.8.8 ([86]) Let be / a precongruence with respect to ‖F. If there exists a process
Top ∈ EF such that for every process X ∈ EF we have X / Top, then:
P ∈ GNDCα/ iff (P ‖F Top) / α(P )
In particular, if the hypothesis of the proposition above holds then it is sufficient to check that
α(P ) is satisfied when P is composed with the most general environment, Top. In our fault-
tolerance analysis context it would permit to make only one single check, in order to prove that a
fault-tolerance property holds in every fault scenario. We have also the following corollary for the
congruence induced by /:
Corollary 3.8.9 ([86]) Let / to be a precongruence with respect to ‖F and let ./ be defined as
/ ∩ /−1. If there exist two processes Bot ,Top ∈ EF such that for every process X ∈ EF we have
Bot / X / Top then
P ∈ GNDCα./ iff (P ‖F Bot) ./ (P ‖F Top) ./ α(P )
We show that whenever we are interested in properties based on the notion of trace equiva-
lence, Proposition 3.7.8 and Corollary 3.8.9 hold.
In [86, 85] is reported the following proposition stating that ≤trace is a precongruence with
respect to CCS operators.
Proposition 3.8.10 ≤trace is a precongruence with respect to ‖F
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In addition we can prove the existence of the most general (failing) environment, and provide




f.TopF + f.TopF (3.8.13)
It is straightforward to demonstrate that:
Proposition 3.8.11 If X ∈ EF then X ≤trace TopF.
Proof. We prove that R def= {(X ′,TopF) | X ∈ Der(X ′) ∩ EF} is a (weak) simulation [158] (see
also Definition 3.8.12) containing the pair (X,TopF). As the simulation preorder is finer that the
trace preorder the thesis follows. There are three possible cases:
• X ′ f−→ X ′′, with X ′′ ∈ EF, and TopF f−→ TopF is derivable; hence, (X ′′,TopF) ∈ R.
• X ′ f−→ X ′′, with X ′′ ∈ EF, and TopF f−→ TopF is derivable; hence, (X ′′,TopF) ∈ R.
• X ′ τ−→ X ′′, with X ′′ ∈ EF, and TopF bτ=⇒ TopF is derivable; hence, (X ′′,TopF) ∈ R.
So we have proved that there exists a most general environment with respect to ≤trace. A
similar conclusion can be obtained when the following simulation relation is considered:
Definition 3.8.12 ([160]) Let S a binary relation on E × E. Then S is said to be a simulation if
for each (P,Q) ∈ S and for each a ∈ Actτ , if P a−→ P ′ then there exists Q′ such that Q ba=⇒ Q′
and (P ′, Q′) ∈ S.
We write Q ≤sim P if there exists a simulation S such that (P,Q) ∈ S. It is easy to prove that
≤sim is a precongruence with respect to CCS operators and that it admits the same most general
environment in (3.8.13).
Proposition 3.8.13
(1) ≤sim is a precongruence with respect to ‖F
(2) if X ∈ EF then X ≤sim TopF.
Proof of case 1. Let consider the following R def= {(P ‖F X,Q ‖F X) | P,Q,X ∈ E,P ≤sim
Q}. We show that is a simulation relation. The only interesting case is that involving τ within
a communication: let assume that P ‖F X τ−→ P ′ ‖F X ′, because P a−→ P ′ and X a−→ X ′
with a ∈ Act . Because of P ≤sim Q, we have that Q ba=⇒ Q′, and the transition Q ‖F X bτ=⇒
Q′ ‖F X ′ is derivable; moreover P ′ ≤trace Q′ and hence (P ′ ‖F X ′, Q′ ‖F X ′) ∈ R. The other
(simpler) cases are listed as follows:
• P ‖F X a−→ P ′ ‖F X . This happens for a 6∈ F ∪ F, if P a−→ P ′ and X 6 a−→. Because
of P ≤sim Q then Q ba=⇒ Q′ and so Q ‖F X ba=⇒ Q′ ‖F X is derivable. Moreover,
P ′ ≤trace Q′ and hence (P ′ ‖F X,Q′ ‖F X) ∈ R.
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• P ‖F X a−→ P ‖F X ′. This happens for a 6∈ F ∪ F, if X a−→ X and P 6 a−→. Then
Q ‖F X a−→ Q ‖F X ′ is derivable, and (P ‖F X ′, Q ‖F X ′) ∈ R.
Proof of case 2. Directly from the proof of Proposition 3.8.11.
As a conclusion, when≤trace and≤sim are used as process relations, the check that P satisfies
GNDC properties can be carried out only against the “most general (faulty) environment”.
3.8.3 Compositional Analysis of Fault-Tolerance
This section illustrates that, when ≤trace and ≤sim are used as process preorders in our analysis
scheme, compositional proof rules for establishing that a system enjoys GNDC can be applied.
Compositionality is a desirable property in verification to infer a global fault-tolerance exploiting
local fault-tolerance results. Let us show it with a simple example, obtained with the following
processes:
Torch def= get(ret.flash.0+ fail.no flash.0)
S
def= (Torch ‖ Ene{f0,f1}#) \ {get, ret}
This example represents the behavior of a flashing torch Torch using the fault-tolerant ener-
gizer of Example 3.8.6. The energizer is expected to furnish one unit of energy, even in case of
fault. The flashing torch Torch emits a flash action whenever it receives exactly one unit of en-
ergy, no flash otherwise. What an observer watching the system S, obtained by composing the
torch and the energizer, expects is to see only flash actions. (Recall that the system Ene{f0,f1}#
provides only ret.) This safety property can be formalized as:
S ∈ GNDCα(S)≤sim iff ∀Ff ∈ E{f0,f1} : S ‖{f0,f1} F{f0,f1} ≤sim α(S)
def= flash.0
Here the ≤sim relation has been used. In this case the expected behavior (given through α(S))
is that one unit of energy is furnished (and so one flash is observed). It is easy to convince us
that the given specification of the system enjoys our safety property. Let us now consider a system
Sn obtained by composing (in parallel) n instances of the system S and a similar safety property,
on the Sn, that reflects the question “only at most n flashes are observed”. In our scheme this is
equivalent to prove that:
Sn ∈ GNDCα(S)n≤sim iff
∀F{f0,f1} ∈ E{f0,f1} : Sn ‖{f0,f1} F{f0,f1} ≤sim α(S)n
def= α(S) ‖ . . . ‖ α(S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
Compositionality would made the previous statement true, for any fixed n, without the need
of any additional check. In the following we prove that it is really the case when ≤trace or ≤sim
are used. The following results hold:
Proposition 3.8.14 Let P1 and P2 be two processes such that Pi ∈ GNDCα(Pi)≤trace for i = 1, 2.
Then
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• P1 ‖ P2 ∈ GNDCα(P1)‖α(P2)≤trace
• P1 ‖ P2 ∈ GNDCα(P1)‖α(P2)≤sim
Proof. Exploiting the existence of the most general environment Top, and the fact that ≤trace
(resp.≤sim) is a precongruence.
Remark 3.8.15 We affirm that global fault-tolerance can be deduced from local fault-tolerance
in Section 3.8.3. Here, by local fault-tolerance we mean the property enjoyed by the formal
specification of sub-systems which are required to be fault-tolerant on their own. By global fault-
tolerance we mean the property enjoyed by the specification of a system which is obtained by the
composition of such sub-systems without the adjoint of any other global modules, such as a voter.
Obviously we do not expect compositionality to hold in such cases.
3.9 Conclusions
The general contribution of this chapter is that the theory and tools of security and security protocol
analysis can be profitably applied in fault-tolerant analysis. We start showing how a fault-tolerant
(candidate) system may be formalized using CCS. The formal specification is built following a
uniform modeling scheme requiring both the failing behavior (with respect to fault occurrences)
and fault-recovering procedures to be specified. Faults are represented by specific actions in the
system model, that a fault injector environment is able to activate.
This general framework has two main advantages. Firstly, it makes a logical characterization
of fault-tolerance possible: the fault tolerant verification problem, with respect to a given prop-
erty, is formulated as a module checking problem [126], i.e., as the verification problem of an
open system acting in an unspecified fault injecting environment. Secondly, it allows the formal-
ization of some fault-tolerance properties within the GNDC framework. The consequence of our
logical characterization of fault-tolerance is that, by partial model checking, the fault-tolerant ver-
ification problem may be expressed as a validity problem in the µ-calculus. In this way, general
validation tools and proof techniques can be exploited. For a more efficient (and tailored) analysis
we propose, for example, the use of universal and conjunctive µ-calculus formulas whose valid-
ity problem is solvable in time linear to the size of the formula (obtained after the partial model
checking step). A consequence of the characterization of fault-tolerance in the GNDC scheme,
is that we benefit from various theoretical results and analysis techniques from security analy-
sis, where GNDC has been introduced. Specifically, when either a trace relation or a simulation
relation are used, GNDC theory assures that efficient analysis procedures exist: fault-tolerance
benefits both of a static characterization of its properties, and of compositionality proofs. Another
advantage, is the possibility of comparing different fault-tolerance properties within GNDC, as is
already done for security properties [83, 81, 85]. Potentially, this is a preliminary step towards a
formal and uniform taxonomy of fault tolerant and security properties. For example, we show that
the fault-tolerance property is formalized as the instance of GNDC known as BNDC. This means
that fault-tolerance is precisely characterized as a non-interference property [204]. An immediate
consequence is that available tools for checking BNDC [146] can be used to check fault tolerance.
Fail safe and fail silent do not enjoy such a precise classification in terms of GNDC properties
known in security, although they are expressible in our running examples. From this formulation
effort it emerges that fail safe is a category of properties parametric in the notion of safe behavior,
and that its informal definition is too general to be unambiguously expressed in GNDC. This
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suggests that only a better classification of fail safeness can lead to a more precise formulation.
Similarly we managed to characterize completely fail stop in one of our examples, but here also a
general characterization is still missing.

4
SPYDER: a Model Checker for Security
Protocols
“The system does not communicate with the
outside, so it cannot be influenced remotely. The
computer system is secure” (Head engineer John
Arnold in Jurassic Park, Crichton, 1991)
Abstract
This chapter presents a model checking environment for security protocols. A protocol is
described as a term of a process algebra consisting of the parallel composition of a finite
number of, communicating and finitely behaviored, processes. Each process represents an
instance of a protocol role. The intruder is implicitly modeled in the semantics of the calculus
as an environment controlling all the communication events.
Security properties are written as formulas of a linear-time temporal logic. The model
checker runs a depth first search algorithm that tests the satisfiability of a formula over all the
traces, generated on-the fly, from a typed version of protocol.
4.1 Introduction
Past experience has shown how formal methods can be successfully applied to the analysis of se-
curity protocols (e.g., see [40, 172, 77, 3, 102]). For example, secrecy, integrity and authenticity
properties [5] can be verified over protocol specifications written in the spi-calculus [7], a process
algebra derived from the pi-calculus [162] enriched with operators to encrypt and decrypt mes-
sages, via symbolic trace analysis [71, 12, 29, 79, 30] or type checking over typed versions on the
calculus [3, 102].
Here we propose a logic-based model-checking [48] approach to the verification of security
protocols. Protocols are expressed over a typed version of a spi-calculus dialect, which we call
the spy-calculus. Properties are written as logic formulas whose satisfiability is checked over
temporal models (i.e., labelled transition systems) which constitute the operational semantics of
the spy-calculus.
Model-checking applied to process algebras close to the spi-calculus was new when the paper
[134](on which this chapter is based) appeared, although its use in protocol security analysis was
already known (e.g., see [155, 136, 163, 182, 53, 92]).
The originality of the approach will be explained using the illustration of Figure 4.1. Let us
suppose to have a finite spy-calculus term Z representing a finite number of runs of a protocol
involving a finite number of roles, and a security property f to be checked on it. The semantics
of Z, a labelled transition systems LTS, is generally infinite-state, because of the infinite number
of messages that each role, running the protocol, can receive from a potential intruder. In fact the
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intruder, following the Dolev-Yao [69] model, is potentially able to compose messages of infinite
length and to deliver them to honest participants in order to subvert the protocol goal.
To reduce the number of messages received by the honest agents to a finite number, our model
checker, SPYDER, checks the satisfiability of f over a typed version of the protocol CSZ (Z). The
use of types allows us to filter out, during the execution of input actions, those messages from
the intruder that do not match the required type. The resulting model of the protocol (LTS[ in
Figure) is proved to be finite-state in this case. Moreover in SPYDER, types are provided through
the definition of a ”typing” function CSZ introduced at run-time. In this way typed versions are
not fixed a priori and a user can obtain different typed versions of same untyped protocol model,
explore different partitions of the whole state space, and consequently increase the confidence that
the results of the analysis hold over the infinite model.
An additional element of flexibility comes from the use of a logic as a language to express
security properties. The logic used by SPYDER has been shown to be sufficiently expressive to
model a large class of properties for example secrecy, authenticity but also some weak form of
privacy, anonymity, and non-repudiation (see [51, 52, 53] for details).
The proposed approach has both advantages and disadvantages. We have already noticed that
having a logic introduces flexibility in expressing security properties, especially the non-standard
ones such as weak forms of privacy or anonymity. In other model checking approaches, such as
for example Casper (which uses the model-checker FDR) [139, 70] the formalization of properties
with the exception of secrecy and integrity does not seem an easy task. The same can be said about
the tools NRL [155] and Murφ [163].
On the other hand we cannot cope with infinite-state models, that is with an unbounded net-
work. Some model checkers, for example NRL [155], can. Others, can deduce results over un-
bounded networks by analyzing bounded versions; for example work on data independence analy-
sis and CSP [36] has shown that FDR [2] (so also Casper [139]) can be used to infer security
results over protocols managing infinite nounces, keys etc. from an analysis performed over a
protocol that uses only a finite set of them. Our approach can help in reaching similar but weaker,
results: by the definition of different typing transformations (e.g., CSZ , . . . ,C′′′SZ in Figure) and by
analyzing the related finite-state models the confidence that the same results hold over the infinite
model can be increased. In fact, as a theoretical result we prove that an attack i.e., a trace that
does not satisfy a formula f over a finite model of a typed version of a protocol ( 6|= f checked
over LTS[ in Figure) always implies the presence of the same attack over the model of the corre-
sponding untyped version of the protocol (6|= f checked over LTS in Figure). This means that our
framework is sound. Generally the existence of an attack over the untyped version of a protocol
does not imply the same attack over a specific typed version, but we prove that a transformation
(e.g., C′SZ in figure) always exists (even though we will not be able to build it without knowing the
attack) such that the resulting typed version (C′SZ (Z) in Figure) shows the same flaw. This implies
that our framework is also complete.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 present the syntax
and semantics of our calculus and the logic used to specify properties. Section 4.4 introduces
its typed version which admits a finite-state labelled transition semantics. Section 4.4.1 and Sec-
tion 4.5 define the class of functions that are used to obtain typed protocols starting from a generic
specification. Moreover in those sections the main results of this chapter are proved. Section 4.5.1
formally describes the model checker algorithm whose correctness is based on the theory previ-
ously developed. Section 4.6 concludes. A running example is used throughout the chapter to














6|= f 6|= f
C′′SZ
C′′′SZ
Figure 4.1: The SPYDER environment. A protocol is described as a spy-calculus term Z, while
a property is specified as a logic formula f . Usually the semantic model of Z is an infinite state
labelled transition system LTS. A finite-state model LTS[ can be obtained from a typed specifi-




can be introduced at run-time to obtain different finite models, each repre-
senting a particular partition of the whole infinite state space. If LTS[ is not a model for f (e.g.,
if LTS[ 6|= f ), neither is LTS. If LTS is not a model for f , there exists a C′SZ such that the
corresponding LTS′[ is not a model for f either.
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4.2 The spy-calculus
This section introduces the spy-calculus. It is a process algebra whose syntax is inspired by the
spi-calculus of Abadi and Gordon in [7].
4.2.1 Syntax
In the language we assume an infinite set of constants N (names), an infinite set of variables V
and two binary functions, { } standing for encryption and 〈 , 〉 standing for pairing, respectively.
Moreover, we assume a finite set of A of labels a, and a finite set I of integer identifiers i.
The setM of messages is defined as the collection containing at leastN and such thatM,M ′ ∈
M implies both 〈M, M ′〉 ∈ M and {M}M ′ ∈ M. Similarly the set T of terms is the collection
that contains at least N ∪ V and such that T, T ′ ∈ T implies both 〈T, T ′〉 ∈ T and {T}T ′ ∈ T.
Formally the spy-calculus syntax is defined by the following grammar:
protocols Z ::= Z|||Z ′ | (\N)Z | (i, P )
roles P ::= 0 | a(x).P | a(T ).P | a(T ).P | P + P ′ | (νN)P | [x is T ]P
A protocol Z is the parallel composition of role instances (i, P ). (\N) restricts names in N .
A restricted name is initially private i.e., unknown to the intruder. In (\N)Z, N is bound in Z.
Each role instance, or agent, is composed of an identifier i and by a process (role) P . In turn,
a role P is either:
1. 0, the process that does nothing;
2. a(x).P , the input process ready to receive a message which will be bound to the variable x.
A label a is used to distinguish among different input actions;
3. a(T ).P , the output process ready to send a term T , classified as action a;
4. a(T ).P , the assert process ready to perform an assertion of the term T . Differently from
outputs and inputs, assertions are not communication actions. Assertions are used for ver-
ification purposes only and they act as control flags in the execution of the protocols. As-
sertions were presented first by Woo and Lam in [206] as begin-events and end-events for
specifying protocol authenticity properties;
5. P + P ′, the non-deterministic choice between processes P and P ′;
6. (νN)P , the process that generates a new local name N , then used within P ;
7. [xisT ]P , the match process that requires the term T to unify with the contents of a variable
x (possibly binding free variables in T ) in order to proceed as P .
In process (νN)P the name N is bound in P . In input process a(x).P , the variable x is bound
in P , while in [x is T ]P all the free variables in T are bound in P . We say that a variable, or a
name, is free if it is not bound.
We assume each role P is always introduced by a defining equation p〈x〉 def= P where x is the
tuple of all the free variables x in P . In that case p〈N〉whereN is a tuple of names, is the same as
P [N/x] i.e., the closed process where each free variable x in x is replaced by the corresponding
name N inN .
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Before describing an example specification of a protocol in the spy-calculus, let us discuss
some of its characteristics. A protocol consists of a number of finite and sequential processes. The
use of finite processes avoids problems due to recursive processes, but it suffices to describe the
behavior of a role running a security protocol (e.g., see [43]). In fact, the specification of a role is
usually a finite sequence of actions.
Some security protocols show their vulnerability only when running over repeated sessions.
So we need to describe more runs of a protocol specification. In the spy-calculus, as usual in
security protocol analysis (e.g., see [182, 71, 29]), it is possible to model a principal running a finite
number of sessions of the protocol by specifying, for example, k instances, (i1, P ), . . . , (ik, P ),
of the same role P . We cannot model an unbounded replication of processes, usually written as
!P , because this would lead to infinite runs of a protocol.
In any case limiting the number of runs to be finite is a widely accepted strategy for the model
checking approach to security (e.g., see [56]), where a finite-state analysis is required. This is the
case in most of the famous model checkers Murφ [163], Brutus [53] or FDR [136], even if some
of them limit the number of steps not at syntax level but only during the analysis. By combining a
limited number of runs and the fact that agents are finite-behaviored, we implicitly are assuming
only a finite number of nounces, keys, process names etc.. to be involved in a protocol. Again,
this constraint is required in order to have finite-state analysis, although the analysis remains NP-
Complete [114] even under these strict conditions. In [178, 36] Roscoe et al show how, by the
application of data independence techniques, it is possible to reduce the problem of proving the
security of a model where an infinite supply of different nounces, keys etc. is required, to a finite
check where only a finite number of them are indeed involved. These techniques, ad-hoc proved
within the CSP theory, would merit more attention but restating them within our framework is
beyond the scope of this chapter.
To conclude this discussion, we observe that even the use of finite runs and a finite number of
nounces, keys, etc. is not sufficient to obtain finite-state models, for an intruder may still generate
data of an infinite length. We will postpone the discussion about how to cope with this last kind of
infiniteness, till Section 4.5.
Example 4.2.1 As an example of a specification in spy-calculus, let us consider the following key-
exchange protocol, a simplified (in the sense that it focuses on the agreement of a new session key)
version of Needham-Schroeder Shared Key protocol [167] (NSSK). The protocol requires three
roles: two principals, A (the initiator) and B (the responder), and a trusted server S. Following
the common informal notation, NSSK is described as follows:
1. A → S : A,B
2. S → A : {KAB}KAS , {A,KAB}KBS
3. A → B : {A,KAB}KBS
Informally, in the protocol, A initiates the communication, by sending a message 〈A,B〉 to
the trusted server S (step 1). With this message A asks S for a session key that A can use to secure
communication with B. As a reply, S prepares a message composed of two parts. Both parts
contain the new session key KAB , created by S (step 2): the first part, {KAB}KAS , is encrypted
with the key KAS that S (already) shares with A (this means that only A should be able to decrypt
the message). The second part, {A,KAB}KBS , is reserved for B, and it is encrypted with the key
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KBS that S shares with B. Instead of sending it directly to B, S relies on A to deliver the message





(1, pA〈A,B, S,Kas〉)|||(2, pB〈A,B, S,Kbs〉)
|||(3, pS〈A,B,Kas,Kbs〉)
where
pA〈a, b, s, kas〉 def= cas(〈a, b〉).cas(x).[x is 〈{x1}kas , x2〉].cab(x2).0
pB〈a, b, s, kbs〉 def= cab(y).[y is {〈a, y1〉}kbs ].0
pS〈a, b, kas, kbs〉 def= (νKab)cas(z).[z is 〈a, b〉].cas(〈{Kab}kas , {〈a,Kab〉}kbs〉).0
The spy-calculus specification of the NSSK protocol shows three agent instances, one for each
role in the protocol. Instance (1, pA〈A,B, S,Kas〉) models one session of the process pA. This
is the initiator A, while (2, pB〈A,B, S,Kbs〉) and (3, pS〈A,B,Kas,Kbs〉) model respectively the
responder B and the trusted server S.
Process A first sends the message 〈a, b〉 to S, then A receives a reply in variable x. Then x
is analyzed: if x is indeed a pair whose first part is encrypted with the shared key Kas, then the
second part of x is stored in variable x2. Then A sends x2 to B. Otherwise the system gets stuck.
Three different labels cab, cas and cbs are used to distinguish input/output actions. In this
example keys Kas and Kbs and the names of participants A, B and S are restricted, that is hidden
from the initial knowledge of the intruder.
4.2.2 Semantics
Differently from the usual approach taken in process algebras for security (e.g., see [5, 181]),
in our calculus, the intruder is not explicitly described as an additional process. Instead, the
strongest possible intruder, i.e., the Dolev-Yao [69] intruder Ω, will appear in the semantics as an
environment having complete control of any communications. A similar approach has been taken
in [31] where an environment-sensitive semantics is defined.
Assuming such an embedded intruder implies that, instead of symmetric and synchronous
communication via shared channels, our calculus uses asynchronous communications via a unique
and anonymous channel, the intruder/environment (intruder from now on). Moreover, having
a unique public channel implies that whenever a process performs an output, the message will
be given to the intruder, while during an input the message will be retrieved from those in the
intruder’s knowledge (see later for a formal definition) i.e., from those that can be composed by
using the messages already known to the intruder.
An important question to ask at this point is: can the fact of modeling the intruder as an
embedded component cause a loss of power or flexibility? For example in this way we cannot
add new intruder capabilities. We can observe that, firstly, a precise set of capabilities (e.g., those
used here, see Figure 4.2) has been identified in the literature and proved to be sufficient to catch
the security flaws we will investigate here (e.g., see [85]); secondly, the semantics of the input
only depends on intruder capabilities, and it is not difficult to extend our calculus in order to be
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parametric with respect to this set. The only constraint we have is that the question ”M belongs
to the intruder knowledge”, where M is a message, must be decidable (see also later).
In the following we will give all the definitions required by the spy-calculus formal semantics.
We start with the definition of knowledge:
Definition 4.2.2 (Knowledge) Let W ⊆ M be a finite set of messages. The knowledge of W ,
written KS (W ), is the set W ∪ {M : W `∗ M}, where ` is the derivation symbol defining the
intruder capabilities in managing messages as given in Figure 4.2.
Here we require that the proof system is such that the question M ∈ KS (W ) is decidable
and derivable. This is indeed the case for the proof system of Table 4.2 (see [79] for the proof of
decidability). This assumption is needed if we want our model checking algorithm to be effective.
The operational semantics of the spy-calculus is given in terms of a labelled transition system
(LTS, in short). States of the LTS are pairs (G : Z), of global states and protocols. A global state
consists of the local state of each agent plus the state of the intruder. In turn, a local state contains
the name p of the role played by the agent, the set W of messages it has received so far, and a
mapping σ from variables to values. Formally:
Definition 4.2.3 (Global State) Let there be n process instances involved in a protocol. A global
state G is a sequence of n+ 1 local states, where:
• G(0) is the local state of the intruder Ω;
• G(i) is the local state of process instance identified by i, for i = 1, . . . , n.
We write Glob to indicate the set of all global states.
Definition 4.2.4 (Local State) A local state l, is a triple (p,W, σ) where p ∈ N is a name, W ⊆
M is a set of messages and σ : V −→M is a function from variables to messages.
Before going on, we give some technical details about the substitution σ, used in the definition
of a local state. With the symbol ⊥ we indicate the function σ undefined everywhere. We say
that σ′ is approximated by σ, written σ′ w σ whenever the function σ′ coincides with σ in every
value of the domain where σ is defined. Moreover we write σ(x) = σ′(x) if both functions are
undefined at x or coincide in x. σ̂ is the extension of σ to message terms. The test σ̂(T ) = σ̂(S)
evaluates to true if and only if both functions return the same ground message, false otherwise.
Giving a global state G, we indicate by pi, Wi, and σi respectively, the items of the local state
G(i), for i = 0, . . . , n. When convenient WΩ will be used instead of W0. It is worth to underline
that in the operational semantics each Wi and σi has a monotone growth rate along the protocol
execution. This implies that a variable is bound by the first (leftmost) input prefix or matching
operator in which it appears.
The transition rules of the LTS describe how a state (G : Z) evolves as a consequence of an
action α. An action is identified by the agent identifier, i (the agent that is performing the action),
by the action label a, and (if the action is a visible action) by the messages M involved in the
action. Formally:
Definition 4.2.5 (Action) An action α is either: (a) i.a〈M〉 or i.a〈M〉 or i.a〈M〉 meaning that
instance i has executed, respectively an input, output or assertion, labelled a over the message
M ; or (b) τ , the internal action.





W ` m W ` k
E{}
W ` {m}k
W ` m W ` m′
E<>
W ` 〈m, m′〉
Shrinking rules
W ` {m}k W ` k
S{}
W ` m
W ` 〈m, m′〉
S<>
W ` m
W ` 〈m, m′〉
S′<>
W ` m′
Figure 4.2: Inference rules defining the derivation symbol `, for the intruder knowledge. W
is a set of initial messages. Among the expanding rules the first says that whatever is in W is
derivable. The second, defines the rule for symmetric encryption and the third, defines the rule
for pair composition. The first shrinking rule defines decryption, whereas the last two define pair
projection.
We write Actτ to indicate the set of all actions. The following definition gives the operational
semantics:
Definition 4.2.6 (Operational Semantics)
Let Z = (\N1) . . . (\Nk)(1, P1)||| . . . |||(n, Pn), be a protocol. The associated labelled transition
system is a tuple (QZ , 〈G0, Z〉,Act ,RZ), where:
(a) QZ ⊆ Glob × Z is the set of states;
(b) 〈G0, Z〉 is the initial state so defined:
• G0(0) = (Ω,WΩ,⊥), is the initial local state of the intruder, where Ω is the name of
the intruder and WΩ is the initial set of messages known to the intruder, composed of
all the free names in Z.
• G0(i) = (pi,Wi,⊥) for all i ∈ I, is the initial local state of the role instance i. More
precisely, pi is the name of the process P , if pi def= P , Wi is the set of messages pi
knows, consisting of all free names in Pi.
(c) Actτ is the set of actions;
(d) the transition relation RZ ⊆ QZ × Act × QZ is the least transition relation defined by the
rules in Figure 4.3. Whenever (q, α, q′) ∈ RZ we will write q α→ q′.
We now explain the rules in Figure 4.3 in an informal way. Rule r≡1 and rule r+1 (and the
symmetric r≡2 and r+2) define the usual transitions in case of respectively parallel composition
and non deterministic choice. Rule r= defines the transition in case of a match: we require that
the local binding function σi can be extended in such a way that x equals T when σi is applied.
In the premises of the rule r= the condition P(σ̂(T )) informally means that σ̂(T ) must not con-
tain variables as decryption keys. We add this condition only to avoid unfair specifications where
encryption could be broken simply by using pattern matching. The use of P( ) is indeed a syn-
tactic constraint, whose presence does not interfere with our analysis. Formally P( ) is defined as
follows:
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(G : Z ′) α→ (G′ : Z ′′)
r≡1
(G : Z|||Z ′) α→ (G′ : Z|||Z ′′)
(G : Z|||(i, P )) α→ (G′ : Z|||(i, P ′))
r+1
(G : Z|||(i, P+P ′′)) α→ (G′ : Z|||(i, P ′))
σi(x) 6=⊥, P(σ̂i(T )), ∃σ′ w σi : σ̂′(T ) = σi(x)
r=
(G : Z|||(i, [x is T ]P )) τ→ (G[σ′/σi] : Z|||(i, P ))
σ̂i(T ) =M
r!
(G : Z|||(i, a(T ).P )) i.a〈M〉→ (G[WΩ ∪ {M}/WΩ] : Z|||(i, P ))
σ̂i(T ) =M
r!!
(G : Z|||(i, a(T ).P )) i.a〈M〉→ (G : Z|||(i, P ))
∃σ′ w σi : σ′(x) =M ∈ KS (WΩ)
r?
(G : Z|||(i, a(x).P )) i.a〈M〉→ (G[Wi ∪ {M}/Wi][σ′/σi] : Z|||(i, P ))
N ′ 6∈ c(P ) ∪ c(Z)
rν
(G : Z|||(i, (νN)P )) τ→ (G[Wi ∪ {N ′}/W ′i ] : Z|||(i, P [N ′/N ]))
r\
(G : Z|||(\N)Z ′) τ→ (G : Z|||Z ′)
Figure 4.3: Labelled Transition Systems rules. Rules r≡2 and r+2, which are the symmetric versus
of r≡1 and r+1, have been omitted. See the text for an informal explanation.
92 Chapter 4. SPYDER: a Model Checker for Security Protocols
P(T ) =

tt if T =M ∈M
tt if T = x ∈ V
P(T ′) if T = {T ′}M
P(T1) ∧ P(T2) if T = 〈T1, T2〉
ff otherwise .
Rule r! is for the output transition. We require that the term T evaluates to a message M , and
then the transition leads to a state where the message M is added to WΩ, the intruder local state.
Rule r!! is similar, but because an assertion is not a communication action, no message is put into
the local state of the intruder. It only leaves a trace as a label in the transition, whose presence can
be tested during the analysis. Rule r? defines the input transition. If the local binding function
σi can be extended in such a way that x equals some message M in the intruder knowledge (i.e.,
M ∈ KS (Ω)), that message is retrieved and then added to the local state of the agent instance.
Note that even if all the premises are decidable, the number of messages in KS (WΩ) is generally
infinite. This produces infinite branching in absence of limiting strategies. We will describe one
such strategy in Section 4.4.1. Rule rν describes the creation of new names. Here by c(P ) we
mean the set of constants that appear syntactically in P . Rule r\ describes the restriction operator.
This operator has no effect on the transition itself, but it modifies the definition of the initial
knowledge of the intruder. Restricted names are initially hidden from the intruder.
4.3 A Logic for Security Properties
This section shows how a linear time temporal logic can be used to express security properties.
Different logics for security can be found in literature (e.g., see [40, 90]), but the logic we propose
here is inspired by the linear time temporal logic first introduced in [51]. It has been used to
express a large set of properties, from secrecy, authenticity, general correspondence properties,
weak forms of anonymity, privacy and non-repudiation (e.g., see [50, 52, 53]). Informally, its
terms talk about messages, roles identifiers, role names and local (with respect to a role instance)
message terms. Its propositions can express facts about actions that happened, tests about what
messages are known to a role (or to the intruder), and equality tests over message terms. Formulas
are either propositional formulas or the modal formula ”eventually” in its past interpretation. By
using this modality it is possible to express properties about temporal correspondences among
events in protocol runs.
Formally, the logic shares with the spy-calculus the same set of names (N), of variables (V),
of integer identifiers (I), and of labels (A). Moreover messages (set M), terms (set T) are defined
as in spy-calculus. We now explain in detail the syntax of the logic, also presented in Figure 4.4.
We let i range over I, T over T, M over M, and λ over A ∪A ∪ {τ}.
A message term ς is (a) name(i), the name of the agent whose identifier is i, (b) i.T the message
term T interpreted in the local state of the agent whose identifier is i or (c) a ground message
M ∈M.
An atomic proposition ρ is (a) Knows(i, ς), a predicate on the presence, in the local state of the
agent identified by i of ς; (b) Acts(i.λ(ς)) (respectively Acts(τ)) a predicate on the fact that
a visible action i.e., a send, receive or assertion, over ς has been performed by the agent
identified by i (respectively a silent action has been performed). (c) ς = ς ′, is an equality
test over terms.
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A formula f is any propositional logic formula, or the modal formula ♦P f , where the symbol
♦P is the modal operator eventually in its past interpretation.
The derived operators ∨ (propositional or) and ⊃ (propositional implication) can be derived
as usual from ∧ and ¬. Moreover as a syntactic sugar we also use the formulas ∃s.f(s), where s
is a variable, defined as ∨{i∈I}f [s/i] and ∀s.f(s) defined as ∧{i∈I}f [s/i].
Example 4.3.1 In this example we show how to express security properties using the logic pre-
sented here. Let us start with the following authenticity property over the NSSK protocol formal-
ized in Example 4.2.1:
“When role pB finishes the protocol thinking that the responder is the role pA, role pA
has at least started the same protocol thinking that the initiator is pB .”
The property can be logically expressed with the following formula:
f
def
= Acts(2.cab(2.y)) ⊃ ♦P (Acts(1.cab(1.x2))) ∧ (2.y = 1.x2) (4.3.1)
Informally this says that whenever the agent with identification number 2 (the one who is
playing the role of pB) receives a message in y (as a consequence of an input action labelled cab)
then the agent identified by 1 (running the role pA) has previously sent a message (in x2) to pB
through an action labelled cab. Additionally the two messages are required to be equal.
The use of identification numbers in the formula makes it not so readable. A clearer way of
writing (4.3.1) is the following:
f ′ def= ∀b. ∃a. name(b) = pB ∧ name(a) = pA ∧ (4.3.2)
Acts(b.cab(b.y)) ⊃ ♦P (Acts(a.cab(a.x2))) ∧ (b.y = a.x2)
Here ∀ and ∃ are used as syntactic sugar for a finite sequence (over the set of identifiers {1, 2, 3}) of
respectively ∧ and ∨. Similar abbreviations are necessary whenever we need to talk about a role
independently of the fact that more instances of it are modeled in the spy-calculus formulation
of a protocol. We will use such style of expressing formulas in the rest of the paper. Formula
(4.3.2) informally says that whenever an agent (playing the role of pB) receives a message in y
(as a consequence of an input action labelled cab) then there exists an agent (running the role
pA) that has previously sent a message (identified by a.x2) to pB through an action labelled cab.
Additionally (4.3.2) requires the two messages to be equal.
Another example of a property for our model of the NSSK protocol is the secrecy property




Informally (4.3.3) expresses the fact that in any state the intruder must not be able to com-
pose the secret key KAB , starting from the messages he has eavesdropped in the communication
channel. Moreover, if we wanted to express the fact that the secret key KAB is known only to the
appropriate roles we could use the following:
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f ::= ρ | ¬f | f1 ∧ f2 | ♦P f formulas
ρ ::= Knows(i, ς)
| Acts(i.λ(ς)) | Acts(τ) λ ∈ A ∪A ∪A
| (ς = ς ′) i ∈ I atomic propositions
ς ::= name(i) | i.T |M T ∈ T,M ∈M terms




((name(x) = pS) ∨ (name(x) = pA) ∨ (name(x) = pB))
(4.3.4)
This formula says that for all instantiations of x, if x knows the secret key KAB then x is the
instantiation of either the role pS , pA or pB . Here we observe that if we wanted to express the fact
that roles pA and pB know the secret key at the end of the protocol, we can use a slightly different
implementation with assertions. For example role pA can assert to have finished the protocol by
the use of end(b), as follows:
pA〈a, b, s, kas〉 def= cas(〈a, b〉).cas(x).[x is 〈{x1}kas , x2〉].cab(x2).end(b).0
The modification to process modeling the role of B is similar, and we omit it. Then the




= ∀x.(name(x) = pA ∧ Acts(x.end(B))) ⊃ Knows(x,KAB)
fB
def
= ∀x.(name(x) = pB ∧ Acts(x.end(A))) ⊃ Knows(x,KAB)
Additional examples of properties expressed in this logic, can be found in [50, 52, 53]
We now explain how the logic is interpreted over the labelled transition systems, models of
spy-calculus protocols. Message terms are interpreted over a global state, while the interpretation
of a formula is defined over traces obtained from the LTS. A trace is the temporal structure over
which the satisfiability of formulas is checked. Formally, a trace is a finite sequence pi = q0 · α1 ·
q1 · . . . · αn · qn, where q0 is the initial state of the LTS and for all i, qi αi+1→ qi+1 is a transition
from qi.
We now define the interpretation function for each syntactic category of the logic. We will
start from message terms.
Definition 4.3.2 (Message Term Interpretation) Given a global state G, and a term T , the term
interpretation, is the functionM : Glob → T →M ∪ {⊥} given below:
M(G)(M) = M, where M ∈M
M(G)(j.T ) = σ̂(T ), where G(j) = ( , , σ)
M(G)(name(j)) = p, where G(j) = (p, , )
⊥ otherwise
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Informally, name(j) is the message which represents, in G, the name of the process instance
whose identifier is j; j.T is the message obtained by instantiating all the variables appearing in T ,
using the set of bindings that the process identified by j has in G.
Atomic propositions ρ (respectively, formulas f ) are interpreted over a trace pi. We write
qi |= ρ (respectively, qi |= f ) when they are satisfied over a state qi = (Gi : Zi) of pi as follows:
Definition 4.3.3 (Atomic Proposition Interpretation) Given a trace pi = q0 ·α1 ·q1 · . . . ·αn ·qn,
we have, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
qi |= Knows(j, ς) iff M(Gi)(ς) ∈ KS (Wj), where Gi(j) = ( ,Wj , )
qi |= Acts(j.λ(ς)) iff αi = j.λ(M), where M =M(Gi)(ς)
qi |= ς = ς ′ iff M(Gi)(ς) =M(Gi)(ς ′)
If we assume that the evaluation of the message term ς in qi returns the message M , informally
Knows(j,M) is satisfied in qi if the role instance identified by j can derive M from message set
Wj . In turn, Acts(j.λ(M)) is satisfied in a state qi, if qi−1
j.λ(M)→ qi is a transition of the trace pi.
Finally, ς = ς ′ is true if the interpretation terms coincide in qi.
Definition 4.3.4 (Formulae Interpretation) Given a formula f and a trace pi = q0·α1·. . .·αn·qn,
we have that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
qi |= ρ iff qi |= ρ
qi |= ¬f iff qi 6|= f
qi |= f1 ∧ f2 iff qi |= f1 and qi |= f2
qi |= ♦P f iff there exists j, 0 ≤ j ≤ i such that qj |= f
Informally the interpretation of ρ, ¬f and f1∧f2 do not differ from the common interpretation
of propositional formulas. Instead ♦P f is satisfied in qi if it is satisfied in some previous state of
the trace.
The obvious extension of satisfiability over pi is pi |= f iff qi |= f , ∀i : 0 ≤ i ≤ length(pi).
Finally we say that a protocol Z satisfies a formula f , written Z |= f , if f is satisfied over all the
traces of the LTS model of Z.
Example 4.3.5 In this example we show how the interpretation of formulas works. Let us assume
we have the protocol below, where a role pA sends an encrypted message to itself via an insecure
channel. Formally:
Zs = (\K)(1, pA(K))
pA(k) = c({A}k).c(x).ok(A).0
In the specification we chose to hide the key K used by the agent from the initial knowledge
of the intruder, and we suppose that A signals the end of the protocol with an assertion labelled
ok(). The property expressing the fact that, when the protocol finishes, the message received is
the same of the one sent, can be expressed as follows:
f = Acts(1.ok(A)) ⊃ (1.x = {A}K)
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Let us now consider one of the traces coming from the labelled transition system model of Zs,
that is pi = q0 · α1 · q1 · α2 · q2 · α3 · q3 where:
q0 = [(Ω, {A},⊥)], [(pA, {A,KA},⊥)]
α1 = 1.c({A}K)
q1 = [(Ω, {A, {A}K},⊥)], [(pA, {A,KA},⊥)]
α2 = 1.c({A}K)
q2 = [(Ω, {A, {A}K},⊥)], [(pA, {A,KA}, [x← {A}K ])]
α3 = 1.ok(A)
q3 = q2
It is easy to verify that pi |= f . In fact, for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, qi 6|= Acts(1.ok(A)) which makes the
implication true, while (a) q3 |= Acts(1.ok(A)) and (b) q3 |= (1.x = {A}K), which also makes
the implication true. (a) is true because q2 1.ok(A)→ q3 is a transition in pi, and (b) is true because x,
interpreted over the local state of 1 in q3, is equal to {A}K . It is also the case that Z 6|= f because










In this trace the intruder intercepts the message {A}K and replaces it by {A}A. This is suffi-
cient to conclude Z 6|= f .
4.4 Typed spy-calculus
In Section 4.2 it has been pointed out that the use of KS (WΩ) generally creates an infinite num-
ber of input transitions but, to perform model checking, we need a finite-state labelled transition
system. This section studies the possibility of using type information (mainly in input actions) to
select only those messages of a certain type in the intruder’s knowledge. In this way the intruder
has only a finite way of composing messages that fulfill a role’s input action and, consequently,
the corresponding transition system has a finite number of transitions. This suffices to obtain fi-
nite models considering that we deal with finite processes and finite protocol runs. It is worth to
underline that the use of types is here oriented only to obtain finite-state models, and not to use
type checking by way of protocol analysis.
In the following we define: (a) what a type is; (b) a partial relation between types (sub-typing)
and (c) the typed version of our calculus, where variables are adorned with types.
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Definition 4.4.1 (Type) A type t, is either: (1) a basic type proc, key, nounce or atom, (2) a
pair type 〈| t, t′ |〉, (3) a crypto type {| t |}t′, a finite union of types t⊕ t′. By T we mean the set of
all possibles types.
Types are partially ordered, with the following ordering relation:
Definition 4.4.2 Let t, t′ ∈ T. We say that t is a subtype of t′written as t ≤ t′, iff
t = t′ or
(
t′ = t′1 ⊕ t′2 and (t ≤ t′1 or t ≤ t′2)
)
t = {| t1 |}t2 and t′ = {| t′1 |}t′2 and t1 ≤ t′1 and t2 ≤ t′2
t = 〈| t1, t2 |〉 and t′ = 〈| t′1, t′2 |〉 and t1 ≤ t′1 and t2 ≤ t′2
Types are used in a slightly extended version of the spy-calculus, called the spyD-calculus,
where names and variables are decorated with their type. The spyD-calculus syntax differs from
spy-calculus in the following points:
• the set of names N is partitioned among Na, Np, Nk and Nn of respectively, atomic mes-
sages, process names, keys, and nounces/timestamps.
• variables are written as typed variables (x : t), where x is a variable and t is a type. The set
T˜ of typed terms T˜ , is then built, over the signature Σ ∪ (V × T). Protocols Z˜ and roles P˜
remain almost unchanged but typed terms are used instead of terms.
The syntax of spyD-calculus is expressed by the following grammar:
protocols Z˜ ::= Z˜|||Z˜ ′ | (\N)Z˜ | (i, P˜ )
roles P˜ ::= 0 | a(x : t).P˜ | a(T˜ ).P˜ | a(T˜ ).P˜ |
P˜ + P˜ ′ | (νN)P˜ | [(x : t) is T˜ ]P˜
We assume that only well typed protocols are possible, meaning that all instances of a variable
bound by the same, leftmost, input primitive or match must have the same type.
Starting from basic types, explicitly assigned to names and variables, a top level type bT˜ c for
a typed term T˜ can be deduced easily by structural induction over terms1. So for example the top
level type of the decorated term {(x : proc)}(k:key) is {| proc |}key. In the following we say that
a message term T˜ has type t if bT˜ c = t, and we write |t| to indicate the number of basic types
appearing in t.
Using types we can define a bounded version of the intruder knowledge.
Definition 4.4.3 (Bounded Knowledge) Let W ⊂ M be a finite set of messages, and t a type.
Then KS (t) called the t-knowledge is the following set of messages:
KS (t)(W ) = {M ∈ KS (W ) : bMc ≤ t}
About bounded knowledge the following results hold:
Lemma 4.4.4 Let W be a finite set of messages. Then for every t ∈ T, KS (t)(W ) is a finite set.
1With a little abuse of notation, the same function symbol b c is used both for the function returning a type given a
message M , and for the function returning a type given a typed term T˜ .
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Proof. The proof follows from the fact that |t| is finite, and the number of messages whose type
is a subtype of t is finite.
Example 4.4.5 Assume W = {A,K}, and t = 〈| proc, key⊕ proc |〉. Then KS (t)(W ) =
{〈A, A〉, 〈A, K〉}.
Lemma 4.4.6 Let W be finite. Given a message M , the question M ∈ KS (t)(W ) is decidable.
Proof. We can easily compute the bMc in linear time in the size of M . If bMc 6≤ t then M 6∈
KS (t)(W ). Otherwise bMc = t and we know from [53] that M ∈ KS (W ) is decidable.
We are now ready to restate the operational semantics of spyD-calculus, making use of the
bounded knowledge KS (t)(W ) in input rule. The spyD-calculus semantics is based on labelled
transition systems, which we call LTS[. The definition is almost the same of that of LTS (see
Definition 4.2.6) with the exception of the transition rule r?, which is re-defined in the rule r˜?:
∃σ′ w σi : σ′(x) =M ∈ KS (t)(WΩ)
r˜?
(G : Z˜|||(i, a(x : t).P˜ )) i.a〈M〉→[ (G[Wi ∪ {M}/Wi][σ′/σi] : Z˜|||(i, P˜ ))
In r˜? the bounded knowledge KS (t) is used instead of KS . We write (G : Z˜)
α→[ (G′ : Z˜ ′) to
say that a typed protocol Z˜, and the global state G, change as a consequence of action α. It follows
that:
Theorem 4.4.7 The LTS[ is finite-state.
Proof. Having only finite processes and a finite number of role instances, the source of infinite
behavior is due to the input transition rule r˜?. But from Lemma 4.4.4 it follows that there can only
be a finite number of transitions for each spyD-calculus protocol.
Logic formulas (see Section 4.3) may be interpreted over the traces pi[ = ρ0 · α1 · · ·αn · ρn,
originating from LTS[, exactly in the same way as they are interpreted over traces pi coming from
LTS. In fact, the satisfiability relation (see Section 4.3) depends on the component G of states
ρ = (G : Z˜), whose definition has not changed.
4.4.1 Building Typed Protocols
In this section we explain how to obtain, in a semi-automated way, typed spyD-calculus protocols
starting from a spy-calculus specification. We recall from Section 4.1 that our target is to build a
typed version at run-time starting from a single spy-calculus version.
To avoid some technicalities, we require that protocols are written in the following normal
form: variables used in the specification of different roles are distinct, and within a single role
variables bound by different binders (e.g., input or match operator) are different. All the examples
described in this chapter are in normal form.
The basic way of obtaining a typed version of a protocol specification is through a typing
function:
Definition 4.4.8 (Typing Transformation) A typing transformation is a partial function S : V→
V× T, such that, for all x in the domain of S, S(x) = x : t where t is a type.
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Based on a transformation S we can define a mapping CS, that is a structural extension of S
from variables to message terms, processes and protocols. Although different symbols should be
used for those extensions, for convenience we will used the same (overloaded) symbol CS for all of
them. The general idea is that, given a protocol Z, CS(Z) is a typed version of Z with finite-state
semantics. To be precise, more than general transformations we are interested in transformations
whose domain is the set of variables of a given protocol. Formally:
Definition 4.4.9 (Transformation with respect to a Protocol)
Let Z be a protocol specification in normal form. A transformation with respect to Z is a trans-
formation SZ whose domain is exactly the set of variables appearing in Z.
We can observe that given a protocol Z and a protocol transformation SZ , the set of bound
and free names of Z and CSZ (Z) is the same. In fact a protocol transformation acts only over
variables, while names are left untouched. The same can be observed for bound and free names of
processes P , involved in Z, and processes CSZ (P ) involved in CSZ (Z).
Example 4.4.10 This example shows a typing transformation. Referring to Example 4.2.1 let us





x : 〈| {| key |}key, {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key |〉, if v = x
x1 : key, if v = x1
x2 : {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key, if v = x2
y : {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key, if v = y
y1 : key, if v = y1
z : 〈| proc, proc |〉, if v = z
⊥, else
The transformation is built following the intuition that messages received in variable y from






(1, pA〈A,B, S,Kas〉)|||(2, pB〈A,B, S,Kbs〉)
|||(3, pS〈A,B,Kas,Kbs〉)
pA〈a, b, s, kas〉 def= cas(〈a, b〉).cas(x : 〈| {| key |}key, {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key |〉)
[x : 〈| {| key |}key, {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key |〉 =
〈{x1 : key}kas , x2 : {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key〉].
cab(x2 : {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key).0
pB〈a, b, s, kbs〉 def= cab(y : {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key)
[y : {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key is {〈a, y1 : key〉}Kbs ].0
pS〈a, b, kas, kbs〉 def= cas(z : 〈| proc, proc |〉)[z : 〈| proc, proc |〉 is 〈a, b〉].
(νKab)cas(〈{Kab}kas , {〈a,Kab〉}kbs〉).0
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4.5 Towards Finite Model Checking
After having shown how typed spyD-calculus protocols can be obtained from (untyped) spy-
calculus specifications via the use of transformation functions, we are interested in investigating
the relationship between LTS and LTS[. We would like to be sure that an attack over a spyD-
calculus protocol implies the presence of the same attack over the corresponding spy-calculus
protocol, and vice-versa.
This section formally shows that there exists a trace inclusion relation between LTS and LTS[:
given a transformation SZ , the set of traces from LTS always includes the set of traces from LTS[.
While this is not a surprise, a more interesting result is that given any trace of LTS, a transformation
can always be defined to yield the same trace in LTS[. This is mainly due to the fact that a variable
can be tagged with a union of types, so our scheme works also in presence of type flaw attacks.
Example 4.5.1 To show how this is possible let us resort to an example. The following standard
version of the seven-message Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol:
1. A → S : B
2. S → A : {PKB, B}PKS
3. A → B : {NA, A}PKB
4. B → S : A
5. S → B : {PKA, A}PKS
6. B → A : {NA, NB, B}PKA
7. A → B : {NB}PKB
In [113] Heather et al show an interesting type flaw attack on this protocol, in turn derived
from [154], when two runs (below) of the protocol are considered (we labelled with α the steps of
the first run and with β those of the second runs):
α3. IA → B : {NI , A}PKB
α4. B → S : A
α5. S → B : {PKA, A}PKS
α6. B → IA : {NI , NB, B}PKA
β3. I(NB ,B) → A : {NI , (NB, B)}PKA
β4. B → IS : (NB, B)
α7. IA → B : {NB}PKB
An intruder, playing the role of A in the first run, receives the message {NI , NB, B}PKA
from B in step 6, which uses this message subsequently in step 3 of the second run. In this second
run A is playing the role of B, and so A interprets the message as the start of a new protocol.
Consequently A takes the field (NB, B) as an agent name, and when A tries, in step 4, to request
(NB, B)’s public key (by sending the (NB, B) identity to the server) this message is intercepted
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again and used by the intruder to end correctly the first run of the protocol. We can model the
protocol in spy-calculus as:
(\Ks)(\Ka)(\Kb)(\A)(\B)(\S)
(1, pA〈A,B, S,Ka〉)|||(2, pA〈B,A, S,Kb〉)|||
(3, pB〈A,B, S,Kb〉)|||(4, pB〈B,A, S,Ka〉)|||
(5, pS〈A,B,Ka,Kb,Ks〉)|||(6, pS〈A,B,Ka,Kb,Ks〉)
Here we have two instantiations of each role. In particular the role of pA (respectively of pB) is
played once by A (respectively by B) and once by B (respectively by A). The first steps of role
pB are the following:
pB〈a, b, s, kb〉 def= c(x).[x is {〈xn, xa〉}kb ].c(xa).P ′
Here P ′ represents the continuation of the process. To catch the type flaw we have to find a typing
that allows the variable x to match with both messages used in the attack. One such a possible
type transformation for x is:
SNSSK(x) = x : {| 〈| nounce, proc⊕ 〈| nounce, proc |〉 |〉 |}key
Unfortunately it seems not easy to find such a typing transformation without knowing the
attack first. Even in the formal proof (see later) our result is not constructive and we have no
general method to construct this abstraction. We conjecture that a static analysis of the message
flow along a protocol specification may help in defining significant transformations, but we have
not yet investigated in this direction. We point out this issue as an area of future work.
To arrive at the main results of this section, we start with some definitions, introducing basic
equivalence relations among global states and traces of the relative transition systems.
Definition 4.5.2 Given a transformation function S, let q = (G : Z) be a state of the LTS, and
ρ = (G′ : Z˜ ′) a state of the LTS[. We say that they are equal up to S and we write q =S ρ, iff
• G = G′;
• CS(Z) = Z˜ ′ where the symbol = is interpreted as syntactic equality.
Definition 4.5.3 Given a transformation function S, let pi = q0 · α1 · q1 · . . . · αn · qn, and pi[ =
ρ0 · α′1 · ρ1 · . . . · α′n · ρn be two traces. We say that they are equal up to S and we write pi =S pi[
iff for all k
• αk = α′k;
• qk =S ρk.
In the following we prove the main lemmas of this section. One states that given a trace in the
LTS[ model of CSZ (Z), there always exists a corresponding trace (with respect to =S) in the LTS
model of Z. The second lemma proves that given a trace in the LTS model of Z, there always
exists a typing transformation CSZ ( ) such that a corresponding trace (with respect to =S) exists
in the LTS[ model of CSZ (Z).
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Lemma 4.5.4 Suppose that Z is a protocol specification in normal form, and SZ a protocol trans-
formation with respect to Z. Let ΠZ be the set of traces from the LTS, model of Z, and let ΠCSZ (Z)
be the set of traces of the LTS[, model of CSZ (Z). Then for each trace pi[ ∈ ΠCSZ (Z) there exists
a trace pi ∈ ΠZ such that pi =SZ pi[.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of the trace pi[ = ρ0 · α1 · ρ1 · . . . · αk · ρk. For any
n ≥ 0, we show that a trace pi exists whose prefix of length n (written pi[n]) is equal up to SZ to
the prefix of length n, of pi[ (written pi[[n]).
[base case: n = 0]. In this case pi[[0] = (G0 : CSZ (Z)). Whatever trace pi ∈ ΠZ we chose,
pi[0] =SZ pi[[0] holds. In fact, pi[0] = (G0 : Z) and pi[0] =SZ pi[[0] immediately follows from the
definition of “=SZ”.
[inductive step: n > 0]. Let us assume that the theorem holds for n. Then there exists a trace
pi ∈ ΠZ such that pi[n] =SZ pi[[n]. We prove that we can extend the trace pi[n] so that pi[n+ 1] is
a trace of ΠZ and pi[n+ 1] =SZ pi[[n+ 1].
Let pi[[n+ 1] be pi[[n] · αn+1 · ρn+1. We distinguish the cases of αn+1.
• [αn+1 = i.a〈M〉, for some i]. This action arises only through the following transition (i.e.,
by rule r˜?)
ρn︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Gn : Z˜|||(i, a(x : t).P˜ )) i.a〈M〉→[
ρn+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Gn[Wi ∪ {M}/Wi][σ′/σi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gn+1
: Z˜|||(i, P˜ ))
Here σ′ : σ′ w σi and σ′(x) = M ∈ KS (t)(WΩ). By the induction hypothesis there exists
a trace pi ∈ ΠZ such that pi[n] =SZ pi[[n]. In particular pi[n] = q0 · α1 · . . . · αn · qn, and
qn =SZ ρn. If we assume that qn = (G′, Z ′) this means that (a) G′ = Gn and (b) CSZ (Z ′) =
Z˜|||(i, a(x : t).P˜ ). We observe that M ∈ KS (WΩ), because KS (t)(WΩ) ⊆ KS (WΩ), and
this implies that the transition
qn︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Gn : Z|||(i, a(x).P )) i.a〈M〉→
qn+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Gn[Wi ∪ {M}/Wi][σ′/σi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gn+1
: Z|||(i, P ))
is possible. It is easy to check that qn+1 =SZ ρn+1, and this suffices to conclude that
pi[n+ 1] =SZ pi[[n+ 1].
• [αn+1 = i.a〈M〉, for some i]. This action arises only through the following transition (i.e.,
rule r˜!):
ρn︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Gn : Z˜|||(i, a(T˜ ).P˜ )) i.a〈M〉→
ρn+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Gn[WΩ ∪ {M}/WΩ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gn+1
: Z˜|||(i, P˜ ))
Here σ̂i(T˜ ) = M . By the induction hypothesis there exists a trace pi ∈ ΠZ such that
pi[n] =SZ pi[[n]. In particular pi[n] = q0 ·α1 · . . . ·αn · qn, and qn =SZ ρn. If we assume that
q0 = (G, q) this means that: (a) G′ = Gn, (b) CSZ (P ′) = (i, a(T˜ ).P˜ ). Moreover we have
σ̂i(T˜ ) = σ̂i(T ) =M . This means that the transition
4.5. Towards Finite Model Checking 103
qn︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Gn : Z|||(i, a(T ).P )) i.a〈M〉→
qn+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Gn[WΩ ∪ {M}/WΩ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gn+1
: Z|||(i, P ))
is possible. It is easy to check that qn+1 =SZ ρn+1, and this suffices to conclude that
pi[n+ 1] =SZ pi[[n+ 1].
• [αn+1 = τ ]. The only interesting case (we omit the other cases that are obvious) is when
the action is due to the following transition (i.e., rule r˜=):
ρn︷ ︸︸ ︷





Here P(σ̂i(T˜ )) and ∃σ′ w σi : σ̂′(T˜ ) = σi(x). Let pi[n] be q0 · α1 · . . . · αn · qn, and
consider the state qn = (G′ : Z ′). By the induction hypothesis we know that qn =SZ ρn and
as a consequence we have that: (a) G′ = Gn, (b) CSZ (P ′) = (i, [(x : t) is T˜ ].P˜ ), and (c)
σ̂i(T˜ ) = σ̂i(T ) =M . This means that the transition
ρn︷ ︸︸ ︷





is possible. It is easy to check that qn+1 =SZ ρn+1, and this suffices to conclude that
pi[n+ 1] =SZ pi[[n+ 1].
• [αn+1 = i.a〈M〉, for some i]. Similar to the case αn+1 = i.a〈M〉.
Lemma 4.5.5 Suppose that Z is a protocol in normal form, and ΠZ be the set of traces from the
LTS model of Z. Then for each trace pi ∈ ΠZ there exists a transformation S such that in the set
of traces ΠCSZ (Z) of the LTS[ model of CSZ (Z) there is a trace pi[ such that pi[ =SZ pi.
Proof. Let pi be q0 · α1 · · ·αn · qn. First of all let us define SZ . The idea is that the type of a
variable x is the union of types of the messages that are bound to x along the trace. Because our
protocols are in normal form, for each role instance, each variable is bound only by one operator
(i.e., input or match). This means that, within a role, only one message is bound to each variable.
Globally more messages can be bound to a variable x but only in different role instances. Let us
construct SZ in the following way:
Remark 4.5.6 Assume q = (G′, Z ′) is a state of a trace pi from the LTS model of a protocol Z,
and let SZ be the function returned by the algorithm 1. We have that M is the message bound to a
variable x (i.e., if M = σi(x), where G(i) = (pi, σi,Wi) for some i) then
bMc ≤ bSZ(x)c
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Algorithm 1 function BuildTypingFunction(pi). Given a trace pi returns a typing function S(Z).
1: SZ ←⊥;
2: for all i : αi ∈ pi do
3: let σi−1 the binding function in qi−1
4: let σi the binding function in qi
5: let Vi−1 = {x : σi−1(x) =⊥} {the set of vars not bound in qi−1}
6: let Vi = {x : σi(x) 6=⊥} {the set of vars bound to some message in state qi}
7: let V = Vi ∩ Vi−1 {exactly the set of vars assigned in consequence of the action αi}
8: for all x ∈ V do
9: if SZ(x) =⊥ then
10: SZ(x)← x : bσi(x)c
11: else




At this point we can prove that there exists a trace pi[ ∈ CSZ (Z) such that pi[ =SZ pi. The
proof is by induction over the length of pi. We show that for any n ≥ 0 we can find a trace pi[ such
that pi[n] = pi[[n]
[base case: n = 0]. In this case pi[0] = (G0 : Z). Whatever trace pi[ ∈ ΠCSZ (Z) we chose
pi[[0] =SZ pi[0] holds. In fact, pi[0] = (G0 : Z) and for definition pi[0] =SZ pi[[0] trivially holds for
definition of “=SZ”.
[inductive step: n > 0]. Suppose that the theorem holds for n, we will prove the theorem for
n+ 1. Let pi[n+ 1] be pi[n] · αn+1 · qn+1. We will distinguish by cases over αn+1.
• [αn+1 = i.a〈M〉, for some i]. This action arises only through the following transition (i.e.,
by rule r?):
qn︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Gn : Z|||(i, a(x).P )) i.a〈M〉→
qn+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(G[Wi ∪ {M}/Wi][σ′/σi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gn+1
: Z|||(i, P ))
where σ′ : σ′ w σi and σ′(x) = M ∈ KS (WΩ). By the induction hypothesis there exists a
trace pi[ ∈ ΠCSZ (Z) such that pi[[n] =SZ pi[n]. In particular pi[[n] = ρ0 ·α1 · . . . ·αn ·ρn, and
ρn = (Gn : CSZ (Z)|||(i, a(x : SZ(x)).CSZ (P ))). In addition (see remark 4.5.6) we have that
bMc ≤ bSZ(x)c. This means that M ∈ KS (t)(WΩ), where t = bSZ(x)c, and the transition
ρn︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Gn : CSZ (Z)|||(i, a(x : SZ(x)).CSZ (P )))
i.a〈M〉→[
ρn+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Gn[Wi ∪ {M}/Wi][σ′/σi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gn+1
: CSZ (Z)|||CSZ (P ))
is possible. It is easy to check that qn+1 =SZ ρn+1.
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• [αn+1 = i.a〈M〉, i.a〈M〉( for some i), and αn+1 = τ ]. These cases can be proved as in
Lemma 4.5.4.
Now we analyze the impact of the protocol transformation on the satisfiability of formulas. In
particular given a protocol specification Z, a protocol transformation SZ , and a formula f to be
checked, we want to be sure that if f can be checked over CSZ (Z). The answer is given by the
following theorems.
Theorem 4.5.7 Given a protocol Z, a transformation SZ over Z, and a logic formula f . Let ΠZ
be the set of traces of the LTS model of Z, and let ΠCSZ (Z) be the set of traces of the LTS[ model of
CSZ (Z), and let pi ∈ ΠZ be and pi[ ∈ ΠCSZ (Z) such that pi =SZ pi[. Then pi |= f iff pi[ |= CSZ (f).
Proof. When pi =SZ pi[, pi and pi[ coincide over the global state; the result follows because |= is
defined over the global states.
Theorem 4.5.8 Given a protocol Z and a protocol transformation SZ over Z. Suppose that f is
a logic formula. Then CSZ (Z) 6|= f implies Z 6|= f
Proof. CSZ (Z) 6|= f means that there exists a trace pi[ = ρ0 · α1 · . . . · αn · ρn, of LTS[ such that
pi[ 6|= f . By Lemma 4.5.4 there must exist a trace pi of LTS such that pi[ =SZ pi. By Theorem 4.5.7
we have that pi[ 6|= f .
Theorem 4.5.9 Given a protocolZ and a formula f such thatZ 6|= f . Then there exists a protocol
transformation SZ such that CSZ (Z) 6|= f .
Proof. Z 6|= f means that there exists a trace pi = ρ0 · α1 · . . . · αn · ρn, of ΠZ such that pi 6|= f .
By Lemma 4.5.5 there exists a protocol transformation SZ and a trace pi of ΠCSZ (Z) such that
pi[ =SZ pi, and by Theorem 4.5.7 we have that pi[ 6|= f .
Theorem 4.5.9 is possible because variables may assume, via SZ , potentially any type. This
makes our type system too general to be used in a static type checking framework.
4.5.1 Model Checking the spy-calculus
This section presents SPYDER, the model checking framework we intend to use for verifying
security. The kernel procedure of SPYDER is described by Algorithm 2, a simple procedure which
visits a finite labelled transition system in a depth first search mode. As parameters the algorithm
requires a closed protocol Z in normal form, a protocol transformation SZ , and a formula f to
be checked. Informally Algorithm 2 uses two stacks: (a) a stack SΛ containing transitions that
implement the depth first traversal of the transition system; (b) a stack SΠ for storing prefixes of
traces. In particular during the depth first traversal of transitions, prefixes ρ0 · α1 · · ·αi · ρi are
built and the satisfiability of the formula f is checked over the state qi. The procedure stops with
a counterexample if f is discovered to be unsatisfied in some ρi.
Algorithm 2 has time complexity O(|V | · (|f |+ |Wmax| · |Mmax|)) where |V | is the number of
states of the transition system, |f | is the length of formula f , Wmax is the greatest WΩ and Mmax
is the biggest message used within the protocol. It is worth to underline that using the protocol
transformation SZ limits the number of traces of the model to a finite number, even if it remains
exponential (when an exponential number of messages is involved in input actions). This means
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that our model checker runs in exponential time with respect to the length of messages involved in
the protocol.
We observe that the depth of the tree representing the LTS is linear in the number of steps made
by the agent. Therefore by using a on-the-fly generation strategy a depth first search requires lin-
ear space. SPYDER has been implemented in Ocaml2, and its main modules are represented in
Figure 4.5. The first module lexically checks a spy-calculus specification and renames variables
to obtain a normal form of the protocol. This specification is then parsed and an internal represen-
tation of the protocol is built. The user provides also a logic formula and a typing function that are
given as input to the model checker module. The execution finishes with success or with a trace
showing why the formula is not satisfied.
Example 4.5.10 We continue example 4.4.10 showing how a formula is checked over a typed





(1, pA〈A,B, S,Kas〉)|||(2, pB〈A,B, S,Kbs〉)
|||(3, pS〈A,B,Kas,Kbs〉)
pA〈a, b, s, kas〉 def= cas(〈a, b〉).cas(x : 〈| {| key |}key, {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key |〉)
[x : 〈| {| key |}key, {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key |〉 =
〈{x1 : key}kas , x2 : {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key〉].
cab(x2 : {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key).0
pB〈a, b, s, kbs〉 def= cab(y : {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key)
[y : {| 〈| proc, key |〉 |}key is {〈a, y1 : key〉}Kbs ].0
pS〈a, b, kas, kbs〉 def= cas(z : 〈| proc, proc |〉)[z : 〈| proc, proc |〉 is 〈a, b〉].
(νKab)cas(〈{Kab}kas , {〈a,Kab〉}kbs〉).0
Figure 4.6 shows the transition system model of CSZ (KE), while in Figure 4.7 we report a
table containing detailed information about the most significant states of the transition system (the
ones boxed in Figure 4.6). In the first column, state names q are reported, in the second the arrays
representing the global states G (each element of the array lays in a different row), and finally in
the third column the fragment of the calculus Z representing the protocol evolution. We want to
stress that the transition system is now finite state.
The formula given in example 4.4.10 (also reported at the end of the paragraph) and expressing
an authenticity property can be checked over the finite labelled transition system. It is easy to
verify that the formula is not satisfied. For example, in the trace q0 ·λ1 . . . λ7q7 process B receives
a message before A sends it, proving that the intruder has maliciously assumed A’s identity.
f
def
= ∀b. ∃a. name(b) = B ∧ name(a) = A ∧ (4.5.1)
Acts(cab)b{〈A, x2〉}KBS ⊃ ♦PActs(cab)ay1 ∧
a.y1 = b.{〈A, x2〉}KBS
2Ocaml is available on line at the web site http:\\caml.inria.fr
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Algorithm 2 function ModelChecking (Z is a closed protocol in normal form, f is formula and
SZ is a transformation w.r.t. Z)
1: Z˜ ← CSZ (Z) {Get a typed protocol, using SZ}
2: ρ0 = (G0 : Z˜) {Set the initial state}
3: SΛ ← ∅ {an empty stack for containing actions}
4: SΠ ← ∅ {an empty stack containing actions and states (i.e., prefix of traces)}
5: push(SΠ,  · ρ0)
6: repeat
7: · ρ← head(SΠ) {retrieve the element on the top of the stack (only the state is significant
here)}
8: if notmark(ρ) then {mark(ρ) equal true means that ρ has been not visited yet}
9: mark(ρ)← tt {mark ρ as “visited”}
10: if (ρ : SΠ) 6|= f then {if f is not satisfied over ρ along trace SΠ}
11: return ff, SΠ {failure and return a counterexample}
12: else {f is satisfied}
13: Λ← {α : α is an enabled transition from state ρ}
14: if Λ = ∅ then {no transition is possible}
15: pop(SΠ) {delete head element α · ρ from trace stack (i.e., backtrack)}
16: else




21: if SΛ 6= ∅ then {if some transition remains}
22: α← pop(SΛ) {retrieve next transition (i.e., depth first search)}





28: until SΠ = ∅ {all states have been visited}
29: return tt {success}
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counter example ok
abstract model











Figure 4.5: The architecture of the SPYDER prototype implemented in Ocaml
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter presents SPYDER, a model checking environment for a typed spi-calculus dialect. A
protocol is specified as a term of a formal calculus called the spy-calculus describing a parallel
composition of a finite number of process instances, each representing a finite-behaviored role
running the protocol. More runs of a protocol can be described by instantiating more copies of
each agent. The spy-calculus has an operational semantics based on labelled transition systems,
where the intruder is described in the Dolev-Yao style. Security properties can be expressed in a
linear time temporal logic.
Here types are used to obtain finite-state labelled transition systems. Types are assigned in
a flexible manner, by user-defined transformation functions CSZ ; these are applied to a given
protocol specification Z to obtain a typed version in CSZ (Z), before running the model checker.
A transformation CSZ is a “view” that a user can introduce to select a finite partition of the
state space. Different transformations can be used to select different portions of the state space,
increasing the confidence of the analysis.
As theoretical result we have proved that given a formula f , an attack (that is a trace over
which f is not satisfied) over a transformed protocol CSZ (Z) always implies the existence of the
same attack over the original protocol Z. Obviously finding an attack via protocol transformations
is only a sound method, i.e., if an attack exists over a protocol Z we have no guarantee that the
attack can be found over a specific transformed protocol. Anyway, we prove that a transformation
C′SZ that preserves the attack always exists. This mean that our transformations are general enough













































λ1 = 1.cas〈〈A, B〉〉
λ2 = 3.cas〈〈A, B〉〉 λ7 = 1.cab〈{〈A, K〉}Kbs 〉
λ5 = 2.cab〈{〈A, K〉}Kbs 〉
λ6 = 1.cas〈〈{K}Kas , {〈A, K〉}Kbs 〉〉
λ4 = 3.cas〈〈{K}Kab , {〈A, K〉}Kbs 〉〉
Figure 4.6: The finite state labelled transition system which models CSNSSK (NSSK).



























(pS ,W3 ∪ {〈A, B〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
W ′3
},








[z is 〈A, B〉].(νKab)
cas(〈{Kab}Kas ,
{〈A,Kab〉}Kbs〉).0)
q′2 G′2 = G2 Z˜ ′2 =















(1, cas(x)[x is 〈x1, x2〉]cab(x2).0)
|||(2, pB〈A,B, S,Kbs〉)
|||(3, cas(〈{K}kas , {〈A,K〉}kbs〉).0)
where K is a new name
q4 G4 =
(Ω,
W ′Ω︷ ︸︸ ︷





(pS ,W ′′3 , σ′3)
Z˜4 =
(1, cas(x)[x is 〈x1, x2〉]cab(x2).0)
|||(2, cab(y).[y is {〈A, y1〉}Kbs ].0)
|||(3, 0)
Figure 4.7: Details of the LTS of the protocol CSNSSK (NSSK) (part A). In the first column we list
the name of the states, in the second and third column their contents i.e., the global states and suf-
fixes of the spy-calculus protocol specification (where we omitted types for sake of saving space).







W ′2︷ ︸︸ ︷
W2 ∪ {{〈A, K〉}Kbs},
[y ← {〈A, K〉}Kbs ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ2
)
(pS ,W ′′3 , σ′3)
Z˜5 =
(1, cas(x).








(pB,W ′2, σ2 ∪ [y1 ← K]︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ′2
)
(pS ,W ′′3 , σ′3)
Z˜ ′5 =
(1, cas(x).







W ′1︷ ︸︸ ︷
W1 ∪ 〈{K}Kas , {〈A,K〉}Kbs〉,




(pS ,W ′′3 , σ′3)
Z˜6 =






σ1 ∪ [x1 ← K,


















Figure 4.8: Details of the LTS of the protocol CSNSSK (NSSK) (continued).
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In our framework we do not have any automatic method to find a typing transformation catch-
ing an attack without knowing the attack first. The formal proof of completeness, where this
transformation is proved to exist, is not constructive and it does not help in this direction. At the
present version of the tool finding the right typing transformation depends on the experience of
the engineer that performs the verification. We conjecture that useful hints in defining a signifi-
cant typing transformation can emerge from a static analysis of the message flow along a protocol
specification. This conjecture is supported by those results that show that it is possible to use type
checking to check secrecy and authenticity (e.g., see [3, 102]). Type checking for security protocol
is not commonly used, and the large availability of dynamic verifier confirms this impression. We
claim that static type checking can be profitably integrated in our tool with dynamic analysis: a
static (even partial) check can be used as front-end to built a set of typing transformations then
used in the dynamic model checker module. We have not investigated this solution yet, and we
point out it as a future research.
Our SPYDER implementation runs in exponential time in the size of the longest message in-
volved in the protocol. This matches the expected theoretical computational complexity, so it is
the best we can expect. We think that the SPYDER performance can be significantly improved
by the use of partial order reduction techniques that may help in reducing even more the size of
protocol models (this is evident, for example, just looking at the model in Figure 4.6). In fact, the
use of partial order reduction has been applied with success in the model checker BRUTUS [52]
whose logic (and relative semantical models) have inspired the one we have used here. We leave
as a future work the porting of such techniques to SPYDER.
Part III




Relating Multiset Rewriting and
Process Algebras for Security Protocol
Analysis
“Quando leggemmo il disı¨ato riso esser
basciato da cotanto amante, questi, che
mai da me non fia diviso, la bocca mi
bascio` tutto tremante. Galeotto fu’l libro
e chi lo scrisse: quel giorno piu` non
vi leggemmo avante.” (Francesca in La
Divina Commedia – Inferno Canto V,
Dante Alighieri)
“When we had read how the desired smile
was kissed by one who was so true a lover,
this one, who never shall be parted from
me, while all his body trembled, kissed my
mouth. A Gallehault indeed, that book and
he who wrote it, too; that day we read no
more.”
Abstract
When analysing security protocols, different specification languages support very different
reasoning methodologies whose results are not directly or easily comparable. Therefore, es-
tablishing clear mappings among different frameworks is highly desirable, as it permits vari-
ous methodologies to cooperate by interpreting theoretical and practical results of one system
into another. In this chapter, we examine the relationship between two general verification
frameworks: multiset rewriting (MSR) and a process algebra (PA) inspired by CCS and the
pi-calculus. Although defining a simple and general bijection between MSR and PA appears
difficult, we show that the sub-languages needed to specify cryptographic protocols admit an
effective translation that is not only trace-preserving, but also induces a correspondence re-
lation between the two languages. In particular, the correspondence sketched in this chapter
permits transferring several important trace-based properties such as secrecy and many forms
of authentication.
5.1 Introduction
In the last decade, security-related problems have attracted the attention of many researchers from
several different communities, especially formal methods (e.g., [4, 6, 40, 50, 43, 66, 79, 84, 82,
102, 150, 182, 77]). These researchers have often let their investigation be guided by the tech-
niques and experiences specific to their own areas of knowledge. This massive interest has deter-
mined a plethora of results that often are not directly comparable or integrable with one another. In
the last few years, attempts have been made to unify frameworks for specifying security properties
often expressed in different ways [86], and to study the relationships between different models for
representing security protocols [44].
In this chapter, we relate a transition-based and a form of process-based models for the descrip-
tion and the analysis of a large class of security protocols. We choose the multiset-rewriting for-
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malism MSR as a representative of the former, and synthesize salient features of popular process
algebras in a system that we call PA as an abstraction of the latter.
MSR, with its roots in concurrency theory and rewriting logic, has proved to be a language
suitable for studying foundational issues in security protocols [43]. It is also playing a practical
role through the closely related CIL intermediate language [66] of the CASPL security protocol
analysis system [65], in particular since translators from several tools to CIL have recently been
developed. Ties between between MSR and strand spaces [76], a popular specification language
for crypto-protocols, were analyzed by Cervesato et al in [44].
Process algebra encompasses a family of well-known formal frameworks proposed to describe
features of distributed and concurrent systems. Here we use a PA that borrows concepts from
different calculi, specifically CCS [158] and the pi-calculus [158]. We expect our results to be
applicable to other (value passing) process algebras used for security protocol analysis, e.g., the
spi-calculus [5] or CSP [181]. Indeed, when applied to security protocol analysis, most such
languages rely only on a well-identified subset of primitives, that we have isolated in the language
considered here.
We relate MSR and PA by defining encodings from one formalism to the other. Moreover
we propose a correspondence relation between MSR and PA protocol models, preserved by our
encodings, that is sufficient to transfer several useful trace-based properties such as secrecy and
many forms of authentication. Informally, this relation says that an MSR configuration and a PA
process correspond if and only if the messages stored on the network and the messages known by
the intruder are the same, step by step, in the two models.
Consequences of the results in this chapter are:
• First, our encodings establish a relationship between the specification methodologies un-
derlying MSR and PA. MSR is a representation paradigm based on transitions between
explicit states, as found, for example, in the vast majority of tools for security protocol
analysis [43, 50, 65, 70, 150, 172, 181]. The approach underlying PA and the languages
behind it, e.g., [5, 29, 82, 102, 77], represents concurrent systems, with security protocols
as a particular instance, as independent threads of computation communicating by message
passing. While specifications are obviously related, moving between paradigms is an error-
prone process unless guided by formal encodings.
• Second, the relationship we developed helps at relating verification results obtainable in
each model, in particular as far as secrecy and authentication are concerned. Systems a` la
MSR overwhelmingly embrace a verification methodology based on some form of trace ex-
ploration: model-checking [50, 65, 70, 181], theorem proving [172], or a combination [150].
The situation is more complex in process-algebraic languages, in which the analysis can be
based on traces [29, 82, 186], but also on process equivalence [5], type-checking [102] and
other forms of symbolic reasoning [110]. While we do not study how these last three forms
of analysis map to in the MSR world, we believe that the present study opens the door
to such an investigation. Authentication and secrecy are quintessential trace-based safety
properties (they are expressed in terms of intruder knowledge and messages passed onto
the network and our encodings preserve this information). Therefore relating trace-based
results in MSR and PA is valuable, in particular as these languages rely on different notions
of traces, and sometimes make different uses of them, e.g., [82].
• Finally, by bridging PA and MSR, we implicitly define a correspondence between PA and
other languages for security analysis. MSR has already been related to other formalisms,
5.2. Background 117
such as strand spaces [76] in a setting with an interleaving semantics (a worthy investigation
as remarked in [62]), while work on linear logic and MSR appears in [157].
5.2 Background
In this section, we recall the syntax and formal semantics of multiset rewriting (MSR) and we
define the language, PA, that we will use as a representative of process algebras. Before doing so,
we present our notation for tuples, as both MSR and PA rely on these objects. A tuple is defined
by the following grammar:
t ::=  | t; t
A tuple t is a sequence of items. We use the semicolon (“;”) as the tuple constructor: it is associa-
tive but not commutative. We write  for the empty tuple, which acts as the left and right identity
of “;”. We write t ∈ t to indicate that item t is present in tuple t, and use the notation t′ v t to
indicate that t′ is a subsequence of t, i.e., that t′ can be obtained by deleting zero or more symbols
from t. Finally, given tuples t and t′ with t′ v t, we write t− t′ for the tuple obtained by filtering
out all items t′ ∈ t′ from t, while preserving the order of the remaining elements of the latter.
5.2.1 First Order Multiset Rewriting
The language of first-order MSR is defined by the following grammar:
Elements a˜ ::= · | a(t), a˜
Rewriting Rules r ::= a˜(x)→ ∃n.b˜(x;n)
Rule sets r˜ ::= · | r, r˜
Multiset elements are chosen as atomic formulas a(t), where t is a tuple of terms over some first-
order signature Σ. We write a˜(x) to emphasize that variables, drawn from x, appear in a multiset
a˜. Similarly we write t (respectively t) as t(x) (respectively t(x)), to underline that varibles x
appear in a term t (respectively in the tuple of terms t). Instead, we write t (respectively t) to
emphasize, when required, that a term t is (respectively all the term in t are) ground, i.e., variable-
free.
In the sequel, the comma “,” will denote multiset union and will implicitly be considered
commutative and associative, while “·”, the empty multiset, will act as a neutral element; we will
omit it when convenient. The operational semantics of MSR is expressed by the following two
judgments:
Single rule application r˜ : a˜ −→ b˜
Iterated rule application r˜ : a˜ −→∗ b˜
The multisets a˜ and b˜ are called states and are always ground formulas. The arrow represents a
transition. These judgments are defined as follows:
msr0
(r˜, a˜(x)→ ∃n.b˜(x;n)) : (c˜, a˜[t/x]) −→ (c˜, b˜[t/x,k/n])
msr∗
r˜ : a˜ −→∗ a˜
r˜ : a˜ −→ b˜ r˜ : b˜ −→∗ c˜
msr1
r˜ : a˜ −→∗ c˜
The first inference shows how a rewrite rule r = a˜(x) → ∃n.b˜(x;n) is used to transform
a state into a successor state: it identifies a ground instance a˜(t) of its antecedent and replaces it
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with the ground instance b˜(t;k) of its consequent, where k are fresh constants. Here [t/x] denotes
the substitution (also written θ) replacing every occurrence of a variable x among x with the
corresponding term t in t. These rules implement a non-deterministic but sequential computation
model. This means that in general several rules are applicable at any step but only one rule,
chosen non-deterministically among them, is applied at each step. Concurrency is captured as the
permutability of (some) rule applications. The remaining rules define −→∗ as the reflexive and
transitive closure of −→.
5.2.2 Process Algebras
Process algebraic specifications of security protocols are generally limited to the parallel compo-
sition of a number of processes describing the sequence of actions performed by each agent. With
this in mind, we forsake the full treatment of a traditional process algebra, such as the pi-calculus,
in favor of a more specific language, PA, that includes the features commonly used for describ-
ing cryptographic protocols. In particular, we lay out PA on two levels: sequential processes
describe the sequence of atomic actions (input, output, name generation, etc.) performed by an
individual agent and parallel processes bundle them into a multi-agent specifications. Sequential
processes are synchronous, although a systematic use of buffer processes will prevent the possi-
bility of blocking on an output action. For convenience, we will rely on polyadic communication
channels.
With these premises, the language of PA is defined by the following grammar:
Parallel processes Q ::= 0 | Q ‖ P | Q ‖ !P
Sequential processes P ::= 0 | a(t).P | a(x).P | [x = t] P | νx.P
Parallel processes are defined as a parallel composition of – possibly replicated – sequential
processes. These, in turn, are a sequence of communication actions (input or output), pattern
matching and constant generation. An output process a(t).P is ready to send a tuple of terms t,
each built over a signature Σ, along the polyadic channel named a. An input process a(x).P is
ready to receive a tuple of (ground) messages, each in the corresponding variable x ∈ x. The
process [x = t] P is a parallel pattern matching construct which forces any instantiation of x
to match the pattern t, possibly binding previously unbound variables in the latter. Finally, the
creation of a new object in P (as in the pi-calculus [162]) is written as νx.P (we will sometimes
abbreviate νx1. . . . νxn.P as νx.P ). The binders of our language are νx, a(x) which bind each
x in x, and [x = t] which binds any first occurrence of a variable in t. This induces the usual
definition of free and bound variables in a term or process.
The operational semantics of PA is given by the following judgments:
Single interaction Q⇒ Q′
Iterated interaction Q⇒∗ Q′
They are defined as follows:
pa0
(Q ‖ a(t).P ‖ a(x).P ′)⇒ (Q ‖ P ‖ P ′[t/x])
t = t′[θ]
pa[]
(Q ‖ [t = t′] P )⇒ (Q ‖ P [θ])
k 6∈ c(Q) ∪ c(P )
paν
(Q ‖ νx.P )⇒ (Q ‖ P [k/x])
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Q⇒ Q′′ Q′′ ⇒∗ Q′
pa1
Q⇒∗ Q′
The first inference (reaction) shows how two sequential processes, respectively one ready to per-
form an output of a tuple t of ground terms, and one ready to perform an input over x react by
applying the instantiating substitution [t/x] to P ′. The second inference rule (matching) says that
there must exist a substitution θ that matches terms t′ with ground terms t, for [t = t′]P to evolve
into P [θ]. The third rule defines the semantics of νx as an instantiation with a fresh constant i.e.,
a name which differs form those appearing in all the process terms (here c(P ) denotes the set of
constant in P ). The next rule allows interactions to happen modulo structural equivalence ≡, that
in our case contains the usual monoidal equalities of parallel processes with respect to ‖ and 0,
the unfolding of replication (i.e., !P ≡ !P ‖ P ), and the equation [t = t′] P ≡ [t∗ = t′∗] P
which filter out identities in tuple’s matching, i.e., where t∗ and t′∗ are obtained from t and t′ by
removing all identical items in corresponding positions in a patter matching over tuples.
Finally, the last two inferences define ⇒∗ as the reflexive and transitive closure of ⇒.
5.3 Security Protocols
A cryptographic protocol is a collection of distributed programs supporting communication be-
tween participating agents and aimed at achieving predetermined security outcomes such as se-
crecy or authentication. The agents communicating in a protocol are called principals, while the
individual programs they execute as part of the protocol are called roles. Communication hap-
pens through a public network and is therefore accessible to anyone, unless protected through
cryptography.
Both transition- and process-based languages have been widely used for the specification of
cryptographic protocols (see for example [4, 6, 50, 43, 66, 79, 84, 82, 102, 150, 182, 77]). In this
section, we define MSRP and PAP , two security-oriented instances of MSR and PA respectively,
and describe how they can be used to specify security protocols.
Narrowing our investigation to a specific domain allows us to compare directly these restricted
versions of PA and MSR. Moreover by restricting our analysis to cryptographic protocols, we are
able to obtain stronger correspondence results than what seems achievable in a general comparison
between PA and MSR[25].
The two specifications will rely on a common first-order signature ΣP that includes at least
concatenation (〈 , 〉) and encryption ({ } ). In both formalisms, terms in ΣP stand for messages.
Predicate symbols are interpreted as such in MSRP , and as channel names in PAP . Variables will
also be allowed in rules and processes.
5.3.1 Formalizing Protocols as Multiset Rewriting
MSRP relies on the following predicate symbols [44]:
Network Messages (N˜ ): are the predicates used to model the network, where N(t) means that
the term t is stored in the network.
Role States (A˜): are the predicates used to model roles. Assuming a set of role identifiers R, the
family of role state predicates {Aρi(t) : i = 0 . . . lρ}, is intended to hold in the internal
state, t, of a principal in role ρ ∈ R during the sequence of protocol steps i = 0 . . . lρ. The
behavior of each role ρ is described through a finite number of rules, indexed from 0 to lρ.
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Intruder (I˜): are the predicates used to model the intruder I , where I(t), means that the intruder
knows the message t.
Persistent Predicates (p˜i): are ground predicates holding data that does not change during the
unfolding of the protocol (e.g., Kp(K;K ′) indicates that K and K ′ form a pair of pub-
lic/private keys). Rules use these predicates in a read-only manner to access the value of
persistent data.
A security protocol is expressed in MSRP as a set of rewrite rules r˜ of a specific format called
a security protocol theory. Given roles R, it can be partitioned as r˜ = ∪ρ∈R(r˜ρ), r˜I , where r˜ρ and
r˜I describe the behavior of a role ρ ∈ R and of the intruder I . For each role ρ, the rules in r˜ρ
consist of:
• one initial rule
instantiation rρ0 : p˜i(x) → ∃n.Aρ0(x;n), p˜i(x)
• zero or more (i = 1 . . . lρ) message exchange rules:
send rρi : Aρi−1(x) → Aρi(x), N(t(x))
receive rρi : Aρi−1(x), N(y) → Aρi(x; y)
analysis rρi : Aρi−1(t(x)) → Aρi(x)
The first rule (instantiation) describes the instantiation step of a protocol role. All the new
names required in a role ρ are generated during instantiation, and similarly all the variables x
referring to permanent data p˜i(t) are bound to ground permanent terms in that rule. The second
rule (send) describes an action of sending a message t composed by using (all or a subset of) the
ground terms in the role’s state. The third rule (receive) describes a receive operation, where a
message t stored in the net is retrieved, bound to variable y and then stored into the internal state
of the role. The last rule (analysis) simulates the action of a role when it analyses (e.g., decrypts
or splits) previously received messages.
This fairly explicit formulation of MSR rules will simplify our comparison with PAP . Equiv-
alent, but more succinct, formulations can be found in [43, 42].
Rules in r˜I are the standard rules describing the intruder in the style of Dolev-Yao [69], whose
capabilities consist in intercepting, analyzing, synthesizing and constructing messages, with the
ability to access some permanent data. Formally:
rI1 : pi(x) → I(x), pi(x)
rI2 : · → ∃n.I(n)
rI3 : N(x) → I(x)
rI4 : I(x) → N(x), I(x)
rI5 : I(〈x1, x2〉) → I(x1), I(x2), I(〈x1, x2〉)
rI6 : I(x1), I(x2) → I(〈x1, x2〉), I(x1), I(x2)
rI7 : I({x}k), I(k), Kp(k; k′) → I(x), Kp(k; k′), I({x}k), I(k)
rI8 : I(x), I(k) → I({x}k), I(x), I(k)
rI9 : I(x) → ·
where x, xi’s and k are variables. Informally, the first rule allows the intruder to access (i.e., get
knowledge of) persistent data. In the second, rule the intruder creates a new ground datum. In
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the third, a message stored in the network is intercepted, while in the fourth a known message
is injected into the network channel. The remaining rules describe the intruder capabilities for
managing the messages it knows: more precisely its ability to decompose pairs, to compose pairs,
to decrypt a message (if the relative decryption key is known), and to create encrypted messages.
Finally, the last one describes the capability of the intruder in deleting messages (i.e., forgetting
knowledge).
In MSRP , a state is a multiset of the form s˜ = (N˜ , A˜, I˜, p˜i), where the components collect
ground facts of the form N(t), Aρi(t), I(t), and pi(t) respectively. An initial state s˜0 = (I˜0, p˜i)
contains only the initial intruder knowledge (I˜0) and persistent predicates (p˜i). Note that p˜i remains
the same in every state. A pair (r˜ : s˜) consisting of a protocol theory r˜ and a state s˜ is called a
configuration. The initial configuration is (r˜ : s˜0).
Example 5.3.1 We make these definitions more concrete by showing the MSRP representation
of the classical Needham-Schroeder Public Key (NSPK ) protocol [167]. In the common informal
notation, it is written as follows:
1. A −→ B : {A,NA}KB
2. B −→ A : {NA, NB}KA
3. A −→ B : {NB}KB
(5.3.1)
The abstract principal A and the role it executes are called the initiator since it originates
the first message. Dually, B is the responder. This first message, {A,NA}KB , consists of A’s
name and a freshly generated random value NA (a nonce), and is encrypted using B’s public
key KB . Upon successfully decrypting this message (using private key K−1B ), B replies with the
second message, {NA, NB}KA , where NB is a second nonce, generated by B. Upon successfully
processing this message, A sends the final message {NB}KB which shall be interpreted by B.
Here, A and B perform distinct although related sequences of actions: A generates NA, sends
{A,NA}KB , waits for a message from B and verifies that it matches the format {NA, NB}KA ,
and finally sends the third message, {NB}KB . This sequence of actions constitute A’s role. B’s
role is similar. Both MSRP and PAP give a role-centric representation of a protocol.
The MSRP specification of the NSPK protocol consists of the rule-set RNSPK which we
partition as (RA,RB, r˜I). RA and RB implement the roles of the initiator (A) and the responder
(B) respectively, while r˜I describes the actions of a potential attacker, and have been fixed earlier
in the discussion.
First some abbreviations. We define
p˜i(x; y; kx; k′x, ky) = Pr(x), PrK(x; k
′
x), PbK(y; ky), Kp(kx; k
′
x)
Here, persistent predicate Pr(z) indicates that z is the name of a principal; the predicate PbK(z; kz)
defines kz to be the public key of principal x; the predicate PrK(z; k′z) says that k′z is z’s private
key; finally, Kp(kz; k′z) relates a public key kz and the corresponding private key k′z . Two 5-tuples
of variables (a; b; ka; k′a; kb) and (b; a; kb; k′b; ka) will occur repeatedly in this example; therefore
we shall abbreviate them asA andB, respectively.
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Then, the following rules describe A’s role:
RA

rA0 : p˜i(A) → ∃na.p˜i(A), A0(A;na)
rA1 : A0(A;na) → N({a, na}kb), A1(A;na)
rA2 : A1(A;na), N(m) → A2(A;na;m)
rA3 : A2(A;na; {na, nb}ka)→ A3(A;na;nb)
rA4 : A3(A;na;nb) → N({nb}kb), A4(A;na;nb)
The first rule rA0 in RA is the instantiation rule of this role, and takes care of generating the
initiator’s nonce, na and collecting the persistent information used in the role. Rules rA1 and rA4
are send rules corresponding to the message transmission step 1 and 3 in protocol (5.3.1). Rules
rA2 and rA3 realize the initiator’s actions in the second step of NSPK , namely the reception of a
message m from b and the verification that it matches the expected pattern {na, nb}ka . Reception
and analysis are described as separated steps accordingly to the MSRP syntax.
The responder’s role is similarly specified by the following MSRP rule set:
RB

rB0 : p˜i(B) → ∃nb.p˜i(B), B0(B;nb)
rB1 : B0(B;nb), N(m) → B1(B;nb;m)
rB2 : B1(B;nb; {a, na}kb), → B2(B;nb;na)
rB3 : B2(B;nb;na) → N({na, nb}ka), B3(B;nb;na)
rB4 : B3(B;nb;na), N(m
′)→ B4(B;nb;na;m′)
rB5 : B4(B;nb;na; {nb}kb) → B5(B;nb;na)
Again, the instantiation rule rB0 instantiate all the variables B to ground terms. Rules rB1 , rB4
model the receiving steps 1 and 3 in protocol (5.3.1), while rB3 is the rule corresponding the
sending step 2. Finally rules rB2 , rB5 describe the analysis steps performed by the role.












p˜i(E;A;KE ;K ′E ;KA),︸ ︷︷ ︸
p˜i
whereA, B, E, are specific principals (a and b above were variables), withE acting as the attacker.
For each of them, the pseudo-functionsK andK ′ denote their public and private key, respectively.
In this initial state, the intruder knowledge consists of its name E and its public/private key
pair KE ,K ′E . The persistent data p˜i defines the attributes (name, public and private key) of each
of these principals, in particular of the intruder E who may participate in the protocol as an honest
player if he wishes. This is useful, for example, when testing some authenticity property.
5.3.2 Protocols as Processes
A security protocol may be described in a fragment of PA where:
• Every communication happens through the net (here P!net is the process that manages the
net as a public channel where protocol roles send and receive messages).
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• There is an intruder, with some initial knowledge, able to intercept and forge messages
passing through the net (here Q!I , with initial knowledge QI0).
• Each principal starts the protocol in a certain role ρ.
Formally a security protocol, involving a collection of roles {ρ}, is expressed in PAP as a
“security protocol process Q”, defined as the parallel composition of five components: P!net ‖∏
ρ P!ρ ‖ Q!I ‖ Q!pi ‖ QI0 where
∏
P denotes the parallel composition of all the processes in P.
More precisely:
P!net = !Ni(x).No(x).0 This process describes the behavior of the network as a buffer that copies
messages from channel Ni (input to the net) to No (output from the net), implementing an
asynchronous form of message transmission on top of a synchronous calculus.
P!ρ Each of these replicated sequential processes capture the actions that constitute a role, in the
sense defined for MSRP . These processes have the form
P!ρ = !p˜i(x).νn.Pρ
Here Pρ is a sequential process that performs input and output only on the network channels,
and that analyses the received messages. Variables x and n are free in Pρ.
Notice that pattern matching is sufficient for “extracting” a piece of information when ΣP
is used, but more general mechanisms could be considered (as in Crypto-CCS for exam-
ple [86]).We have used p˜i(x).P as a shortcut for pi1 (x1) . . . pik (xk).P , where xi v x.
Formally,
Pρ ::= 0 | No(y).Pρ | Ni(t).Pρ | [x′ = t(x)] Pρ
Q!I = !PI1 ‖ . . . ‖ !PI9 ‖ !PI10 This is the specification of the intruder model in a Dolev-Yao
style. The dedicated channel I holds the information the intruder operates on (it can be
either initial, intercepted, or forged). Each PIi , for i = 1, . . . , 9 describes one capability
of the intruder. The additional process PI10 has no meaning in term of intruder capability
but technically it behaves as a “garbage” collector of messages in the intruder knowledge.
Processes PIi are defined as follows:
PI1 = pi(x).I (x).0
PI2 = νn.I (n).0
PI3 = No(x).I (x).0
PI4 = I (x).I (x).Ni(x).0
PI5 = I (x).I (x).[x = 〈x1, x2〉].I (x1).I (x2).0
PI6 = I (x1).I (x1).I (x2).I (x2).I (〈x1, x2〉).0
PI7 = Kp(w).I (y).I (y).[w = 〈y, y′〉].I (x).I (x).[x = {z}y′ ].I (z).0
PI8 = I (x).I (x).I (k).I (k).I ({x}k).0
PI9 = I (x).0
PI10 = I (x).I (x).0
Processes PI1 through PI9 perform the same actions as the MSRP intruder rules with the
same index in Section 5.3.1. For example, PI5 retrieves an object x previously memorized
as I(x), splits it into the pair (x1, x2), and then stores a copy of each of the terms x, x1 and
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x2: this is exactly what rI5 achieved. Channel I is used to store the intruder’s knowledge
in a distributed way. Process PI10 ensures that writing on I is never blocking, even in our
synchronous calculus. In particular, it allows expressing every term t known to the intruder
as the singleton process I (t).0, since it can rewrite a trailing sequence of outputs I (t).I (t′).0
into I (t).0 ‖ I (t′).0.
Q!pi =
∏
!pi(t).0 This process represents what we called “persistent information” in the case of
MSRP . We can assume the same predicate (here channel) names with the same meaning.
This information is made available to client processes on each channel pi (e.g., Kp). It is
assumed that no other process performs an output on pi.
QI0 =
∏
I (t).0 for terms t. QI0 represents the initial knowledge of the intruder.
In PAP , an initial state is a process (P!net ‖
∏
ρ!Pρ ‖ Q!I ‖ Q!pi ‖ QI0). Subsequent states
are obtained by applying the execution rules of PA defined in Section 5.2.2.
Example 5.3.2 In order to gain a better understanding of the PAP specification methodology, we
will now express the NSPK protocol (5.3.1) in this language. The PAP specification of NSPK
protocol will consist of the following processes:
QNSPK = P!net ‖ P!A ‖ P!B ‖ Q!I ‖ Q!pi ‖ QI0
Here P!net and Q!I have already been defined. As with MSRP , we rely on the abbreviations
A = (a; b; ka; k′a; kb) and B = (b; a; kb; k′b; ka) for the given tuples of variables. The other
processes are as follows:
P!A = !p˜i(A). νna. Ni({a, na}kb). No(m). [m = {na, nb}ka ] . Ni({nb}kb). 0
where p˜i(A) is an abbreviation for the prefix
Pr(a).PrK(a; k′a).PbK(b; kb).Kp(ka; k
′
a)
First, process P!A receives, through channels p˜i, the instantiating constants of the initiator role.
Then it sends the encrypted message {a, na}kb on the net, where na is a fresh name and kb the
responder’s public key. Then, P!A receives a message m that it tries to interpret as {na, nb}ka by
decryption using the private key ka, and by splitting the results as the pair (na, nb). If this step
succeeds the message {nb}kb is sent back to the net.
The process P!B representing the responder of NSPK is similarly defined as follows:
P!B = !p˜i(B). νnb. No(m).[m = {a, na}kb ] .
Ni({na, nb}ka). No(m′). [m′ = {nb}kb ] . 0
The initial knowledge of the intruder is:
QI0 = I (E).0 ‖ I (KE).0 ‖ I (K ′E).0
i.e., the intruder knows its name and its private/public key pairs. Finally the processes modeling
the persistent information are the following:
Q!pi = Qp˜i(A;B;KA;K′A;KB) ‖ Qp˜i(B;A;KB ;K′B ;KA) ‖
Qp˜i(B;E;KB ;K′B ;KE) ‖ Qp˜i(E;A;KE ;K′E ;KA)
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where Qp˜i(x;y;kx;k′x;ky) is the parallel composition of simple replicated processes that output each
object in p˜i(x; y; kx; k′x; ky) on channels p˜i, i.e., :
!Pr(x).0 ‖ !PrK(x; k′x).0 ‖ !PbK(y; ky).0 ‖ !Kp(kx; k′x).0 .
Here finishes the example showing how to write a security protocol in our subset of PA.
5.4 Encoding Protocol Specifications
This section describes two encodings: one from MSRP to PAP and the other from PAP to MSRP .
As we define these encodings, we assume a common underlying signature ΣP . In particular, the
predicate symbols and terms in MSRP find their counterpart in channel names and messages in
PAP , respectively.
The first mapping, from MSRP to PAP , is based on the observation that role state predicates
force MSRP rules to be applied sequentially within a role (this is not true for general MSR the-
ories). Minor technicalities are involved in dealing with the presence of multiple instances of a
same role (they are addressed through replicated processes).
At its core, the inverse encoding, from PAP to MSRP , maps sequential agents to a set of
MSRP rules corresponding to roles: we generate appropriate role state predicates in correspon-
dence of the intermediate stages of each sequential process. The replication operator is not directly
involved in this mapping as it finds its counterpart in the way rewriting rules are applied. The trans-
formation of the intruder, whose behavior is fixed a priori, is treated off-line in both directions.
Before proceeding we introduce some simplifying assumptions and a preliminary observation.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the rewrite rules of an MSRP theory are written in the
following form: variables occurring in two occurrences of a role state predicate Aρi(x), one in the
antecedent and one in the consequent of two consecutive rules, have the same name. Moreover,
in the antecedent Aρi(t(x)) of an analysis rule, we require that all the variables introduced by
t(x) be distinct from the variables x′ in the consequent Aρi(x′) of the preceding rule. These
assumptions, purely syntactical, simplify situations in the proofs without invalidating our analysis.
Example 5.3.1 implements them.
We begin by characterizing the structure of a generic PAP state reachable from an initial
specification (see Sec. 5.3.2) as the parallel composition of precisely identified processes. We
have the following proposition:







P!ρ ‖ Q!I ‖ Q!pi) ‖ (Qnet ‖
∏
ρ
Pρ ‖ QI ‖ Qrem)
where:
Qnet ::= 0 |
∏
No(t).0
Pρ ::= 0 | No(x).Pρ | Ni(t).Pρ | [t = t′] Pρ
QI ::= suffix of PIj , for all j
Qrem ::= 0 | No(x).Ni(x).0 | p˜i(x).νn.Pρ | νn.Pρ |
∏
pi(t).0
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Proof. By induction over the number of transition steps. As the base of the induction let us
observe that a PAP initial state Q0 is exactly the process Q! ‖ QI0 (where Q! = P!net ‖
∏
ρ P!ρ ‖
Q!I ‖ Q!pi), and that Q0 ⇒∗ Q0. Then, let be Q such that Q0 ⇒∗ Q′ ⇒ Q. For inductive
hypothesis Q′ may be written as a process of form Q! ‖ (Qnet ‖
∏
ρ Pρ ‖ QI ‖ Qrem), and
it is easy to check that, each transition Q from Q′ can be written as well as a process of form




ρ ‖ Q′I ‖ Q′rem).
5.4.1 From MSRP to PAP
This section defines the transformation d e that, given an MSRP configuration (r˜ : s˜) with r˜ =
(∪ρ(r˜ρ), r˜I) and s˜ = (N˜ , A˜, I˜, p˜i) returns a PAP state Q! ‖ Qnet ‖
∏
ρ Pρ ‖ QI (with Q! =
(P!net ‖
∏
ρ P!ρ ‖ Q!I ‖ Q!pi)).
More precisely d e is a tuple of encodings d eRρ , d eRI , d eN d eAρ , d eI , d epi, each operating
on a different component of the MSRP configuration, as depicted in the following scheme:





















This definition is interpreted as follows:
• Pnet is fixed a priori (see Section 5.3.2);
• ∏ρ P!ρ and Q!I , result from the transformation of respectively ∪ρ(r˜ρ) and r˜I ;
• Q!pi results from the transformation of p˜i, and
• Qnet,
∏
ρ Pρ, and QI result from transformation of, respectively N˜ , A˜ and I˜ .
Intuitively, the transformations d∪ρ(r˜ρ)eRρ and dr˜IeRI return the parallel composition of repli-
cated (i.e., preceeded by a !) processes modeling the sequence of actions of each role and of the
intruder, respectively. The replication operator makes these processes always available for in-
stantiation as the MSR rules are. The intruder process is fixed a priori and its transformation is
obvious. The transformation of r˜ρ, e.g., the rules of role ρ, is more interesting: it results in a se-
quential process Pρ, whose send, receive or match sub-processes are obtained, respectively from
send, receive and analysis rules in r˜ρ (see also Example 5.4.2). Particular attention is reserved for
the translation of the first instantiation rule rρ0 .
The next transformations act on predicates N˜ , A˜ and I˜ in the MSRP state, and return the
parallel composition of sequential processes. More precisely, all the predicates N(t) in N˜ are
transformed into singleton output processes No(t).0 representing the availability of the ground
datum t on the net. Similarly predicates I(t) in I˜ are transformed into output processes I (t).0 rep-
resenting the intruder knows the datum t. Finally the transformation of each predicates Aρi(t), in
A˜ returns the suffix of the process Pρ that model the remaining role rules rρi+1 , . . . , rρlρ . Variable
in Pρ are partially instantiated depending on terms in t.
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The acquisition of permanent facts and the creation of new variables x are mapped, respec-
tively to a sequence of input actions from processes Q!pi, and actions νx for each x in x. In turn
Q!pi is the parallel composition of replicated output processes pi(t).0, each obtained from a per-
manent predicates pi(t) in p˜i. Their task is to make permanent fact always available to be received.
Whenever unambiguous, we will omit the identifying subscript from the encoding functions
d eRρ , d eRI , d eN d eAρ , d eI , or d epi, simplifying them to d e.
d eRρ . In transforming processes P!ρ, for each role ρ, a subroutine function d e#(x) is called by the
top level transformation d e. d e#(x) ranges over the set of role rules ∪ρ(r˜ρ), and takes a tuple
x of variables as parameter. This parameter, initially the empty tuple , collects variables
used along the rewriting rule, and uses them opportunely in the building process. We define
it on the structure of the role rule rρi ∈ r˜ρ involved. Formally for i = 0:
drρ0e = p˜i(x).νn.drρ1e#(x;n) if rρ0 : p˜i(x)→ ∃n.Aρ0(x;n), p˜i(x)
A role generation rule is mapped onto a process which first receives, in sequence, permanent
terms via the channels pi in p˜i and then generates all the new names n used in this role.
For 0 < i ≤ lρ − 1:
drρi+1e#(x) =

Ni(t(x)).drρi+2e#(x) , if rρi+1 = Aρi(x)→ Aρi+1(x), N(t(x))
No(y)drρi+2e#(x;y) , if rρi+1 = Aρi(x), N(y)→ Aρi+1(x; y)
[x = t(x′)] drρi+2e#(x′), if rρi+1 = Aρi(t(x′)),→ Aρi+1(x′)
The transformation of a send or a receive rewriting rule is straightforward. The translation of
an analysis rewriting rule is less obvious: the matching [x = t(x′)] is intended to simulate
the matching that — in the semantics of MSR — happens between the terms in consequent,
Aρi(x), of rule rρi and the terms in the antecedent Aρi(t(x′)) of (actual) rule rρi+1 . Finally
and with a little abuse of notation, we set drρlρ+1e#(x) = 0.
The final process defining the role ρ behavior is the following: Pρ
def
= drρ0e
d eRI . The intruder is handled by simply mapping r˜I to Q!I . More precisely, we define the trans-
formation function d e that relates the intruder rewriting rule rIj with the sequential agents
PIj defined in Section 5.3.2. Moreover the transformation produces the additional process
!PI10 .
At this point the transformation is complete as soon as the state s˜ = (N˜ , A˜, I˜, p˜i) is treated.
d eAρ . For each Aρi(t) ∈ A˜, we define PAρi (t) = drρi+1e
#
(x)[t/x], where drρi+1e#( ) was defined
above and x are the variables appearing as argument of the consequent predicate Aρi(x) in
rρi .













dN(t), N˜e=No(t).0 ‖ dN˜e
d·e =0
dI(t), I˜e= I (t).0 ‖ dI˜e
d·e =0
dpi(t), p˜ie= !pi(t).0 ‖ dp˜ie
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Example 5.4.2 (Translation of NSPK from MSRP to PAP ) We now provide an example on how
d e works. We apply it to the MSRP specification of NSPK given in Section 5.3.1.
d
p˜i(A)→∃na.p˜i(A),A0(A;na)︷︸︸︷
rA0 e = !p˜i(A).νna.drA1e#(A;na)
d
A0(A;na)→N({a,na}kb ),A1(A;na)︷︸︸︷




















dRAe = !p˜i(A).νna.Ni({a, na}kb).No(m).
[A;na;m = A;na; {na, nb}ka ] .Ni({nb}kb).0
which can be simplified into
dRAe = !p˜i(A).νna.Ni({a, na}kb).No(m).
[m = {na, nb}ka ] .Ni({nb}kb).0
by means of the structural equivalence, which removes items in corresponding positions in pattern
matching over tuples. This process is exactly the same provided in Section 5.3.2.
Similarly (omitting the details) it is easy to check that:
dRBe = !p˜i(B).νnb.No(m).
[B;nb;m = B;nb; {a, na}kb ] .Ni({na, nb}ka).
No(m).[B;nb;na;m′ = B;nb;na; {nb}kb ] .0
5.4.2 From PAP to MSRP
This section defines the transformation b c that given a PAP state returns a configuration in
MSRP . Indeed b c consists of encodings
b c!ρ, b c!I , b cnet, b cρ b cI and b cpi,
each operating on different sub-processes of the PAP state. The following schema describes





ρ P!ρ ‖ Q!I ‖ Q!pi )c ‖ ( Qnet ‖
∏
ρ Pρ ‖ QI ‖ Qrem) =
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Note that the following processes are not involved in any transformation:
• P!net, since it implements a form of buffering that is unnecessary in MSR;
• Qrem, since it represents partial computations (see Proposition 5.4.1). As we will see later,
they will not have any significant MSRP counterpart.
Intuitively b∏ρ P!ρc!ρ analyzes each (un-banged) sequential processes Pρ in ∏ρ P!ρ and for
each ρ returns the multiset of the rule corresponding to Pρ’s sequential steps. Input, output and
analysis sub-process in Pρ are mapped into receive, send, and analysis rewriting rules for role ρ,
respectively. Prefixes νx and input sequences p˜i(x) are turned into an instantiation rule. Techni-
calities are needed for the management of variables and of the predicate indexes in building rules
rρi’s. Two parameters, the step number and the variables, are passed along the transformation.
Similar devices support the transformation of each processes Pρ in
∏
ρ Pρ. They represent partial
execution of the protocol by role ρ, their analysis produces the state predicates Aρi(t), for suitable
i and t.
The transformation of Q!I and Q!pi are straightforward: the former maps directly to the in-
truder rewriting rules of MSRP , while in the latter each !pi(t).0 in Q!pi is mapped to the persistent
predicates pi(t). The same can be said about processes Qnet: each sequential process No(t).0 is
mapped into a predicate N(t) in the MSRP state.
The transformation of the processes in QI is more complex. Indeed, we need to distinguish
between processes that represent immediately available intruder knowledge (e.g., I (t).0) from
processes that do not (e.g., No(x).I (x).0). The former are transformed in corresponding intruder
predicates I(t), while the latter are generally discarded. Generally speaking b c is not injective,
and similar situations can happen while transforming processes intoMSRP states. Said differently,
PAP steps are finer grained then the MSRP steps, and as a consequence some processes do not
represent proper MSR objects (for example processes in Qrem) and they have to be ignored,
while others represent MSRP objects even when they are only partially completed (for example
processes I (t).P ′I ) and their translation can be anticipated (see also Figure 5.1 or later for details).
In the following, with a little abuse of notation, we drop the subscript from the transformations,
b c!ρ, b c!I , b cnet, b cρ, b cI and b cpi, when no ambiguity arises, writing them instead as b c. We
now describe each transformation in detail.
b c!ρ. The basic translation involves the transformation function b c#(i;x) for the P!ρ’s (called as a
subroutine by the top level transformation b c) which, given a sequential agent representing
a role ρ, returns the multiset of rules r˜ρ. Here i is a non-negative integer. Formally:
bp˜i(x).νn.P ′ρc = {p˜i(x)→ ∃n.Aρ0(n;x)} ∪ bP ′ρc#(1:(x;n))
bNo(y).P ′ρc#(i:x) = {Aρi−1(x), N(y)→ Aρi(x; y)} ∪ bP ′ρc#(i+1:(x;y))
bNi(t).P ′ρc#(i:x) = {Aρi−1(x)→ Aρi(x), N(t)} ∪ bP ′ρc#(i+1:x)
b[x′ = t(x′′)] .P ′ρc#(i:x) = {Aρi−1(x[t(x′′)/x′])→ Aρi(x[(x′′− x)/x′]), N(t)}
∪ bP ′ρc#(i+1:(x[(x′′−x)/x′]))
b0c#(i;x) = ·
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The transformation of a send, of a receive and of a new process are quite obvious and require
no additional comment. The translation of a match process [x′ = t(x′′)] .P ′ρ, whose aim is
to analyze some previously received message, yields an analysis rewrite rule. It would be
straightforward if all variables of the role were matched each time (possibly redundantly)
as these variables could be used to build the corresponding role predicate. Instead, only
a subset of all variables appears during matching (the variables that are being analyzed),
while the corresponding role predicate needs all of them. We reconstruct them be carrying
a parameter which stores the tuple of all the variables used so far by the role. With this as a
template, we can construct the right tuples in the rule antecedent and in the rule consequent.
b c!I . The intruder process Q!I is mapped directly to the MSRP intruder rules r˜I , with each !PIj
associated with rIj . Process !PI10 is dropped.
b cnet. Each occurrence of a process No(t).0 in Qnet is mapped to a state element N(t).
b cρ. Let Pρ be an instantiated suffix (in
∏
ρ Pρ) of a role specification P!ρ, and let θ = [x/t] be
the witnessing substitution. If Pρ starts with either a persistent input pi(x) or the ν operator,
we set bPρc = ·. Otherwise, let i be the index at which Pρ occurs in P!ρ as for the above
definition. Then bPρc = Aρi(t).
b cI . Each object in QI (that, we recall, contains all the prefixes of PIj processes), is translated
using the function b cI , defined below:
b0cI = bNo(t).0cI = bνn.PIcI = bI (x).PIcI = bpi(x).PIcI = ·
bI (t).PIcI = I(t), bPIcI
b[t = t(x)] .PIcI =
{ bPI [θ]cI if t(x)[θ] = t
· otherwise
b cpi. Each process !pi(x) in P!pi, or pi(x) in Ppi is translated into the state object pi(x).
The intuition underlying the definition of b cI is to collect all the ground output events of
a partially executed intruder processes (i.e., processes that are suffixes of some PIj , but
that do have not the form I (t).0)1 as process PI10 has the potential of turning them into
the canonical form I (t).0. In this way, we map any such intruder suffix into an MSRP
state where this knowledge is already present. In particular, each object I (t).0 (respectively
the I (t).I (t).0) in QI is rendered as the state element I(t) (respectively pair of elements
I(t), I(t)), and that the un-banged processes PIj are mapped into the empty multiset. Note
that b cI is not injective.
P!net and Qrem disappear (i.e., they are mapped onto the empty multiset).
Example 5.4.3 (Translation of NSPK from PAP to MSRP ) We now provide an example on how
b c works, by applying it to the PAP specification of NSPK given in Section 5.3.2. Let us start
1From now on let us call them all intruder partial suffixes.
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by considering the process PA:
PA = p˜i(A).νna.
P ′A︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ni({a, na}kb).No(m).
P ′′′A︷ ︸︸ ︷
[m = {na, nb}ka ] .Ni({nb}kb).0︸ ︷︷ ︸
P ′′′′A︸ ︷︷ ︸
P ′′A
we have:
bPAc = p˜i(A)→ ∃na.p˜i(A), A0(A;na)
∪bP ′Ac#(1:(A;na))
bP ′Ac#(1:(A;na)) = A0(A;na)→ N({A,na}kb), A1(A;na)
∪bP ′′Ac#(2:(A;na))
bP ′′Ac#(2:(A;na)) = A1(A;na), N(m)→ A2(A;na;m)
∪bP ′′′A c#(3:(A;na;m))
bP ′′′A c#(3:(A;na;m)) = A2(A;NA; {na, nb}ka)→ A3(A;na;nb)
∪bP ′′′A c#(4:(A;na;nb))






p˜i(A) → ∃na.p˜i(A), A0(A;na)
A0(A;na) → N({a, na}kb), A1(A;na)
A1(A;na), N(m) → A2(A;na;m)
A2(A;na; {na, nb}ka)→ A3(A;na;nb)




p˜i(B) → ∃nb.p˜i(B), B0(B;nb)
B0(B;nb), N(m) → B1(B;nb;m)
B1(B;nb; {a, na}kb), → B2(B;nb;na)
B2(B;nb;na) → N({na, nb}ka), B3(B;nb;na)
B3(B;nb;na), N(m′)→ B4(B;nb;na;m′)
B4(B;nb;na; {nb}kb) → B5(B;nb;na)
5.5 Correspondence Relation between MSRP and PAP
This section introduces a correspondence relation between MSRP configurations and PAP states,
such that two corresponding computations are characterized by identical network messages and
intruder knowledge, step by step. This will allow us to prove that the translations presented in
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this chapter are reachability-preserving in a very strong sense. Indeed, we show that our encod-
ings transform a configuration (respectively a state) into a state (respectively configuration) that
correspond to each other in our relation, and this implies that our encodings can preserve secrecy
and authenticity properties while going from MSR to PA and vice versa (this is further discussed
in Section 5.6). In the following we formalize the notion of observation and transition step with
respect to the intruder and the network in the MSR and PA frameworks.
Our notion of observation is concerned with only those messages representing terms in the
net and the intruder knowledge. They are given by the predicates N(t) and I(t) in an MSRP
configuration. Formally we have:
Definition 5.5.1 Given a multiset of ground atoms s˜ and a predicate name a ∈ {N, I}, we define
the projection of s˜ along a as the set Prj a(s˜) = {t : a(t) ∈ s˜}. If C = (r˜; s˜) is a configuration,
we set Prj a(C˜) = Prj a(s˜).
Collecting the network messages and the intruder knowledge of a PAP state P is trickier
because of the particular form of the processes representing that the intruder and the network (see
Section 5.3). More precisely, these terms appear in output actions (over channels No or I) that
will be surely executed by either QI or Qnet. Indeed, QI and Qnet outputs (on those channels)
are always realizable, because processes PI10 and P!net can always accept them as input. In order
to collect those messages we introduce the notation Q α→ to indicate that α is the set of output
actions that process Q (intended to be QI or Qnet) is able to execute in later steps of execution.
Formally:
Definition 5.5.2 Given a process Q, the judgment Q α→ is defined by the following rules:










(Q ‖ P ) α∪α′→
P [θ] α→ t′ = t[θ]
[t′ = t] .P α→
6 ∃θ : t′ = t[θ]
[t′ = t] .P ∅→
In the following we write a(t) ∈ Q if a(t) ∈ α where α : Q α→.
Definition 5.5.3 Let a be a channel label in {No, I}, we define the observations of process Q
along a as the set Obsa(Q) = {t : a(t) ∈ Q}.
Using Definitions 5.5.1 and 5.5.3, we make precise what we intend for an MSRP configuration
and a PAP state to be corresponding.
Definition 5.5.4 Given an MSRP configuration C and a PAP state Q. We say that C and Q are
corresponding, written C ./ Q, if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. PrjN (C) = ObsNo(Q)
2. Prj I(C) = ObsI(Q)
Informally C ./ Q means that the messages that are stored in the net and the intruder knowledge
are the same in configuration C and state Q.
The interaction between our notions of observation and our encodings is captured in the fol-
lowing proposition:
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Proposition 5.5.5 Let C be an MSRP configuration, and Q be a PAP state. Then:
bdCec = C; (5.5.1)
dbQce = Q′ where Q′ is such that bQ′c ./ Q, (5.5.2)
ObsNo(Q
′) = ObsNo(Q) and ObsI(Q′) = ObsI(Q).
Proof. The critical point here is when the non injective b c function is applied. More precisely,
b c shows its non-injectivity when dealing with:
(a) intruder partial suffixes i.e., suffixes of some PIj that do not have the form I (t).0;
(b) not-yet-instantiated process roles, i.e., un-banged processes in Pρ starting with pi or ν.
In proving (5.5.1), we observe that starting from an MSRP configuration C, process dCe
contain neither intruder partial suffixes nor not-yet-instantiated role processes. As a consequence
by applying again b c, an easy induction yields C back.
More difficult is the proof of (5.5.2). Here Q may contain some process that is an intruder
partial suffix, or a not-yet-instantiated process role. In this case different Q, Q′, may converge, via
b c, to the same set of predicates p˜i, I˜ . However not-yet-instantiated process roles do not affect the
./ relation, because only communication over pi or paν transitions are possible from them. Then
all the remaining difficulties are hidden in intruder partial suffixes. In Figure 5.1, we have depicted
one of these situation, involving where partial suffixes of PI5 and PI6 . Now we can observe that:
• because of the way we have defined ObsI( ) and from the fact that bQcI = bQ′cI = . . . =




= ObsI(Q1) = ObsI(Q2)
From now on let us consider a witness [Q] of the quotient class QI/O.
• Prj I(bQ′cI) = ObsI(Q′) for all Q′ ∈ [Q′], because b cI is build exactly to maintain the
intruder knowledge.
Now when applying dbQcIeI back for some Q′ ∈ [Q], by definition of d eI , we obtain exactly
that Q# ∈ [Q] that contain no partial suffixes of PIj . Again Figure 5.1 may help visualize the
intuition. Analogous considerations (indeed simpler) can be provided when predicates N˜ and
processes in Pnet are involved.
Moreover we have that an MSRP configuration always corresponds to its encoding in PAP :
Lemma 5.5.6 Let C be an MSRP configuration. Then C ./ dCe.
Proof. Observe that dN˜e = ∏N(t)∈N˜ No(t).0, that dI˜e = ∏I(t)∈I˜ I (t).0, and that no other
multiset in C generates any No(t).0 or I (t).0, via d e. Then it easily follows that:
PrjN (C) = ObsNo(dCe)
Prj I(C) = ObsI(dCe)
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I(t1), I(t2)
I (t1).0 ‖ I (t2).0






I (t2).0 ‖ I (t1).I (x2).I (x2).I (〈t1, x2〉).0
Figure 5.1: An example of a possible scenario when applying the translations bd eIcI
The dual result holds as well, i.e., every PAP state always corresponds to its MSRP encoding:
Lemma 5.5.7 Let be Q a PAP state. Then bQc ./ Q.
Proof. The proof follows considering similar argument of Lemma 5.5.6.
On the basis of these concepts, we can now define a relation between MSRP configurations
and PAP states, a form of weak bisimulation we call correspondence, such that if in MSRP is
possible to perform an action (by applying a rule) that will lead to a new configuration, then in
PAP is possible to follow some transitions that will lead in a corresponding state, and vice versa.
Definition 5.5.8 Let C and Q be the set of all MSRP configurations and PAP states, respectively.
We call correspondence the largest relation ∼ ⊆ C×Q satisfying the following conditions: for all
(r˜ : s˜) ∼ Q
1. (r˜ : s˜) ./ Q;
2. if r˜ : s˜ −→ s˜′, then Q⇒∗ Q′ and (r˜ : s˜′) ∼ Q′;
3. if Q⇒ Q′, then r˜ : s˜ −→∗ s˜′ and (r˜ : s˜′) ∼ Q′.
We say (r˜ : s˜) and Q are correspondent is there exists a correspondence ∼ such that (r˜ : s˜) ∼ Q.
The following theorems affirm that there is a correspondence between security protocol spec-
ifications written in MSRP and PAP when related via the encodings here presented.
Theorem 5.5.9 Given an MSRP security protocol theory C. Then C ∼ dCe.
Proof. See Appendix 5.8
Theorem 5.5.10 Given an PAP security protocol process Q. Then bQc ∼ Q.
Proof. See Appendix 5.8
This means that any MSRP step can be faithfully simulated by zero or more steps in PAP through
the mediation of the encoding d e, and vice-versa, the reverse translation b c will map steps in
PAP into corresponding steps in MSRP .
We conclude by observing that our encodings and Theorem 5.5.9 and 5.5.10 allow us to reason
about security properties in one of either frameworks and transfer the results to the other.
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5.6 Security Analysis
This section shows how our encodings preserve some security properties from one: formalisms
to the other: in particular those security properties whose definitions can be expressed in terms of
predicates over the intruder knowledge or the set of messages on the networks, specifically secrecy
and authenticity.
5.6.1 Secrecy
A secrecy property requires that a certain message, say M , cannot be discovered by an intruder
during any possible interactions with protocol participants. Generally speaking the discovery of a
secrecy flaw can be performed by looking for traces where the intruder acquires knowledge of the
secret. If no such trace exists, then secrecy is preserved.
In MSRP , the formal definition of such a secrecy violation is straightforwards in our context
by using the Prj I( ) function:
Definition 5.6.1 (Secrecy violation in MSRP ) Let be C be an MSRP configuration of a proto-
col, and M be a ground message. We say that C does not preserve the secrecy of M if and only
if
∃C ′. C −→∗ C ′ and M ∈ Prj I(C ′)
Definition 5.6.1 can often be verified quite efficiently using modern model checking and theorem
proving techniques [172, 43].
A secrecy flaw is defined similarly in PAP :
Definition 5.6.2 (Secrecy violation in PAP ) Let Q be a PAP model of a protocol, and M be a
ground message. We say that Q does not preserve the secrecy of M if and only if
∃Q′, Q⇒∗ Q′, and M ∈ ObsI(Q′)
Again, Definition 5.6.2 can be efficiently verified by one of the existing strategies for checking
secrecy violation or secrecy preservation developed for process algebras, e.g., using reachability
analysis techniques [79, 29].
The main fact here is that, independently from the checking strategy chosen, our correspon-
dence relation preserves secrecy. Indeed, the intruder knowledge in two corresponding models, an
MSRP configuration and a PAP state respectively, is the same step by step. So whenever there is
a computation that leads the intruder to discover a secret M in the MSRP model, there shall be a
computation in the PAP model where the intruder is able to capture the same message. Then, by
producing corresponding models, our encodings are able to map secrecy properties from MSRP
to PAP and vice versa. In fact:
Proposition 5.6.3 Let be C an MSRP configuration and M a ground message. Then
M ∈ Prj I(C) iff M ∈ ObsI(dCe)
Proof. Straightforward by Theorem 5.5.9.
and
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Proposition 5.6.4 Let be Q a PAP state and M a ground message. Then
M ∈ ObsI(Q) iff M ∈ Prj I(bQc)
Proof. Straightforward by Theorem 5.5.10.
The obvious conclusion is that secrecy is preserved by our encodings.
Theorem 5.6.5 Let be C an MSRP model of a protocol (i.e., an initial MSRP configuration).
Then for any message M , a secrecy violation (w.r.t M ) happens in C if and only if a secrecy
violation (w.r.t. M ) happens in dCe.
Proof. Straightforward by Theorem 5.5.9 and Proposition 5.6.3.
Theorem 5.6.6 Let be Let be Q a PAP model of a protocol (i.e., an initial PAP state). Then for
any message M , a secrecy violation (with respect to M ) happens in Q if and only if a secrecy
violation (with respect to M ) happens in bQc.
Proof. Straightforward by Theorem 5.5.10 and Proposition 5.6.4.
5.6.2 Authentication
The treatment of authentication properties is a bit more delicate. There are several notions of au-
thentication. One of the most popular techniques was introduced by Woo and Lam [206]: roles
are annotated with unforgeable control actions called assertions that describe the state of the pro-
tocol execution from the point of view of the principal executing it: for example the initiator may
use begin(L) to assert that the protocol has started, while the responder may assert end(L) when
it reaches its last event. The label L uniquely identifies relevant parameters of this session (the
principals involved, their role, nonces, etc.).
Generally speaking, if a protocol guarantees authentication, then in every run each end(L)
event matches a distinct begin(L) event preceeding it, even in the presence of an attacker. If this
is the case, we know that the initiator and the responder have a compatible view of the world. If
we abstract a run as the sequence of assertions issued by all parties, this is equivalent [147] to
checking that in each run the number of end(L) never exceeds the number of begin(L), for the
same L.
Definition 5.6.7 A protocol P satisfies authenticity if and only if for every run of the protocol and
for every L, the number of end(L) events never exceeds the number of begin(L) events.
We show how this mechanism works for detecting Lowe’s attack on the NSPK protocol [138].
Consider that when one user A starts to run the protocol as initiator apparently with a responder
B, it sends a control message begin(〈A, B〉). When one user B running the role of responder
finishes a protocol apparently with an initiator A running the role of initiator then it sends the
message end(〈A, B〉). Ideally, if we assume that these messages are never removed from the net,
the number of messages of the form begin(〈A, B〉) must be greater than the number of messages
of the form end(〈A, B〉) at any point of any computation.
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The attack is given by the following sequence of actions. We only need three users: A,B and
E such that A initiates a run with a dishonest principal E who reroute it as a run with B. We write
E(A) to denote the intruder impersonating the agent A:
A −→ E : {NA, A}KE
E(A) −→ B : {NA, A}KB
B −→ E(A) : {NA, NB}KA
E −→ A : {NA, NB}KA
A −→ E : {NB}KE
E(A) −→ B : {NB}KB
Principal A starts a run of the protocol with the dishonest agent E, who decrypts the transmitted
values and repackages them as if they were intended for principal B. Agent B, believing he is
responding to A, sends the message {NA, NB}KA to E, who simply forwards it to A. This prin-
cipal replies to E with the last message {NA, NB}KA , that E repackages for B as earlier. In the
end, A correctly believes she has authenticated E, but B incorrectly assumes he has authenticated
A while he was talking to E only. Woo and Lam’s method reveals this failure of authentication: if
we start the initiator role with the assertion begin(〈A, B〉) and conclude the responder role with
end(〈A, B〉), we extract from the above run the trace {begin(〈A, E〉), end(〈A, B〉)}, which vi-
olates Definition 5.6.7. While this method may seem rather simple it has been shown very useful
for detecting attacks on security protocols (e.g., see [137]).
A possible solution to include authenticity in our framework comes from the observation that
it is possible to encode begin-end assertions through particular control messages in such a way
that the observational power of our correspondence relation is enough. Since our correspondence
relation “observes” only the status of the net and of the intruder knowledge, this implies that we
have to find a way to record the begin-end events in either the intruder knowledge or in the network.
Moreover because our notion of observation concerns sets we must face the problem of losing the
number of repetitions of events in sets. Both problem can be easily solved (e.g., see [147]).
The latter one, for example can be solved by introducing in each control message information
that makes it unique e.g., a timestamp. This information is then filtered out when used to check
related begin-end events.
To solve the former problem we will develop a different strategy that consists in sending
begin-end assertions over a private network, we call NP . The goal of this private network is
only to collect control messages for sake of verification. Moreover we assume assertions be coded
as control messages 〈begin, L〉, 〈end, L〉, where the label L carries sufficient information for
uniquely identify the session. Moreover we assume that L carries timestamp information that
make them unique in different run of the protocol.
In MSRP to model such a network we need a new predicate NP . A role may assert something
by sending a control message over NP . This can be done, for example, by using the send rewriting
rule. This requires a new class of assertion rules, similar to send rules:
assertion rule Aρi−1(x)→ Aρi(x), NP (〈a, L(x)〉)
where a ∈ {begin, end}.
InPAP the private networkNP is modeled by the process !N Pi (x).N Po (x).0, while a process’s
assertion is modeled by sending a message, of form either 〈begin, L(x)〉 or 〈end, L(x)〉, towards
the channel NPi . We deal with authentication by slightly modifying our encodings to take into
account the new symbols NP . The correspondence relation needs to be modified too. We handle
NP by simply mirroring the treatment of N .
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We can now define our instances of Definition 5.6.7 as in the following.
Definition 5.6.8 (Authenticity violation in MSRP ) Let be C be an MSRP model of a protocol
(i.e., an initial configuration). We say that C violates authenticity if and only if for some L,
∃C ′, C −→∗ C ′, such that in PrjNP (C ′) the number of 〈end, L〉 is greater of the number of
〈begin, L〉.
If it is the case will write C 6|= {end(L) ↪→ begin(L)}.
Definition 5.6.9 (Authenticity violation in PAP ) Let be Q be a PAP model of a protocol. We
say that Q violates authenticity if and only if for some L, ∃Q′, Q⇒∗ Q′ such that in ObsNP (Q′)
the number of 〈end, L〉 if greater of the number of 〈begin, L〉.
If it is the case will write Q 6|= {end(L) ↪→ begin(L)}.
All the results stated in Section 5.5, remain valid. Precisely because the messages stored in the
network in two correspondent models, respectively an MSRP and a PAP , are the same step by
step if there is a computation that leads to a authenticity flaw in the MSRP model, there would be
another computation in the PAP model where the same flaw is shown, and vice versa. Then our
encodings, mapping models into correspondent models, are able to map authenticity properties
from MSR to PA and vice versa. The previous results can be formalized into the following
propositions
Proposition 5.6.10 Let be C an MSRP model of a protocol and L a ground control message.
Then C 6|= {end(L) ↪→ begin(L)} iff dCe 6|= {end(L) ↪→ begin(L)}.
Proof. Straightforward by Theorem 5.5.9.
Proposition 5.6.11 Let be Q a PAP model of a protocol and L a ground control message. Then
Q 6|= {end(L) ↪→ begin(L)} iff bQc 6|= {end(L) ↪→ begin(L)}.
Proof. Straightforward by Theorem 5.5.10.
The obvious conclusion is that authenticity is reserved by our encodings.
Theorem 5.6.12 Let be Let be C an MSRP model of a protocol. Then C preserves authenticity if
and only if dCe does.
Proof. Straightforward by Theorem 5.5.9 and Proposition 5.6.10.
Theorem 5.6.13 Let be Let be Q a PAP model of a protocol. Then Q preserves authenticity if
and only if bQc does.
Proof. Straightforward by Theorem 5.5.10 and Proposition 5.6.11.
5.7 Conclusions
This chapter shows how multiset rewriting theories (MSR) and process algebras (PA) used to de-
scribe security protocols are related. We show how to define semantics preserving transformations
between MSR and PA describing protocols. The correspondence relation we used, is based on
which messages appear on the network and on which messages the intruder knows.
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5.8 (Appendix) Theorem Proofs
This appendix provides a proof for Theorem 5.5.9 and a proof for Theorem 5.5.10.
We begin this section by reminding that a MSRP state is a multiset of form s˜ = (N˜ , A˜, I˜, p˜i),
where the components collect ground facts N(t), Aρi(t), I(t) and pi(t) respectively, while a PAP





P!ρ ‖ Q!I ‖ Q!pi) ‖ (Qnet ‖
∏
ρ
Pρ ‖ QI ‖ Qrem)
where:
Qnet ::= 0 |
∏
No(t).0
Pρ ::= 0 | No(x).Pρ | Ni(t).Pρ | [t = t′] Pρ
QI ::= suffixes of PIj , for all j
Qrem ::= 0 | No(x).Ni(x).0 | p˜i(x).νn.Pρ | νn.Pρ | |
∏
pi(t).0
Moreover in the following we will use implicitly the following proposition:
Proposition 5.8.1 b!P ‖ P ‖ Qc = b!P ‖ Qc
Proof. It is based on the fact that b cmaps processes P , coming from any transition !P ⇒ P ‖!P ,
into the empty multiset. Formally:b!P ‖ P ‖ Qc = b!P c, bP c, bQc = b!P c, ·, bQc = b!P c, bQc
= b!P ‖ Qc
We now prove the following main theorem:
Main Theorem (Reminder) 1 Given an MSRP security protocol theory C. Then C ∼ dCe.
Proof. The proof consists in showing that
R = {(C, dCe) : C0 −→∗ C} ∪ {(C,Q) : C0 −→∗ C, bQc = C}
is a correspondence ∼. Because of Lemma 5.5.6 and Lemma 5.5.7 it is sufficient to show that for
all (C,Q) ∈ R:
(I) C −→ C ′ implies Q⇒∗ Q′ and (C ′, Q′) ∈ R
(II) Q⇒ Q′ implies C −→∗ C ′ and (C ′, Q′) ∈ R.
Precisely (C ′, Q′) ∈ R means that either bQ′c = C ′ or Q′ = dC ′e.
Before explaining the technical steps of the proof, let us focus on the following question. What
are the (C ′, Q′) ∈ R that are reachable via a MSRP or PAP transition from (C,Q) ∈ R? In other
words, given a transition C −→ C ′ (resp., Q ⇒ Q′) what transitions dCe ⇒∗ Q′ or Q ⇒∗ Q′
where bQc = C (resp., bQc −→∗ C ′ or C −→∗ C ′ where dCe = Q) satisfy condition (I) (resp.,
condition (II)) above?
Let us first focus on (I) and on Figure 5.2. and suppose that a MSRP transition C −→ C ′
occurs. Via d e the only possibile PAP transition is dCe ⇒∗ dC ′e (e.g., states Q and Q′ and
the relative Q ⇒∗ Q′ transition in Figure 5.2). Instead via b c, more transitions Q ⇒∗ Q′ are
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possible; precisely all those such that bQc = C and bQ′c = C ′ (e.g., processes Q′′′, Q and Q′′ in
Figure 5.2 and transitions Q′′′ ⇒∗ Q′, Q⇒∗ Q′ and Q′′ ⇒∗ Q′).
Let now focus on (II) and on Figure 5.2 again. Let suppose a PAP transition Q⇒ Q′ occurs.
Here it may be that the only couple (C ′, Q′) corresponding in R, via either b c or d e, to (C,Q)
is such that C = C ′. This happens when transition Q ⇒ Q′ is not able to simulate any complete
MSRP step (e.g., as the transition Q⇒ Q′′ and its correspondent C −→∗ C, in Figure 5.2).
Proof of Part (I). The scheme which guides the proof of this part, is the following:
(I) C −→ C ′ implies (a) dCe ⇒
∗ Q′ and (C ′, Q′) ∈ R
(b) ∀Q : bQc = C,Q⇒∗ Q′ and (C ′, Q′) ∈ R (5.8.1)
In the following we will itemize each sub-case with (I.a), (I.a′), etc., or (I.b) (I.b′), etc., depend-
ing on it is respectively the first, second, etc., sub-case of branches (a) or (b) of (5.8.1); moreover
let us observe that, because bdCec = C (see Lemma 5.5.5)
{(C, dCe) : C0 −→∗ C} ∩ {(C,Q) : C0 −→∗ C, bQc = C} 6= ∅
As a consequence some sub-cases of (b) will coincide with some sub-case of (a). Precisely those
that do really differ, are those involving pairs (bQc, Q) such that Q 6= dCe; to avoid repetitions
we will treat in (I.b) only those cases that differ from cases in (I.a).
Let be C ′ such that C −→ C ′. It must have happened as a consequence of an application of
either a rewriting rule rρ0 , rρi send or rρi receive or rρi analysis for i > 0, . . . , lρ or finally an
intruder rule rIj for j = 0, . . . , 9. We will treat each rule separately. We also remind that for each
rule we will list different sub-cases (I.a) and (I.b).
• (instantiation rule) rρ0 = p˜i(x)→ ∃n.Aρ0(n,x), p˜i(x)
In this case transition C −→ C ′ can be specifically rewritten as:
C = p˜i(k), C ′′
→ Aρ0 [
θ︷ ︸︸ ︷
k/x;m/n], p˜i(k), C ′′
= Aρ0(k;m), C︸ ︷︷ ︸
C′
where, we remind, p˜i(k) is an abbreviation for pi(k1), · · · , pi(kr) where ki for all i, are all ground
tuples of terms.
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MSRP state












C ./ Q′′′ C ./ Q′′
C′ ./ Q′
where:
Figure 5.2: A possible scenario involving corresponding couples (C,Q) and (C ′, Q′) in R, when
it occurs either a transition C −→ C ′ or a transition Q⇒ Q′.







Pρ ‖ Q′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
dC′′e
[def. of d e]
≡ p˜i(k).0 ‖ p˜i(x).νn.Pρ ‖ !p˜i(k).0 ‖ !p˜i(x).νn.Pρ ‖ Q′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
dCe
⇒∗ 0 ‖ Pρ[θ] ‖ dCe︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
[pa0, pa≡, paν]
= 0 ‖ drρ1e#(x;n)[θ] ‖ dCe
= 0 ‖ dAρ0(k;m)e ‖ dCe [def. of dAρi(t)e]
≡ dAρ0(k;m)e ‖ dCe
= dC ′e
? Case (I.b): (C,Q) = (bQc, Q). We need to identify those Q’s such that bQc = C = p˜i(k), C ′′.





) ‖ pim(xm). · · · .pir (xr).νn.Pρ[θ′] ‖ dCe
where θ′ = [k1/x1, · · · , km−1/xm−1]. In words, Q is a partially instantiated role that has
already started receiving its permanent terms, but not all. It is worth to underline that both∏
i=m,...,r pi(ki).0 and pim(xm). · · · .pir (xr).νn.Pρ[θ′] are mapped by b c into the empty multi-
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pim(xm). · · · .pir (xr).νn.Pρ[θ′]
‖ dCe
⇒∗ 0 ‖ Pρ[θ] ‖ dCe [pa0 and paν with m as new
names]
≡ Pρ[θ] ‖ dCe︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
and it easy to check that dC ′e = Q′.
• (send rule) rρi = Aρi−1(x)→ Aρi(x), N(t(x))
In this case transition C −→ C ′ can be specifically rewritten as:
C = Aρi−1(x[θ]), C
′′ → Aρi(x[θ]), N(t[θ]), C ′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
C′
(5.8.2)
where θ is the substitution that allows the rule rρi to be applied. The only significative situation
happens as a sub-case of statement (a) of (5.8.1).
? Case (I.a): (C,Q) = (C, dCe). We have:
dCe = drρie#(x)[θ] ‖ dC ′′e [def. of dAρi−1(x[θ])e]
= Ni(t[θ]).drρi+1e#(x)[θ] ‖ dC ′′e [unfolding drρie#(x)[θ]]
=
Ni(t[θ]).drρi+1e#(x)[θ] ‖
!Ni(x).No(x).0 ‖ dC ′′′e︸ ︷︷ ︸
dC′′e




!Ni(x).No(x).0 ‖ dC ′′′e︸ ︷︷ ︸
dC′′e
⇒
dAρi (x[θ])e︷ ︸︸ ︷
drρi+1e#(x)[θ] ‖
dN(t[θ])e︷ ︸︸ ︷




• (receive rule) rρi = Aρi−1(x), N(y) −→ Aρi(x; y)
In this case transition C −→ C ′ can be specifically rewritten as:
C = Aρi−1(x[θ]), N(t), C
′′ −→ Aρi(x[θ]; y[t/y]), C ′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
C′
(5.8.3)
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where θ is the substitution that allows the rule rρi to be applied. Again the only significative case
happens as a sub-case of class (a) in statement (5.8.1).
? Case (I.a): (C,Q) = (C, dCe). We have:
dCe = drρie#(x)[θ] ‖ No(t).0 ‖ dC ′′e [def. of dAρi−1(x[θ])e]
= No(y).drρi+1e#(x;y)[θ] ‖ No(t).0 ‖ dC ′′e [espanding drρie#(x)[θ]]




• (analysis rule) rρi = Aρi−1(t(x)) −→ Aρi(x).
In this case transition C −→ C ′ can be specifically rewritten as:
C = Aρi−1(t(x)[θ
′]), C ′′ −→ Aρi(x[θ′]), C ′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
C′
(5.8.4)
Again the only interesting scenario comes from sub-case (a) of (5.8.1). While analyzing this case
let us:
• rewrite the ground term t(x)[θ′] as k;
• assume that the consequent predicate of rule rρi−1 is Aρi−1(x′), i.e., rule rρi−1 = . . . −→
Aρi−1(x
′).
• assume θ be the unifier such that x′[θ] = k, that is the substitution that unifies the predicate
Aρi−1(x
′) with the ground predicate Aρi−1(k) in the MSRP state C.
? Case (I.a): (C,Q) = (C, dCe). We have:
dCe = drρie#(x′)[θ] ‖ dC ′′e
= [
k︷︸︸︷
x′[θ] = t(x)[θ]].drρi+1e#(x)[θ] ‖ dC ′′e [def. of drρie#(x′)]
⇒ drρi+1e#(x)[θ][θ′′] ‖ dC ′′e [pa[], and t(x)[θ][θ′′] = k]




Note that here, θ′ can be used instead of θθ′′ because θ′ and θθ′′ coincide on x, that in turn are all
the variables appearing in drρi+1e.
• (intruder rules) rIj , for j = 0, . . . , 9.
Let us consider just a significative rule, for example rule rI6 = I(x1), I(x2) → I(〈x1, x2〉),
I(x1), I(x2). The proofs for the other intruder’s rules are similar. In this case transition C −→ C ′
can be specifically rewritten as:
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C = I(t1), I(t2), C ′′ −→ I(〈t1, t2〉), I(t1), I(t2), C ′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
C′
. (5.8.5)





I (t2).0 ‖ dC ′′e [def. of d e]





I (t1).0 ‖ I (t2).0
‖ I (x1).I (x1).I (x2).I (x2).I (〈x1, x2〉).0






dI(〈t1, t2〉)eI︷ ︸︸ ︷








Let now start analyzing the case (C,Q) = (bQc, Q). We need to identify those Q’s such that
bQc = I(t1), I(t2), C ′′. In fact, more different Q’s (precisely different QI ) exist, for the non
injective b cI is now involved in the translation (see also Figure 5.1). In addition, we remind,
the only really significative (w.r.t. case (I.a)) situations are those ones where Q’s are such that
Q 6= dCe
? Case (I.b′): a first case happens when Q contains both the process I (t2).0 and the proper suffix
of PI6 , I (t1).I (x2).I (x2).I (〈t1, x2〉).0.
Q = I (t2).0 ‖ I (t1).I (x2).I (x2).I (〈t1, x2〉).0 ‖ dC ′′e
≡
I (t2).0
‖ I (t1).I (x2).I (x2).I (〈t1, x2〉).0




⇒∗ 0 ‖ I (〈t1, t2〉).0 ‖ I (t1).0 ‖ I (t2).0 ‖ dC ′′e︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
[pa0]
and it is easy to verify that bQ′c = C ′.
? Case (I.b′′): a second case happens when Q is [〈t1, t2〉 = 〈x1, x2〉].I (x1).I (x2).0 ‖ dC ′′e. In
words Q contains a proper suffix of process PI5 , standing for the intruder that has already acquired
the message 〈t1, t2〉, but that has not yet performed the output in which it splits it. We remind that
in this case b cI translates the process as it would have already performed the outputs, obtaining
the predicates I(t1), I(t2). Then we have:
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Q = [〈t1, t2〉 = 〈x1, x2〉].I (x1).I (x2).0 ‖ dC ′′e
≡ [〈t1, t2〉 = 〈x1, x2〉].I (x1).I (x2).0‖ I (x).I (x).0 ‖ dC ′′e [from !PI10 ;pa!]
⇒ I (t1).I (t2).0 ‖ I (x).I (x).0 ‖ dC ′′e [pa[]]
⇒ I (t2).0 ‖ I (t1).0 ‖ Q′′ [pa0]
⇒∗ 0 ‖ I (〈t1, t2〉).0 ‖ I (t1).0 ‖ I (t2).0 ‖ Q′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
[see Case (I.a)]
and it is easy to verify that bQ′c = C ′.
? Case (I.b′′′): the last case is when Q = I (t1).I (t2).0 ‖ dC ′′e, where again a suffix of PI5 is
involved. This case is simply a sub-case of the previous one.
Here ends the proof of (I), where we have shown that for every (C,Q) ∈ R C −→ C ′ implies
Q⇒∗ Q′, and (C ′, Q′) ∈ R.
Proof of Part (II). The scheme which guides the proof of this part is the following:
(II) ∀(C,Q) ∈ R, Q⇒ Q′ implies C −→∗ C ′ and (C ′, Q′) ∈ R
Because, we remind, R = {(C, dCe) : C0 −→∗ C} ∪ {(C,Q) : C0 −→∗ C, bQc = C}, the
previous statement can be specifically restated as:
∀(C,Q) ∈ R,
(a) dCe ⇒ Q′ implies C −→∗ C ′ and (C ′, Q′) ∈ R
(b) ∀Q : bQc = C,Q⇒ Q′ implies C −→∗ C ′ and (C ′, Q′) ∈ R
(5.8.6)
where (C ′, Q′) ∈ Rmeans that either bQ′c = C ′ or Q′ = dC ′e. In the following we treat a list
of cases. Each case corresponds to a possible⇒ transition. Again we will itemize each sub-case
with (II.a), (II.a′), etc., or (II.b) (II.b′), etc., depending on it is respectively the first, second,
etc., sub-case of branches (a) or (b) of (5.8.6).
• (pa0: i.e., communication transition)
Reasoning about pa0, we must distinguish among the name of the channel a involved in the
reaction i.e., a = Ni, No, pi, I . Let us discuss each case separately.
(a = Ni) Here we treat with transitions that involve channel Ni.
? Case (II.a): (C,Q) = (C, dCe).
This case may happens when C = Aρi−1(x[θ]), C ′′ and rρi : Aρi−1(x) −→ Aρi−1(x),
N(t(x)).
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In this case transition dCe ⇒ Q′ can be specifically rewritten as:
dCe =
Aρi−1 (x[θ])︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ni(t(x)[θ]).
drρi+1e#(x)[θ]︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pρ[θ] ‖ dC ′′e
≡ Ni(t(x)[θ]).Pρ[θ] ‖ Ni(x).N (x).0 ‖ dC ′′e [expanding PAP state]
⇒ Pρ[θ] ‖ N (t(x)[θ]).0 ‖ dC ′′e︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
Then we have:
C = Aρi−1(x[θ]), C
′′ −→ N(t(x)[θ]), C ′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
C′
[rρi+1]
and it is easy to check that dC ′e = Q′.
? Case (II.b): (C,Q) = (bQc, Q). The only different case in this sub-part happens when
bQc = I(t), bQ′′c. We observe that a Q producing such a MSRP state is the following:
Q = I (t).0 ‖ Ni(t′).0 ‖ Ni(x).No(x).0 ‖ Q′′
where Ni(t).0 is an intruder partial suffix of PI4 = I (x).Ni(x).0. We remind that Ni(t).0
and Ni(x).No(x).0 are mapped, by b c, onto the empty multiset.
Let observe that transition Q⇒ Q′ can be specifically rewritten as:
Q = I (t).0 ‖ Ni(t).0 ‖ Ni(x).No(x).0 ‖ Q′′
⇒ I (t).0 ‖ 0 ‖ No(t).0 ‖ Q′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
Then we have:
bQc = I(t), bQ′′c −→ I(t), N(t), bQ′′c︸ ︷︷ ︸
C′
[by rI4]
and it is easy to check that C ′ = bQ′c.
(a = No) Here we treat with transitions that involve channel No.
? Case (II.a): (C,Q) = (C, dCe). This case happens when C = N(t), Aρi−1(x[θ]), C ′′
and rρi : Aρi−1(x), N(y) −→ Aρi−1(x; y). In this case transition dCe ⇒ Q′ can be
specifically rewritten as:
dCe = No(t).0 ‖
dAρi−1 (x[θ])e︷ ︸︸ ︷
No(y).
drρi+1e#(x)[θ]︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pρ[θ] ‖ dC ′′e
⇒ 0 ‖ Pρ[θ][t/y] ‖ dC ′′e︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
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Then we have:
C = N(t), Aρi−1(x[θ]), C
′′ −→ Aρi−1(x; y)[θ][t/y], C ′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
C′
[by rρi]
and it is easy to check that C ′ = bQ′c.
? Case (II.a′). Another case of this class happen when C = N(t), C ′′ and rI3 = N(x) −→
I(x). Let observe that transition dCe ⇒ Q′ can be specifically rewritten as:
dCe = No(t).0 ‖ dC ′′e
≡ No(t).0 ‖ No(x).I (x).0 ‖ dC ′′e [expanding P!I ]
⇒ I (t).0 ‖ dC ′′e︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
Then we have:
C = N(t), C ′′ −→ I(t), C ′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
C′
[by rI3]
and it is easy to check that C ′ = bQ′c.
(a = pi) Here we will treat with transitions that involve channel pi’s.
? Case (II.a): (C,Q) = (C, dCe). The only interesting scenario in this sub-case happens
when in C no role predicates, w.r.t. a role ρ are yet produced and when rρ0 = p˜i(t(x)) −→
∃n.Aρ0(x;n). Let observe that transition dCe ⇒ Q′ can be specifically rewritten as:
dCe = P!ρ ‖ Q!pi ‖ dC ′′e
≡
pi1 (x1).··· .pik (xk))︷︸︸︷
p˜i(t) .νn.
drρ1e#(x;n)︷︸︸︷
Pρ ‖!pi1 (t).0 ‖ dCe [by expanding Q!pi, P!ρ]
⇒ pi2 (x2). · · · .pik (xk).νn.Pρ[t0/x1] ‖ dCe︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
At this point, by observing that process pi2 (t2). · · · .pik (tk).νn.Pρ[t0/t1]. is indeed one that
is considered garbage by the b c (i.e., it is mapped into the empty multiset) it is easy to
check that bQ′c = C, and we conclude observing that C −→∗ C is a possible transition 2.
? Case (II.a′). Another sub-case happens when intruder is involved. Specifically when
dCe = Q!pi ‖ Q!I ‖ dC ′′e and transition dCe ⇒ Q′ may be istantiated as:
dCe = Q!pi ‖ Q!I ‖ dC ′′e
≡ pi(t).0 ‖ pi(x).I (x).0 ‖ dC ′′e
⇒ 0 ‖ I (t).0 ‖ dC ′′e︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
2Note that the particular case where dCe = νn.Pρ i.e., is part of the case paν .
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Then we have:
C = pi(t), C ′′ −→ pi(t), I(t), dC ′′e︸ ︷︷ ︸
C′
[by rI1]
and it is easy to check that C ′ = bQ′c.
? Case (II.b): (C,Q) = (bQc, Q). The only interesting cases in this side, arise by consid-
ering those Q’s such that bQc = C, for some C : C0 −→∗ C. In fact, if C contains no role
predicates, w.r.t. a role ρ, every Q containing only partial instantiations of that role (i.e.,
processes starting with a pi or ν that are suffix of Pρ) is such that bQc = C. Treating this
class of case as a one general case, the transition Q⇒ Q′ can be written as:
Q = pij (xj). · · · .pik (xk).νn.Pρ ‖ pij (t).0 ‖ bC ′′c [j > 1]
⇒ pij+1 (xj+1). · · · .pik (xk).νn.Pρ[t/xj ].0 ‖ bC ′′c︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
Note that despite this transition, bQ′c = C still hold. In fact partial instantiated (role)
processes are mapped onto the empty multiset. Then we conclude observing that C −→∗ C
is a possible transition.
(a = I) Here we treat with transitions that involve channel I . When the intruder channel I is
involved, many different situations involving the intruder arise. Here we will treat just some
of the most significative ones i.e., those involving the states in Figure 5.1. The others can be
analyzed in a similar way.
? Case (II.a): (C,Q) = (C, dCe). A sub-case of this class happens when C = I(t1)
, I(t2), C ′′. We start observing that transition dCe ⇒ Q′ can be written as:
dCe = I (t1).0 ‖ I (t2).0 ‖ dC ′′e
≡
I (t1).0 ‖ I (t2).0 ‖




0 ‖ I (t2).0 ‖
I (t1).I (x2).I (x2).I (〈t1, x2〉).0
‖ dC ′′e︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
[expanding PAP state]
Note that despite this transition, bQ′c = C still holds. In fact partial instantiated (role)
processes are mapped onto the empty multiset. Then we conclude observing that C −→∗ C
is a possible transition.
No more interesting cases fall in this class. On the contrary, many cases arise when consid-
ering situation in class (b) i.e., those Q such that bQc = C = I(t1), I(t2), C ′′.
? Cases (II.b), (II.b′), (II.b′′): (C,Q) = (bQc, Q′). Let us consider the following proce
sses (see also Figure 5.1)
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Q1 = I (t1).0 ‖ I (t1).I (x2).I (x2).I (〈t1, x2〉).0 ‖ dC ′′e
Q2 = I (t1).I (t2).0 ‖ dC ′′e
Q3 = [〈t1, t2〉 = 〈x1, x2〉] I (x1).I (x2).0 ‖ dC ′′e
each translated into C via b c (specifically via b cI ). Let us observe that for any Q′i : Qi ⇒
Q′i then bQ′ic = C, for i = 1, 2, 3. Then we conclude observing that C −→∗ C is a possible
corresponding transition.
? Case (I.b)′′′: A last interesting situation happens when:
Q = I (t2).0 ‖ I (t1).0 ‖ I (x2).I (x2).I (〈t1, x2〉).0 ‖ dC ′′e
In this case we observe that:
Q = I (t2).0 ‖ I (t1).0 ‖ I (x2).I (x2).I (〈t1, x2〉).0 ‖ dC ′′e
⇒ 0 ‖ I (t1).0 ‖ I (t2).I (〈t1, t2〉).0 ‖ dC ′′e︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
Then we have:
bQc = I(t2), I(t1), C ′′ −→ I(t2), I(t1), I(〈t1, t2〉), C ′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
C′
[by rI6]
and it is easy to check that bQ′c = C ′.
• paν (i.e., new name generation)
The only possible transition paν happens when analyzing cases in (b) i.e., when (C,Q) =
(Q, bQc). In fact no process obtained from d e can perform a paν transition as first step.
? Case (II.b): (C,Q) = (bQc, Q′). The first easy scenario is the following:
Q =
νn1.··· .νnh︷︸︸︷
νn .Pρ ‖ dCe
⇒ νn2. · · · νnh.Pρ[m/n1] ‖ dCe︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
In this case, being νn2. · · · νnh.Pρ[m/n1] one of the processes left out by encoding b c, we have
that bQ′c = bQc = C, and we conclude observing that C −→∗ C is a possible transition.
? Case (II.b′): the second, more interesting, scenario happens when :




[θ][m/n1] ‖ dCe︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′




p˜i(t), C ′′ −→ Aρ0(x;n)[θ′], dCe︸ ︷︷ ︸
C′
[by rρ0]
and it is easy to check that dC ′e = Q′.
• pa[] (i.e., matching)
The only interesting case happens when C = Aρi−1(x′[θ]), C ′′ and rρi = Aρi−1(t(x)) −→
Aρi(x). Let start observing that in this case transition dCe ⇒ Q′ can be written as:
dCe =
dAρi−1 (x′[θ])e︷ ︸︸ ︷
[x′[θ] = t(x)].
drρi+1e#(x)[θ]︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pρ[θ] ‖ bC ′′c
⇒
drρi+1e#(x)[θ][θ′]=dAρi (x[θ][θ′])e︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pρ[θ][θ′] ‖ bC ′′c [where θ′ : x′[θ] = t(x)[θ′]]
Then we have:
C = Aρi−1(x
′[θ]), C ′′ −→ Aρi(x[θ][θ′]), C ′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
C′
and it is easy to check that dC ′e = Q′.
• pa≡ (i.e., structural equivalence)
The proof in case of pa≡ transitions, follows easily from the previous transition cases by
induction.
Here ends proof of (II), where we have shown that for every (C,Q) ∈ R Q ⇒ Q′ implies
C −→∗ C ′, and (C ′, Q′) ∈ R.
Main Theorem (Reminder) 2 Given an PAP security protocol theory Q. Then bQc ∼ Q.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 5.5.9, by defining the relation R′ = {(bQc, Q) : Q0 ⇒∗
Q} and showing that it is a correspondence relation ∼.
6
Security Analysis with Team Automata
“Molti ci gabbano” (Leonardo da Vinci in
Aforismi, Novelle e Profezie, L. da Vinci)
“Many people deceive us”
Abstract
In this chapter we develop a framework based on team automata that can be used for formal
security analysis. To this aim, we first define an insecure communication scenario for team
automata, which is general enough to encompass various communication protocols. Then,
we reformulate the Generalized Non-Deducibility on Compositions schema, originally intro-
duced in the context of process algebras, in terms of team automata. Based on the resulting
framework, we subsequently develop a compositional analysis strategy that can be used for
the verification of security properties for a variety of communication protocols. We apply the
framework in practise, by showing that integrity is guaranteed for a particular instance of the
Efficient Multi-chained Stream Signature protocol.
6.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen an increasing interest in the use of automata-based formalisms for the
specification and verification of security properties in communication protocols [109, 129, 140,
169, 170]. We continue this line of research by showing how team automata — an extension of
Input/Output (I/O) automata [142] — can be used for security analysis.
Team automata offer a flexible formal model which allows one to specify the components of a
reactive, distributed system and – separately – to describe their interactions. Originally introduced
in the context of Computer Supported Cooperative Work for formalizing the conceptual and ar-
chitectural levels of groupware systems [18, 74, 123], team automata have proved their usefulness
also in the context of computer security. In [195] various access control strategies have been spec-
ified and analyzed by means of team automata. An effort was made in [72] to use team automata
to model and analyze a privacy property of a protocol by Cachin et al. [41] for securing mobile
agents in a hostile environment.
In this chapter we develop a general framework for security analysis with team automata. To
this aim, we first define an insecure communication scenario for team automata, based on the ad-
dition of a so-called most general intruder to a team automaton model of a secure communication
protocol. Then, we reformulate the GNDC schema in terms of team automata and subsequently
describe a compositional analysis strategy for insecure scenario, which can be used for verifying
security properties. Finally, we apply this framework to show that a particular instance of the
Efficient Multi-chained Stream Signature (EMSS) protocol [173] achieves integrity. The aim of
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this case study is not to provide new insights into the EMSS protocol, but rather to show the ef-
fectiveness of our approach for a well-known stream signature protocol, thus facilitating an easy
comparison for those familiar with other approaches.
Our approach is not unique. In [140], an experiment involving the combination of simple
shared-key communication with the Diffie-Hellman key distribution protocol [67] is modelled and
proved correct using I/O automata. As noted by the author herself, a limitation of I/O automata
approach is the fact that the protocol allows only purely passive eavesdroppers to listen in on the
communication. This choice simplifies the formulation of compositional results, as an eavesdrop-
per cannot change the course of communication, e.g., by conducting a communication in which
it pretends to be an honest participant. The I/O automata approach does provide compositional
reasoning techniques.
Another related approach can be found in [169, 170], where interactive state machines —
another extension of I/O automata — are introduced and applied to security analysis. In partic-
ular, interacting state machines are used to model and analyze the classic Needham-Schroeder
public-key authentication protocol in the corrected version by Lowe [138]. An advantage of this
approach is the fact that it allows one to automatize the verification, and to prove theorem-like
properties, using the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [168]. What is missing are solid techniques for
compositional reasoning over more complex communication protocols.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 we define team automata, after which we
describe an insecure communication scenario for team automata in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4 we
reformulate the GNDC schema in terms of team automata and enrich the insecure scenario with a
compositional analysis strategy. We subsequently apply this in Section 6.5 by verifying integrity
in a case study, in which team automata specify an instance of the EMSS protocol. Finally, the
chapter is concluded by a summary of our main results and some directions for future work.
6.2 Background on Team Automata
A team automaton consists of a number of component automata — which are ordinary automata
without final states in which actions are divided into input, output, and internal actions — com-
bined in a coordinated way so that they can perform shared actions. Internal actions have strictly
local visibility and cannot be used for communicating with other component automata, while input
and output actions together form the external actions that are observable by other components and
that are used for the communication between components. During each communication step the
components within a team may simultaneously participate in one instantaneous action, i.e., syn-
chronize on this action, or remain idle. Component automata can thus be combined in a loose or
more tight fashion depending on the actions on which to synchronize and when. Team automata
can in turn be used as components in a higher-level team automaton.
Technically, team automata are an extension of I/O automata. However, whereas I/O automata
are required to be input enabled, i.e., in each state it must be possible to execute every input action,
such a restriction does not hold for component (and team) automata. Moreover, the composition
of a set of component automata need not result in a unique team automaton, but can be a whole
range of team automata—distinguishable only by their synchronizations. I/O automata, on the
other hand, are uniquely defined by their constituents. Finally, I/O automata do not allow output
actions to be synchronized, whereas team automata do.
The main feature distinguishing team automata from other models in the literature is the free-
dom they offer by allowing one to choose the synchronizations when composing a team from a




Figure 6.1: Transition space of TA. Here a ∈ Σ is an action name. Each tuple of circles represents
a state of the team automaton, whereas each individual circle represents a state of a component
automaton. Black circles are the states that participate in a-transitions (here represented as dotted
lines). Any transition in the set, ∆a(S), of all the a-transitions is a potential a-transition of the
team automata (here represented as solid lines). The definition of a transition relation δa allows
only a selection of a-transitions to be part of the resulting team automata (the cross-hatched area)
.
set of component automata. Most automata-based models, on the contrary, use a single method
of composition, resulting in composite automata that are uniquely defined by their constituents.
This holds for all the above mentioned automata-based models, and — in disguise — in several
non-automata-based models, like CSP and statecharts [112].
We briefly introduce the notation and terminology used throughout this chapter; then we recall
some definitions and results concerning team automata from [18, 196].
The (Cartesian) product of sets Vi, with i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is denoted by
∏
i∈{1,...,n} Vi. In
addition to the prefix notation, we also use the infix notation V1 × · · · × Vn. For j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
projj :
∏
i∈{1,...,n} Vi → Vj is defined by projj((a1, . . . , an)) = aj . The power-set of a set V is
denoted by 2V . Let Σ and Γ be sets of symbols, Γ ⊆ Σ . The morphism presΣ,Γ : Σ∗ → Γ∗,
defined by presΣ,Γ(a) = a if a ∈ Γ and presΣ,Γ(a) = λ (the empty string) otherwise, preserves the
symbols from Γ and erases all other symbols. In the following we discard Σ when no confusion
can arise, and we use of the trivial extension of presΓ to sets of sequences.
Let f : A→ A′ and g : B → B′ be functions. Then f × g : A×B → A′ ×B′ is defined as
(f × g)(a, b) = (f(a), g(b)). We use f [2] as shorthand for f × f .
Definition 6.2.1 An automaton is a 4-tuple A = (Q,Σ, δ, I), with a set Q of states, a set Σ of
actions, Q ∩ Σ = ∅, a set δ ⊆ Q × Σ × Q of transitions, and a set I ⊆ Q of initial states. The
set CA of computations of A consists of all the sequences α = q0a1q1 · · · anqn, where n ≥ 0 and
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q0 ∈ I , and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}: qi ∈ Q, ai ∈ Σ, and (qi−1, ai, qi) ∈ δ. The Γ-behavior BΓA of
A, with Γ ⊆ Σ, is defined by BΓA = presΓ(CA).
The Σ-behavior ofA is also called the behavior ofA, in which case Σ may be omitted. Finally,
note that behavioral inclusion defines a preorder relation on automata.
As said before, team automata are composed of component automata, which are automata
distinguishing input, output, and internal actions.
Definition 6.2.2 A component automaton is a construct C = (Q, (Σinp,Σout,Σint), δ, I), with an
underlying automaton (Q,Σinp ∪ Σout ∪ Σint, δ, I) and pairwise disjoint sets Σinp of input, Σout
of output, and Σint of internal actions.
The set Σ denotes the set Σinp ∪ Σout ∪ Σint of actions of the component automaton C and Σext
denotes its set Σinp∪Σout of external actions. In the sequel we let S = {Ci | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} be an
arbitrary but fixed set of component automata specified by Ci = (Qi, (Σi,inp,Σi,out,Σi,int), δi, Ii),
with set Σi = Σi,inp∪Σi,out∪Σi,int of actions and set Σi,ext = Σi,inp∪Σi,out of external actions.
When composing team automata the various internal actions of the components automata must
be kept private, i.e., be uniquely associated to one component automaton. This is obtained by
requiring that Σi,int ∩
⋃
j∈({1,...,n}−{i})Σj = ∅, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i.e., no internal action
of any component from S may appear as an action in any of the other components constituting
S. If this is the case, then S is called a composable system and in the sequel we assume that S
is a composable system. We speak of a team automaton over S if its components are exactly the
automata in S.
The state space of a team automaton is the product of the state spaces of the components (in S).
The internal actions of the components are the internal actions of the team automaton. Each action
which is output for one or more of the components is an output action of the team. In particular, an
action that is an output action of one component and also an input action of another component, is
considered an output action of the team automaton. The input actions of the team that do not occur
at all as output action of any of the components in S, are the input actions of the team. The reason
for this construction is the following. When relating an input action a of a component to an output
action a of another component, the input may be thought of as being caused by the output. On
the other hand, the output action remains observable as output. Finally, the transitions of a team
automaton over S are based on, but not fixed by, the transition of transition of the components
constituting S. They are chosen by allowing certain synchronizations on actions, while excluding
others. To define a TA, we need to synchronize various component automata. The following
definition allows us to define the ”maximal synchronization” setting. Let a ∈ Σ, in the following
the set δa, called a-transitions of A, is defined as δa = {(q, q′) | (q, a, q′) ∈ δ}.
Definition 6.2.3 Let S a set of component automata, and a ∈ ⋃i∈{1,...,n}Σi. The set ∆a(S) of
synchronizations of a is defined as






Qi | (∃ j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : projj [2](q, q′) ∈ δj,a)
and (∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} :(proji[2](q, q′) ∈ δi,a) or (proji(q) = proji(q′)))}.
The set ∆a(S) thus contains all possible combinations of a-transitions of the components in S,
with all non-participating components remaining idle. It is explicitly required that at least one
component is non-idle. Figure 6.1 gives an idea of the transition space ∆a(S) of a team automaton
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over S. When defining a team automaton over S, a specific subset of ∆a(S) must be chosen for
each action a. This specifies the synchronization between the components constituting the team.
Definition 6.2.4 Let S = {(Qi,Σi,inp,Σi,out, Σi,int, δi, Ii) | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} be a set of com-


















δ ⊆ Q× Σ×Q
Here I =
∏
i∈{1,...,n} Ii, δ is such that δa = {(q, q′) | (q, a, q′) ∈ δ} ⊆ ∆a(S), for all a ∈ Σ =
Σinp ∪ Σout ∪ Σint, and δa = {(q, q′) | (q, a, q′) ∈ δ} = ∆a(S), for all a ∈ Σint.
All team automata over a given composable system have the same set of states, the same
alphabet of actions — including the distribution over input, output, and internal actions — and the
same set of initial states. They only differ in the choice of the transition relation δ and only as far
as external actions are concerned: for each external action a we have the freedom to choose δa.
This implies that S, even if it is a composable system, does not uniquely define a team automaton.
Each choice of synchronizations thus defines a team automaton. It is important to observe that
every team automaton is again a component automaton, which in turn can be used as a component
in an hierarchically composed team.
It can be useful to hide certain external actions of a team automaton before composing this
team with other teams to avoid synchronizations on these actions (on a higher level of the compo-
sition).
Definition 6.2.5 Let T = (Q, (Σinp,Σout,Σint), δ, I) be a team automaton and let Γ ⊆ Σext.
Then hideΓ(T) = (Q, (Σinp − Γ,Σout − Γ,Σint ∪ Γ), δ, I).
In hideΓ(T), the external actions in Γ have thus become unobservable to other automata by regard-
ing them as internal actions.
6.2.1 The Max-ai Team Automata
In the sequel, we make use of a team automaton of a specific type, called max-ai team automaton1.
Informally, the max-ai team automaton over a composable system S is the unique team automaton
in which any execution of an action a sees the participation of all components having a in their set
of actions. Before we can define max-ai automata, we first need to define the following relation
Raia (S):
1Here “ai” stands for action indispensable.
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Definition 6.2.6 Let a ∈ ⋃i∈{1,...,n}Σi. The set is-ai for a in S, denoted by Raia (S), is defined as
Raia (S) = {(q, q′) ∈ ∆a(S) | ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : [a ∈ Σi ⇒ proji[2](q, q′) ∈ δi,a]}.
The set Raia (S) thus contains all and only those a-transitions from ∆a(S) in which every com-
ponent automaton with a as an action participates. Hence the max-ai team automaton over S is
the unique team automaton in which any execution of a sees the participation of all components
having a in their set of actions.
Definition 6.2.7 T = (Q, (Σinp,Σout,Σint), δ, I) is the max-ai team automaton over S, denoted
by ||| S, if δa = Raia (S), for all a ∈ Σ.
Figure 6.2 shows two component automata C1 and C2. Figure 6.3 shows two of the several
team automata that can be built by starting from those component automata. We enforce maximal
synchronization in Tai = ||| {C1,C2}: any execution of action a and action b sees the participation
of both components whenever possible. Tfree is the team automaton over {C1,C2} in which any















Figure 6.2: Example of two composite automata, C1 and C2. Here q1, q′1, q2, and q′2 are states,








































Figure 6.3: Example of two different TA over {C1,C2}. Tai is the max-ai team automaton. Tfree
is the team automaton whose transition relation selects those transitions of the team involving only
one single component.
The Γ-behavior of a team automaton T, denoted as BΓT , is defined as usual in automata theory
(see Definition 6.2.1). In particular, BΓT = presΓ(CT), with set CT of computations of T consist-
ing of all the sequences α = q0a1q1 . . . anqn, where n ≥ 0 and q0 is an initial state, qi, are states,
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ai are actions and (qi−1, ai, qi) are transitions. When Γ = Σout, then BΣoutT is the output behavior
of T. By appropriately choosing Γ, also the input and the internal behavior of T can be defined.
Remark 6.2.8 In [18] it was shown that the behavior of an iteratively composed max-ai team
automaton equals that of the max-ai team automaton over the underlying components. For ex-
ample, considering the automata in Example 6.3, if T′ and T′′ are the max-ai team automata over
{T′′,C3} and {C1,C2} respectively, and if T is the max-ai team automaton over {C1,C2,C3}, then
BT′ = BT .
6.2.2 Compositionality in Team Automata
A team automaton is said to satisfy compositionality if its behavior can be described in terms of
that of its constituents i.e., when the behavior of the team automaton automata can be expressed
as a shuffled version of the sequences that form the behaviors of the set of its components [196].
Definition 6.2.9 Let ∆i be alphabets and Li ⊆ ∆∗i , with i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The fully synchronized
shuffle, || {∆i|i∈{1,...,n}} Li is defined as || {∆i|i∈{1,...,n}} Li = {w ∈ (
⋃
i∈{1,...,n}∆i)
∗ | ∀ i ∈
{1, . . . , n} : pres∆i(w) ∈ Li}.
Example 6.2.10 Let ∆1,∆2 be alphabets. Let L1 = {abc} be a sequence such that L1 ⊆∆1 =
{a, b, c} and L2 = {cd} a second sequence such that L2 ⊆ ∆2 = {c, d}. Then, the fully syn-
chronized shuffle abc ∆1 || ∆2 cd = {abcd} (i.e., words must synchronize on ∆1 ∩ ∆2 = {c}).
Before continuing, we observe the following property of full synchronized shuffles.
Remark 6.2.11 Let ∆i, with i ∈ {1, .., 4}, be alphabets and let Li ⊆ ∆∗i . Then
|| {∆1,∆3} {L1, L3} ⊆ || {∆2,∆4} {L2, L4}
whenever L1 ⊆ L2 and L3 ⊆ L4.
In [196] it was shown that the construction of team automata to certain types of synchroniza-
tion, like the one leading to max-ai team automata, guarantees compositionality.
Theorem 6.2.12 (Compositionality of team automata) Let T be the max-ai team automaton
over S. Then BT = || {Σi|i∈{1,...,n}} BCi .
6.3 An Insecure Communication with Team Automata
In this section we use team automata to model a generic (insecure) communication system in
which to analyze security properties.
We assume all actions to be built over a first order signature σ, where predicate symbols are
seen as communication channels and atomic formulas as messages. We assume that σ contains
at least the following function symbols: { } encryption, 〈 , 〉 paring, h( ) hashing, and those
indicating the secret and public key, sk( ) and pk( ) respectively. We let m,m′ range over the
set Messages of atomic formulas and c, c′ over the set Channels of predicate symbols. In the
sequel, Eve, Eve′, Pub, Pub′, Reveal, and Reveal′ will be used as particular predicate names.
An action is denoted by c(m), which represents a message m sent over channel c. Given a set
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M ⊆ Messages of messages, we define c(M) = {c(m) | m ∈ M}. Given a set C of predicate
names we define C(M) = {c(m) | m ∈ M, c ∈ C}. Finally, with a little abuse of notation, we
will also write C as an abbreviation for the set C(Messages).
We abstract from the cryptographic details concerning the operations according to which mes-
sages can be encrypted, decrypted, hashed, et cetera, but we assume the presence of a cryptosystem
(defined by a derivation operator `) that implements these operations. By applying cryptographic
operations from this cryptosystem to a set M of messages, a new set KS (M) = {m | M ` m}
of messages (usually called the deduction set) can be obtained. This approach is standard in the
analysis of (cryptographic) communication protocols [53, 86, 134, 140].
In the sequel, we model a generic cryptographic communication protocol specification involv-
ing two roles, viz. an initiator TS and a responder TR. We assume all the communication between
TS and TR to flow through an insecure channel (cf. Figure 6.4). This insecure channel may release
some messages to an intruder which, in turn, can eavesdrop on these messages as well as inject
fake messages in the communication channel. This is a standard approach for verifying security
properties for (cryptographic) communication protocols. A protocol specification is considered
secure with respect to a security property if it satisfies this property despite the presence of the
intruder. As in [140], the insecure channel and the intruder are modelled by team automata TIC
and TX . We thus propose a framework consisting of four types of team automata (see also Fig-
ure 6.4):
1. TS plays the role of the protocol’s initiator,
2. TR plays the role of the protocol’s responder,
3. TIC plays the role of the insecure channel, and
4. TX plays the role of the active and malicious intruder.
We let the initiator and the responder communicate with the insecure channel through disjoint
sets of actions ΣScom and ΣRcom, respectively, so that a direct communication between them is
impossible. The TIC , in turn, can interact with the intruder only through a distinct set ΣIcom of
actions. Finally, some particular actions may be used by an honest role to reveal some information
to the outside concerning, e.g., a state reached during a run of the protocol.
We let TP denote the team automaton representing our protocol specification in the absence of the
intruder. We thus define TP to be the max-ai team automaton over {TS ,TR, TIC } that is obtained
after hiding the actions ΣPcom = ΣScom ∪ ΣRcom, i.e., all messages passing through the insecure
channel (e.g., ΣPcom = {Pub(m), Pub′(m) | ∀m ∈ Messages} in Figure 6.4). Hence
TP = hideΣPcom( ||| {TS ,TR,TIC }).
By hiding ΣPcom, TP - appears as a black box, possibly with some output actions ΣSsig and ΣRsig—
signalling the successful reception of messages. Usually such signals are used only for verification
purposes and for the sequel we assume that ΣSsig ∩ ΣRsig = ∅ (e.g., ΣSsig = {Reveal} and ΣRsig =
{Reveal′} in Figure 6.4).
We let TI be the team automaton representing the protocol specification in presence of the
intruder. The actions in ΣIcom serve as back-door for intrusion and are added to TIC (e.g., ΣIcom =
{Eve, Eve′} in Figure 6.4). This is what we need to guarantee that the intruder TX may commu-
nicate with TP only through the insecure channel. We define TI to be the max-ai team automaton
over {TP ,TX } that is obtained after hiding the actions ΣIcom, i.e., all messages that the intruder













Figure 6.4: The insecure communication scenario for Team Automata. The insecure scenario is
represented by the automaton TI . Within the scenario, TS models the protocol’s initiator, TIC
models the insecure channel, TR models the protocol’s responder, and TX represents the Dolev-
Yao [69] intruder. The team automaton TP , composed over {TS ,TIC ,TR} represents the secure
scenario.
can eavesdrop from and inject back into the insecure channel. We thus enforce maximal synchro-
nization between the intruder and the protocol. Hence
TI = hideΣIcom( ||| {TP ,TX })
We have now defined an insecure communication scenario for team automata by composing a
secure communication scenario with an intruder.
6.4 GNDC Security Analysis for Team Automata
In Chapter 3 (Section 3.2) we have already seen that GNDC is a scheme that has the form
P ∈ GNDCα/ iff ∀X ∈ EC : (P ‖ X) \ C / α(P )
where (P ‖ X) \ C denotes the parallel composition of processes P and X restricted to commu-
nication over channels other than C. X is an arbitrary (possibly malicious) process in the environ-
ment EC , the set of all processes whose communicating actions are in C. By varying the parame-
ters / and α, the GNDC schema can be used to define and verify many security properties—among
which secrecy, integrity, and entity authentication [81, 84, 86, 104, 149]. Recently, a slightly ex-
tended GNDC schema was defined [85], incorporating the fact that the set of bad behaviors of P
may depend on P itself and on the property under scrutiny.
In the specific context of analyzing cryptographic communication protocols, the static (initial)
knowledge of the hostile environment must be bound to a specific set of messages. This limitation
is needed to avoid a hostile intruder that is too strong, and which would therefore be able to corrupt
any secret (as it would know all cryptographic keys, et cetera). This brings us to the definition of a
new environment EφC , based on EC , of all processes communicating through actions C and having
an initial knowledge of at most the messages in KS (φ). For the analysis of safety properties
(e.g., secrecy, integrity, and entity authentication) it is sufficient to consider the trace inclusion
relation ≤ as a behavioral relation between the terms of the algebra [86]. Hence, let us consider
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the GNDC instance
P ∈ GNDCα≤ iff ∀X ∈ EφC : (P ‖ X) \ C ≤ α(P ), (6.4.1)
which was, e.g., used in [104] to analyze integrity in stream signature protocols. Informally, (6.4.1)
requires traces of process (P ‖ X) \ C to be included in the traces of process α(P ), representing
the expected behavior of P when no adversary is present.
6.4.1 Reformulating GNDC in Terms of Team Automata
We begin by describing the team automaton TP = {Q, (ΣPinp,ΣPout,ΣPint), δ, I} which models the
system P . Because (6.4.1) requires P to communicate with X through the channels contained
in C, we let C = Cinp ∪ Cout; the actions in Cinp are input to X and the actions in Cout that are
output to X . In the sequel, we assume C to coincide exactly with ΣIcom and, in particular, Cinp
with the actions in ΣIcom that are input to TX (e.g., {Eve} in Figure 6.4) and Cout with the actions
in ΣIcom that are output to TX (e.g., {Eve′} in Figure 6.4). We are now able to formalize the hostile
environment EC in terms of team automata as:
EC = {(Q, (Σinp,Σout,Σint), δ, I) | Σinp ⊆ Cinp, Σout ⊆ Cout}. (6.4.2)
In addition, (6.4.1) requires the initial knowledge of the environment to be bound to a specified set
of messages φ. This means that the environment should be able to produce, by means of only its
internal functioning, at most the messages contained in KS (φ). In terms of team automata, this
means that a component automaton in the environment, when considered as a stand-alone com-
ponent, can only execute output actions belonging to C(KS (φ)). Formally, the initial knowledge




C = {X ∈ EC | {γ ∈ BX | γ ∈ ΣXout
∗} ⊆ (C(KS (φ)))∗}. (6.4.3)
Finally, we need a behavioral notion of comparison between team automata which abstracts from
their internal and communicating actions. Furthermore, we want to be able to exclude all se-
quences containing an action occurring in C. Therefore, we hide the output actions involved in
the communications and we define the observational behavior (with respect to actions not in C)
of the resulting team automata as the sequences consisting solely of external actions not in C.
Definition 6.4.1 Let T = (Q, (Σinp,Σout,Σint), δ, I) be a team automaton over S, let Σcom ⊆
Σext, and let T′ = hideΣcom(T). Then the observational behavior of T′ with respect to actions not
in C, denoted by OCT′ , is defined as




As a result we are able to reformulate (6.4.1) in terms of team automata.
Definition 6.4.2 Let α(TP ) be the expected (correct) behavior of TP . Then:
TP ∈ GNDCα(TP )⊆ iff ∀X ∈ EφC : OChideC( ||| {TP ,X}) ⊆ α(TP ).
Informally, Definition 6.4.2 says that TP (i.e., a cryptographic communication protocol specified
in the insecure communication scenario) satisfies GNDCα(TP )⊆ if and only if its observational
behavior, despite communicating with any intruder X through the actions C, is included in α(TP ).
A significant instance of α is, e.g., αint(TP ) = OCTP , which will be used in Section 6.5.2 to
express integrity.
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6.4.2 Security Analysis Strategies for Team Automata
While allowing a uniform approach for specifying security properties, Definition 6.4.2 does not
provide us with effective strategies for the analysis of (cryptographic) communication protocols.
In particular, the universal quantification over EφC causes serious problems when checking TP ∈
GNDCα(TP )⊆ . Luckily, the strategies developed for GNDC in the context of process algebras can
be transferred to team automata.
The Most General Intruder. To avoid the infinite number of checks that the universal quantifi-
cation requires, we now show that there exists an attacker that is more powerful (with respect to
a chosen behavioral relation) than all the others. In this way one can reduce the analysis against
any environment to an analysis against only one, albeit very powerful, so-called most general in-
truder. From the theory of GNDC [85] we know that a sufficient condition for the existence of
such a most general intruder, is to have a behavioral relation that is a pre-congruence with respect
to the (parallel) composition and restriction operators. Restated in our framework we say that /
is a pre-congruence (with respect to ||| and hideC) if for every automaton T, X and X′ in EC ,
whenever BCX /BCX′ then OChideC( ||| {T,X}) /O
C
hideC( ||| {T,X′}). It is not difficult to prove that this
is true in our case, viz.
Lemma 6.4.3 Let T = (Q, (ΣTinp,ΣTout,ΣTint), δ, I) be a team automaton and let X,X′ ∈ EC .
Then
BCX ⊆ BCX′ implies OChideC( ||| {T,X}) ⊆ O
C
hideC( ||| {T,X′}).
Proof. Let a1 · · · an ∈ OChideC( ||| {T,X}) and let B
C
X ⊆ BCX′ . By (6.4.2), ΣXext ⊆ C because
X ∈ EC . Then by Definition 6.4.1, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ai ∈ ΣText − C. We now use the
fact that by definition also all prefixes of a1 · · · an are included in OChideC( ||| {T,X}) and show by
induction that all prefixes of a1 · · · an are also included in OChideC( ||| {T,X′}). First, consider a1.
By Definition 6.4.1, either a1 ∈ BhideC( ||| {T,X}) or b1 · · · bma1 ∈ BhideC( ||| {T,X}), for some
m ≥ 1 and where, for all j ∈ [m], bj is an internal action of hideC( ||| {T,X}). In both cases,
since BCX ⊆ BCX′ and ai ∈ ΣText − C, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it follows by Definition 6.4.1
that a1 ∈ OChideC( ||| {T,X′}). Now assume that a1 · · · ak ∈ O
C
hideC( ||| {T,X′}), with k < n, and
consider a1 · · · ak+1. Using similar arguments as above and the induction hypothesis it follows
that a1 · · · ak+1 ∈ OChideC( ||| {T,X′}).
Since EφC ⊆ EC , this lemma holds for X,X′ ∈ EφC as well. Based on the approach of [86] we now
define a component automaton TopφC , representing the most general intruder.
We specify TopφC in the way that I/O automata are commonly defined [140, 142]. Its states
are thus defined by the current values of the variables listed under States, while its transitions are
defined, per action a, as preconditions (Pre) and effect (Eff), i.e., (q, a, q′) is a transition of TopφC
if the precondition of a is satisfied by q, while q′ is the transformation of q defined by the effect
of a. We omit the precondition (effect) of an action when it is true.
Recall that the set C of predicates that the intruder uses to interact with the insecure channel
is partitioned into Cinp and Cout (e.g., in Figure 6.4, Cinp = {Eve} and Cout = {Eve′}). Re-
call also that C (respectively, Cinp and Cout) is an abbreviation for C(Messages) (respectively,
Cinp(Messages)andCout(Messages)).
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TopφC
Actions
Inp: Cinp(Messages) Out: Cout(Messages) Int: ∅
States
received ⊆ 2Cinp(Messages), initially φ
Transitions
c(m) ∈ Cinp(Messages) c(m) ∈ Cout(Messages)
Eff: received := received ∪ {m} Pre: m ∈ KS (received)
The general way in which TopφC is specified implies that its behavior includes that of any
automaton from EφC .
Lemma 6.4.4 For all X ∈ EφC , BCX ⊆ BCTopφC .
Proof. Let X ∈ EφC . Then (6.4.3) implies that X ∈ EC and thus, by (6.4.2) and the specification
of TopφC , ΣXinp ⊆ Cinp = Σ
TopφC
inp and ΣXout ⊆ Cout = Σ
TopφC
out . From (6.4.3) and the specification
of TopφC it follows immediately that BCX ⊆ BCTopφC .
Lemmata 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 directly imply the following result.
Theorem 6.4.5 For all X ∈ EφC , OChideC( ||| {TP ,X}) ⊆ O
C
hideC( ||| {TP ,TopφC})
.
Together with Definition 6.4.2, this gives us the following result.
Corollary 6.4.6 Let α(TP ) be as in Definition 6.4.2. Then
TP ∈ GNDCα(TP )⊆ iff OChideC( ||| {TP ,TopφC}) ⊆ α(TP ).
Compositional Results. We now report some compositionality results for the insecure commu-
nication scenario which, as we will see, can simplify the analysis.
To begin with, we let:
T1 = hideΣPcom( ||| {TS ,TIC }) and T2 = hideΣPcom( ||| {TR,TIC }).
We then let TP be the team automaton defined at the end of Section 6.3, i.e., with ΣIcom = C
added to TIC . Therefore, TP represents the communication scenario in which an initiator and a
responder are connected by an insecure channel, but are not connected to the intruder. If we add
the most general intruder, some general compositional results can be proved. To this aim we let
T′1 = hideC( ||| {T1 ,TopφC}) and T′2 = hideC( ||| {T2 ,TopφC}).
The following lemma states that the observational behavior of the insecure scenario that sees T1 ,
T2 interacting with the intruder TopφC , can be obtained as a shuffle of the observational behaviors
of T′1 and T′2 .
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Lemma 6.4.7 Let {m | {c(m) ∈ ΣPcom} ⊆ φ. Then























Since ΣSsig ∩ ΣRsig = ∅, this follows directly from the fact that {m | {c(m) ∈ ΣPcom} ⊆ φ, i.e.,
adding TR (TS ) to T′1 (T′2 ) does not change the signals from ΣSsig (ΣRsig) which TS (TR) can
output because all messages that TR (TS ) can send to TIC have already been included in the initial
knowledge of TX .
The previous lemma is used to prove a compositional result over the GNDC specification for
team automata. The following theorem says that if T1 and T2 satisfy GNDC with respect to two
properties α(T1 ) nd α(T2 ) respectively, their composition satisfies GNDC with respect to the
shuffle of these properties.










and thus, by Lemma 6.4.7 and Remark 6.2.11,












{α(T1 ), α(T2 )}
6.5 A Case Study: The EMSS Protocol
The EMSS protocol was introduced in [173] and is used to sign digital streams. It exploits a
combination of hash functions and digital signatures and achieves robustness against packet loss,
i.e., an incompletely received stream may still allow the user to verify the integrity of the packets
that were not lost.
Actually, EMSS is a family of protocols and here we focus on its deterministic (1,2) schema.
We assume that a sender S wants to send a stream of payloads m0,m1, . . . ,mlast to a set of
receivers {Rn | n ≥ 1} (as usual for recipients of digital data streams, we assume that receivers
are not able to communicate to each other). The protocol then requires S to send tuples built from
payloads (called packets) to the receivers.
S
P0−→ {Rn | n ≥ 1} packet P0 = 〈0,m0,∅,∅〉
S
P1−→ {Rn | n ≥ 1} packet P1 = 〈1,m1, h(P0),∅〉
S
Pi−→ {Rn | n ≥ 1} packet Pi = 〈i,mi, h(Pi−1), h(Pi−2)〉 2 ≤ i ≤ last
S
Psign−→ {Rn | n ≥ 1} packet Psign = 〈{h(Plast), h(Plast−1)}sk(S)〉
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After the first two messages, each packet Pi contains a meaningful payload mi, together with
the hashes h(Pi−1) and h(Pi−2) of the previous two packets sent. The end of a stream is indicated
by a signature packet Psign containing the hashes of the final two packets, along with a digital
signature. We assume that the private sender key sk(S) cannot be deduced from {mi | 0 ≤ i ≤
last}.
6.5.1 The EMSS Protocol Modeled by Team Automata
In this section, we specify the deterministic (1,2) schema of the EMSS protocol with team au-
tomata. As already done for the specification of TopφC , we omit the precondition (effect) of an
action when it is true.
The sender S of the stream is modelled by a CA TS and the set {Rn | n ≥ 1} of receivers by
n copies of a CA TR. TS uses its private key sk(TS ) and a public key pk(TS ) to perform regular
digital signature operations. Let Messages denote the set {m0,m1, . . . ,mlast} of meaningful pay-
loads. Then TS and TR use the hash function h : Messages → Hashed. Moreover, TS uses the
function s : 2Hashed → Signed, defined by s(H) = Hsk(TS ), to sign sets of hashed messages with
its private key sk(TS ), whereas TR uses the function s¯ : Signed → {true, false} and the public
key pk(TS ) to verify whether or not a set of hashed messages was signed by TS .
In the specification of TS we explicitly model that each of its actions is enabled only once
during a computation, thus prohibiting loops. For example, as soon as TS has sent P0, then
this action’s precondition P0 /∈ sent prohibits this action to be executed again. For the sake of
readability, we omit the addition of such preconditions to the specification of TS but implicitly
assume that all the actions are executed only once during a computation. Note that each packet








〈1,m1, h(P0),∅〉} ∪ {
Pi︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈i,mi, h(Pi−1), h(Pi−2)〉 | 2 ≤ i ≤ last}
∪ {〈{h(Plast), h(Plast−1)}sk(TS )〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Psign
}
Int: {Hashi | 0 ≤ i ≤ last} ∪ {Sign}
States
sent ⊆ Messages, hashed ⊆ Hashed, signed ⊆ Signed, all initially ∅
Transitions
P0
Eff: sent := sent ∪ {P0}
Hashi, 0 ≤ i ≤ last
Pre: Pi ∈ sent ∧ h(Pi) /∈ hashed
Eff: hashed := hashed ∪ {h(Pi)}
P1
Pre: h(P0) ∈ hashed ∧ P1 /∈ sent
Eff: sent := sent ∪ {P1}
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Pi, 2 ≤ i ≤ last
Pre: {h(Pi−1), h(Pi−2)} ⊆ hashed ∧ Pi /∈ sent
Eff: sent := sent ∪ {Pi}
Sign
Pre: h(Plast) ∈ hashed ∧ s({h(Plast), h(Plast−1)}) /∈ signed
Eff: signed := signed ∪ {s({h(Plast), h(Plast−1)})}
Psign
Pre:{h(Plast), h(Plast−1)}sk(TS ) ∈ signed ∧ Psign /∈ sent
Eff: sent := sent ∪ {Psign}
Clearly TS has no input, while its output behavior BΣoutTS consists of all prefixes of P0P1 · · ·
PlastPsign. To send the packets P0, P1, . . . , Plast, Psign in this order, TS must perform some in-
ternal computations. This is reflected by its internal behavior BΣintTS consisting of all prefixes of
Hash0Hash1 · · · HashlastSign.
We now continue with the specification of TR. TR is capable of receiving as input behavior
packets from P0, P1, . . . , Plast, in the corresponding variables P ′i , for i = 0, . . . , last. Eventu-
ally TR receives the signature packet Psign, that ends the receiving phase. After, TR verifies the
accompanying digital signature of P ′sign(we assume that TR has previously retrieved the public
key pk(TS ) corresponding to the private key sk(TS )); the verification of the signature allows TR
to be sure of the integrity of the stream of verifiable payloads collected in xtractedM, which are
going to be sent to the application as output behavior of TR. The verification of the digital signa-
ture triggers the verification of the stream of the packets received. For i = last, . . . , 0, after TR
has verified P ′i , TR verifies whether it has received P ′i−1. If it is the case, TR extracts the hash
hi−1 from P ′i , computes the hash h(P ′i−1), and compares these two hashes. If they are equal, then
the variable m′i−1 that should contain the verifiable payload mi−1 is extracted from P ′i−1. Other-
wise TR has no output behavior. On the other hand, if TR did not receive P ′i−1 then TR verifies
whether it received P ′i−2. If TR did receive P ′i−2, then it extracts the hash hi−2 from P ′i , computes
the hash h(P ′i−2), and compares the two hashes. If they are equal, then the variable m′i−2 that
should contain the verifiable payload mi−2 is extracted from Pi−2. Otherwise TR has no output
behavior. As already done for the specification of TS we omit in the specification of TR the addi-
tion of preconditions that avoid loops; we implicitly assume that all the actions are executed only




P ′0︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈0,m′0,∅,∅〉,
P ′1︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈1,m′1, h0),∅〉} ∪ {
P ′i︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈i,m′i, h′i−1, hi−2〉 | 2 ≤ i ≤ last}




Int: {XtractHi,XtractMi,Hashi | 0 ≤ i ≤ last} ∪ {Verify, Stream}
States
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received, xtractedM ⊆ Payloads′, xtractedH, hashed ⊆ Hashed, all initially ∅
{{verifiedi|i = 0, . . . , last, sign}, send} ⊆ {true, false}, initially false
Transitions
P ′i , 0 ≤ i ≤ last
Pre: P ′sign 6∈ received
Eff: received := received ∪ {P ′i}
XtractHi,1, 1 ≤ i ≤ last
Pre: [{P ′i−1,
P ′i︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈i,m′i, hi−1, hi−2〉} ⊆ received] ∧ [verifiedi = true]
Eff: xtractedH := xtractedH ∪ {hi−1}
XtractHi,2, 2 ≤ i ≤ last
Pre: [{P ′i−2,
P ′i︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈i,m′i, hi−1, hi−2〉} ⊆ received] ∧ [Pi−1 /∈ received] ∧ [verifiedi = true]
Eff: xtractedH := xtractedH ∪ {hi−2}
P ′sign
Eff: received := received ∪ {P ′sign}
Verify
Pre: [P ′sign ∈ received] ∧ [s¯({
P ′sign︷ ︸︸ ︷
hlast, hlast−1}sk(TS )) = true]
Eff: verifiedsign := true, xtractedH := xtractedH ∪ {hlast, hlast−1}
XtractHsign,1
Pre: [{P ′last,
P ′sign︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈hlast, hlast−1〉} ⊆ received] ∧ [verifiedsign = true]
Eff: xtractedH := xtractedH ∪ {hlast}
XtractHsign,2
Pre: [{P ′last−1,
P ′sign︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈hlast, hlast−1〉} ⊆ received] ∧ [P ′last /∈ received] ∧ [verifiedsign = true]
Eff: xtractedH := xtractedH ∪ {h′last−1}
Hashi, 0 ≤ i ≤ last
Pre: hi ∈ xtractedH ∧ [P ′i ∈ received]
Eff: hashed := hashed ∪ {h(P ′i )}
XtractMi, 0 ≤ i ≤ last
Pre: [hi ∈ xtractedH] ∧ [h(P ′i ) ∈ hashed] ∧ [h(P ′i ) = hi]
Eff: xtractedM := xtractedM ∪ {m′i}, verifiedi := true
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Stream
Pre: [[m′last ∈ xtractedM] ∨ [[m′last−1 ∈ xtractedM] ∧ [P ′last /∈ received]]]
∧[verifiedsign = true]
Eff: send := true
m′0
Pre: [send = true] ∧ [m′0 ∈ xtractedM] ∧ [verified0 = true]
Eff:xtractedM := xtractedM− {m′0}
m′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ last
Pre: [send = true] ∧ [m′i ∈ xtractedM]
∧[{m′k | i ≤ k ≤ last} ∩ xtractedM = ∅] ∧ [verifiedi = true]
Eff: xtractedM := xtractedM− {m′i}
Remark 6.5.1 In the TR model, we have explicitly inverted (with respect to the specification of
EMSS) the order of messages in the output behavior of TR. Without losing generality and without
changing the final results of our analysis, this choice simplifies some technicalities. Observe that
the first message of the output sequence of TR must necessarily be either m′last or m′last−1.
We now go on with the construction the formal model of EMSS, TEMSS . It is defined as the
max-ai team automaton over {TS ,T(i)R | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Formally:
TEMSS = ||| {TS ,T(i)R | 1 ≤ i ≤ n},
Note that TEMSS has no input actions, while it has the union of the output (resp.,internal) actions
of TS and the TR’s as its output (resp.,internal) actions.
6.5.2 Analysis of the EMSS Protocol
In this section we use the GNDC schema for team automata together with the insecure communica-
tion scenario in order to show that the deterministic (1,2) schema of the EMSS protocol guarantees
integrity. Note that this has already been validated in [149], where a CCS-like process algebra was
used instead. Our goal here is thus to use this particular case study to show the effectiveness of
team automata for security analysis.
We model the sender S by TS and the receiver by TR. While here we consider one TR, this
analysis can be extended in a natural way to the case in which there are n copies of TR. We for-
mally define integrity as the ability of TR to accept a message mi, for any i, only if it has indeed
been sent by TS . We also assume that TR signals the acceptance of a stream of messages as a legiti-
mate stream by issuing it as a list of messages {Reveal′}. We require the expected (correct) obser-
vational behavior αint(TP ) of TP with respect to integrity as the set containing all prefixes of the





Reveal′(milast) · · · Reveal′(mi1)Reveal′(mi0) | 0 ≤ i0 < . . . < ilast ≤ last
}
Further, we equip TopφC with an initial knowledge φ consisting of all output actions of TS and
the public key pk(TS ), i.e., φ = {P0, P1, Pi, Psign | 2 ≤ i ≤ last} ∪ {pk(TS )}, where P0 =
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〈0,m0,∅,∅〉, P1 = 〈1,m1, h(P0),∅〉, Pi = 〈i,mi, h(Pi−1), h(Pi−2)〉, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ last,
and Psign = 〈{h(Plast), h(Plast−1)}sk(TS )〉. We do so solely for analysis reasons, viz. in order
to enable TopφC to send the correct messages to TR through the insecure channel. Note that the
messages contained in this initial knowledge are exactly those that the intruder is anyway able to
collect by eavesdropping what TS sends through the insecure channel. As is common in security
analysis, we rely on the perfect encryption assumption, i.e., TopφC cannot deduce sk(TS ) from φ
nor can it forge hash and encryption functions by guessing. From Section 6.4.2 we recall that
T1 = hideΣPcom( ||| {TS ,TIC }), T2 = hideΣPcom( ||| {TR,TIC })
T′1 = hideC( ||| {T1 ,TopφC}), T′2 = hideC( ||| {T2 ,TopφC})
Hence the observational behavior of the max-ai team automaton over T1 and TopφC is empty,
therefore
Lemma 6.5.2 T1 ∈ GNDC∅⊆.
Proof. Directly by Corollary 6.4.6 because OChideC( ||| {T1 ,TopφC})
= ∅.
We now show that the observational behavior of the max-ai team automaton over T2 and TopφC is
included in the expected observational behavior αint(TP ) of TP with respect to integrity,
Lemma 6.5.3 T2 ∈ GNDCαint(TP )⊆ .
Proof. Recall that the behavior of T2 coincides with TR when it interacts with the intruder. Let
us concentrate on the observable (output) behavior of TR in T2 .
If TR shows an empty output behavior ∅, the theorem is trivially satisfied. Otherwise the
output behavior of TR is a sequence of messages. From Remark 6.5.1 the first message of this
sequence must be either Reveal′(m′last) or Reveal′(m′last−1). We treat only the case in which
the first message is Reveal′(m′last); the other case is analogous. In the following we omit the
predicate Reveal′( ), for sake of conciseness.
First we prove the following statement:
Claim 6.5.4 Let P0, . . . , Plast, Psign be the correct packets sent by TS . If TR is in state where
verifiedi = true and {P ′i , Psign} ⊆ received then P ′i = Pi.
Proof of Claim 6.5.4 By induction over i = last, . . . , 0, in which the base case is i = last.
base case: (i = last). By the precondition of XtractMlast, verifiedlast = true implies that hlast ∈
xtractedH, h(P ′last) ∈ hashed and hlast = h(P ′last). By the precondition of Verify, hlast ∈
xtractedH implies that P ′sign ∈ received and verifiedsign = true. From the hypothesis we
know that Psign = 〈h(Plast), h(Plast−1)〉 has been received (in P ′sing), so (by the precondition
of Verify) verifiedsign = true implies that hlast is indeed h(Plast) i.e., it coincides with the
hash of the correct packet Plast. For the properties of hash functions in cryptography this
means that P ′last = Plast.
inductive step: assume that the hypothesis holds for j > i. By the precondition of XtractMi,
verifiedi = true provided that hi ∈ xtractedH, h(P ′i ) ∈ hashed and hi = h(P ′i ). Since
hi ∈ xtractedH, either the precondition of XtractHi,1 or the precondition of XtractHi,2)
must hold. Assume that the precondition of XtractHi,1 holds (the other case is analogous).
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We have that {P ′i , P ′i+1} ⊆ received and verifiedi+1 = true. By hypothesis, Psign is received
and, by the inductive hypothesis, P ′i+1 = Pi+1 i.e., P ′i+1 is authentic. By the precondition of
XtractHi,1 and by the hypothesis that verifiedi = true it follows that the hash hi, extracted
from P ′i+1 = 〈mi+1, hi, hi−1〉, is h(Pi) i.e., hi coincides with h(Pi), the hash of the correct
packet Pi. For the properties of hash functions in cryptography this means that P ′i = Pi.
End of the proof of Claim 6.5.4.
Now the result follows from the fact that: (a) the intruder is not able to forge Psign because
it doesn’t know the private key sk(TS ) of TS ; (b) by the precondition of actions m′i (for i =
0, . . . , last) in TR, messages are revealed by TR (hence by T2 ) in reverse order (with respect to the
packet number).
Finally, after an observation on the composition of team automata that have no internal actions,
we can show that integrity is guaranteed in the instance of the EMSS protocol under scrutiny.
Remark 6.5.5 If {T,T} is a composable system, then clearly B ||| {T,T} = BT .
Theorem 6.5.6 TP ∈ GNDCαint(TP )⊆ .
Proof. From Lemma 6.5.2 and 6.5.3 and Theorem 6.4.8 it follows that









|| {Reveal′} {∅,αint(TP )}
⊆
= GNDCαint(TP )⊆
Then by Corollary 6.4.6. OChideC( ||| { ||| {T1 ,T2 },TopφC})
⊆ αint(TP ). Since TIC has no inter-
nal actions, {TIC ,TIC } forms a composable system, the from Remarks 6.2.8 and 6.5.5 it fol-
lows that B ||| { ||| {T1 ,T2 },TopφC} = B ||| {TS ,TR,TIC ,TopφC} = B ||| {TP ,TopφC} and consequently, that
OChideC( ||| { ||| {T1 ,T2 },TopφC})
= OChideC( ||| {TP ,TopφC})
by Definition 6.4.1.
Hence OChideC( ||| {TP ,TopφC})
⊆ αint(TP ), and thus, by Corollary 6.4.6, TP ∈ GNDCαint(TP )⊆ .
6.6 Conclusions and Future Work
We use team automata to define a framework for security analysis by constructing a general in-
secure communication scenario for team automata and by reformulating the GNDC schema in
terms of team automata. We also define some effective compositional analysis strategies for this
insecure communication scenario. We also investigate strategies of analysis in our framework. We
Firstly, we define the most general intruder in terms of team automata. By the use of the most
general intruder we are able to avoid the universal quantification presents in the re-formulation
of the GNDC schema for team automata. Secondly, we define a compositional analysis strategy
for team automata, and we show how security properties are preserved by composition over an
initiator and a responder. We use the framework to prove that integrity is guaranteed in a case
study in which team automata models the EMSS protocol.
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A goal for the future is to try to automate the current manual verification process. Since
team automata are an extension of I/O automata, the IOA Language and Toolset [91] may be of
help when trying to achieve this goal. Another goal for the future is to extend the team automata
framework with time, probability, or both. Such extensions of automata-based formalisms are well
studied in the literature, e.g., for I/O automata [141, 183]. In this respect, also the well-developed
theory of timed automata needs to be mentioned [11, 129]. Like their I/O automata counterparts,
timed team automata could consider time in the systems they model, whereas probabilistic team





Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis we answer the following questions:
Question 1: can security protocol analysis and fault-tolerance analysis benefit from a common
background and common strategies?
Question 2: which are the differences and similarities between the various strategies used for
security protocol analysis?
We answer question 1 by identifying logic-based model checking as a strategy common to both
fault-tolerance analysis and security protocol analysis (Chapter 1 and Chapter 4). In the context
of industrial applications, we also show how existing tools can be used effectively in both fields
(Chapter 1 and Chapter 2). We prove that a scheme developed in security protocol analysis, the
Generalized Non Deducibility on Compositions (GNDC), can be re-formulated in the framework
of fault-tolerance analysis (Chapter 3). This result implies that any verification strategy used in
the GNDC for security analysis can be applied to fault-tolerance analysis as well. In particular,
we show that the “fault-tolerant” property is an instance of GNDC known as BNDC (Bisimulation
Non Deducibility on Compositions), and this implies that the existing tools for checking BNDC
can be used to check fault-tolerance as well.
Question 2 is answered in two different ways. Firstly, we prove that a bisimulation-like relation
exists between security protocols modeled as process in a process algebras and as a theory in
multiset rewriting systems (Chapter 5). To obtain this result, we use restricted versions of both
formalisms. Those versions are specifically tailored to security protocols. Secondly, we consider
Team Automata – an emerging automata-based formalism – and we show that the GNDC scheme
can be re-formulated in terms of Team Automata (Chapter 6).
7.1 Conclusions
We formulate the conclusions of this thesis in terms of some general principles and subsidiary,
specific statements. Statements are valid throughout this thesis, and generally summarize the
lessons learned during the experiences reported in this thesis. Principles have a wider validity.
Figure 7.1 shows principles and statements in a graphical form.
From Part I and Part II we learn a lesson concerning the concept of attack in security and the
concept of fault in fault-tolerance.


















































































































































































Too much expressive power slows down
development of analysis strategies
Figure 7.1: The five Principles (in light grey boxes) and the three Statements (in dark boxes) of
Integration in Security Protocol Analysis and Fault Tolerance Analysis.
Principle I The Intruder (in security protocol analysis) and the Fault Injector (in fault-tolerance
analysis) are essentially the same entity.
The intruder and the fault-injector share a fundamental characteristic: they can be modeled
as a malicious and active environment trying to subvert system goals. The understanding of this
principle is at the basis of the idea of applying techniques from security analysis to fault-tolerance.
The similarities between the intruder and the fault-injector become evident as soon as we
make clear the separation between the system model and the environment with which the system
interacts. In Chapter 1, where this separation is missing and where the faults are embedded in
the system model, this principle is not immediately clear. Contrastingly, in Chapter 3, where this
separation is applied to a fault-tolerant system, this similarity is evident; this allows us to bring
some strategies from one field to the other. In particular, we are able to characterize fault-tolerance
as a logic validation problem in the µ-calculus; in addition, we are able to reformulate the GNDC
scheme in the context of fault-tolerant systems. Figure 7.2 illustrates the intersection between
security protocol and fault-tolerance analysis that emerges from Principle 1.
From Part II, we learn an important lesson concerning the correct identification of a certain
role.
Principle II In engineering security critical applications, it is essential to realize when an object
plays the role of an encryption key.
This principle emerges from our study of OSA/Parlay architecture (Chapter 2). The simple
yet crucial step that leads to the correct analysis is the understanding that interfaces in web ap-





















Figure 7.2: Meeting Points between Fault Tolerance Analysis and Security Protocol Analysis
keys have. Every security system has key-like elements, that are sometimes difficult to identify.
The application of this principle says that recognizing the “being-key” property in an object is
essential, and objects of this kind have to be carefully protected.
We underline also that, while this principle is obvious in theory, in practice things are non-
trivial: informal specifications, resulting from long, cooperative development processes, can easily
hide a violation of this principle.
Principle III The use of too much expressive power in a formal modelling notation is counter-
productive to the development of analysis strategies .
This principle says that high expressive power in a formal modelling notation is attractive only
when we focus on the modeling activity. High expressiveness hinders when we try to develop
effective analysis strategies.
This principle emerges from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, and it becomes even more evident
in Chapter 6. In the following we list three specific statements supporting the principle, each
concerning the formal models studied in this thesis:
Statement 1 Multiset rewriting contains more inherent parallelism than it is required to analyze
security protocols.
Multiset rewriting is a powerful formalism for modeling and analyzing concurrent systems.
We do not need all of its power in expressing concurrency when describing and analyzing security
protocols. This statement emerges from Chapter 5, where a restricted version of multiset rewriting
proves to be sufficient to describe a large class of security protocols.
Statement 2 Most of the power of process algebras and multiset rewriting is unused when mod-
eling security protocols.
This statement stems from both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. In the first, we model traditional




Figure 7.3: Meeting Points between Process Algebra and Multiset Rewriting in Security Protocol
Analysis
security protocols without using features like mobility and intra-agent parallelism; security pro-
tocols are a parallel composition of sequential agents. Because of this, we are able to build an
optimized and more specific model checker. In Chapter 5 we restrict process algebra and multiset
rewriting to the security protocol context to obtain a strong result of correlation between (subsets
of) the two formalisms.
Statement 1 and Statement 2 are illustrated in Figure 7.3. Here, strand spaces [78] are placed in
the intersection. Strand spaces is a formalism that has been proved to be equivalent to a restricted
version of multiset rewriting [44]. Indirectly, we prove that strand spaces and process algebras are
related as well in the context of security protocol analysis.
Statement 3 Team Automata models are too complex for the effective support of security protocol
analysis.
Team Automata provides flexible models for the specification of communication in systems,
but the flexibility hinders when developing effective strategies of analysis. The possibility of defin-
ing different modalities of synchronization among automata brought us to study their application
in security protocol analysis. Peer-to-peer and multicast/broadcast communications can be ex-
pressed elegantly in team automata. Initially we were thinking of a potential unification between
strategies of analysis for security protocols and broadcast/multicast protocols [197]. What seemed
an advantage proved to be a disadvantage as soon as we started to develop the GNDC theory re-
quired for the development of strategies of security protocol analysis. In the end, in an attempt to
control the growth of the number of cases to be considered we were forced to use the very subset
of Team Automata required to describe traditional (unicast) security protocols.
Other calculi for the analysis of specific systems – like pi-calculus [161] for mobility and (from
a certain point of view) spi-calculus [7] for security protocols – show their strength just in their
conciseness.
Figure 7.4 depicts the relation between process algebras and Team Automata with respect to
the validation of security protocols. GNDC can also be defined in Team Automata terms. Since
I/O automata are a special class of Team Automata it follows that GNDC can be re-defined in
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terms of I/O automata as well.
Principle IV In the analysis of security protocols, automata-based languages are more effective
in quantitative (real-time and probabilistic) than qualitative analysis of security protocols.
This principle emerges from our experience of modeling security properties using Team Au-
tomata. For example, the flexibility of Team Automata helps in expressing advanced commu-
nication paradigms, such as multicast and broadcast [197]. However, in the domain of security
protocol analysis, Team Automata tools and analysis techniques are not competitive.
On the other hand, a significant amount of work on automata in timed security (e.g., see [103]),
and the existing associated tools (e.g., the real-time model checker UPPAAL) make them suitable
for studying timing attacks to security (e.g., see [61]). For what concerns the probabilistic analysis
of security, automata based models are, at present, as promising as process-algebraic approaches
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Principle V Formal schemes of analysis are essential for the unification of analysis techniques.
Creating a scheme of analysis requires an effort of abstraction, whose goal is to identify the
essential entities and their relationships that are required by the analysis. Redefining a scheme
in a different formal model requires (only) the modeling of its entities and its relationships in the
new formal model. The modeling activity can be technically complex, but the theoretical effort of
unification is, in essence, contained in the scheme itself.
For example, for the GNDC scheme, the entities are the system under analysis, its malicious
environment, an agent showing the expected behavior of the system, and a notion of “observ-
ability” relation. In Chapter 3 we apply the GNDC scheme to fault-tolerance, by identifying the
malicious environment with a fault-injector; in Chapter 6 we instantiate GNDC in terms of team
automata showing how to model the entities of the scheme as automata. In both cases we reuse
analysis techniques that are established for the GNDC scheme.
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7.2 Future Work
The research of this thesis can be developed further in at least two different directions: to improve
the techniques of analysis, and to extend the principles of integration to emerging disciplines.
First Direction. The analysis techniques developed in each chapter of the thesis can be improved
further as follows:
• In Chapter 3 we study a formal specification of fail safe, fail silent, fail stop and fault-
tolerance properties in the GNDC scheme. We prove that the “fault-tolerance” property en-
joys a precise classification in terms of GNDC, whereas the other properties are completely
expressible in GNDC only when we consider their instances in our running examples. A
complete formal characterization of these properties is still missing. A goal for the future
is to understand better the formal characteristics of fail silent, fail stop and fail safety prop-
erties and to conclude the classification of fault-tolerant properties as instances of security
(non-interference) properties, by following what has been done in security, for example by
Gorrieri and Focardi in [81, 83].
• In Chapter 4 we design a logic based model checker for the analysis of security protocols.
Our implementation runs in exponential time in the size of the longest message involved in
the protocol. This matches the expected theoretical computational complexity, so it is the
best we can expect. We think that our tool performance can be significantly improved by the
use of partial order reduction techniques. Moreover, we think that a (front-end module of)
static type analysis of the message flow along a protocol specification may help in defining
significant transformations, that in turn are used by our tool to improve the efficiency of the
dynamic analysis. It is interesting to investigate this area as future work.
• In Chapter 5 we relate process algebras and multiset rewriting in the restricted setting of
security protocol analysis. We find a bisimulation-like relation between security protocol
models in the two formalisms, that maintains secrecy and authenticity properties. It would
be interesting to identify other area of research in where such a ‘bisimulation-like” relation
can be defined.
• In Chapter 6 we provide Team Automata with a framework for the analysis of security
protocols. In this domain, a goal for the future is to automate the current manual verification
process. Since team automata are an extension of I/O automata, the IOA Language and
Toolset [91] may be of help when trying to achieve this goal. Another goal for the future is to
extend the team automata framework with time, probability, or both. For this we can benefit
from many previous experiences reported in the literature (e.g., see [141, 183, 11, 129])
where such extensions are proposed for different automata-based formalisms.
Second Direction. The principles of integration identified in this thesis have general validity
and can be applied to other fields of research as well. One of the possible contexts is privacy
control, which we started to investigate in [60]. In this emerging field, the need of instruments
for the specification and analysis of privacy policies is compelling. We hope that the usage of the
integration principles we have identified in this thesis can help in identifying techniques of process
specification and verification techniques also supported by verification tools.
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